Managing Empire: Romano-Italic Relations and the Origins of the Social War

by

Owen James Stewart, BA (Hons)

School of Humanities

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania

February, 2019

STATEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS

Declaration of Originality

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

Owen James Stewart

Date: 18/02/2019

Authority of Access

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Owen James Stewart

Date: 18/02/2019

Statement Regarding Published Work Contained in Thesis

The publisher of the paper comprising the majority of Chapter 1.4 (pages 29 to 42) hold the copyright for that content and access to the material should be sought from the respective journal. The remaining non-published content of the thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Owen James Stewart

Date: 18/02/2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all those who served as my supervisor throughout this project: Geoff Adams, with whom it all began, for his enthusiasm and encouragement; Jonathan Wallis for substituting while other arrangements were being made; and Jayne Knight for her invaluable guidance that made submission possible.

I would also wish to thank my parents for their unending support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

ABSTRACT

Managing Empire: Romano-Italic Relations and the Origins of the Social War

Owen James Stewart

Despite the importance of the Social War to events of Late Republican Rome much debate exists over the nature of the conflict itself. The conflict's origin as well as the motives of the combatants remains a topic of contention. This thesis uniquely considers the outbreak of the Social War in 91 BCE as a failure of Rome's alliance management. It proposes that tactics the Romans utilised to ensure the compliance of the Italian allies ceased to function effectively at the turn of the first century. By contrasting the Romans' approach to alliance management in the fourth and third centuries with that of the second, I argue that changes within the alliance gave rise to the possibility of conflict. To incentivise compliance in the earlier period, the Romans had secured the political and economic interests of the Italic communities. This incentive was not as potent in the later period. Instead, the Romans relied on deterrence against revolt, the other major component of their alliance management, to secure compliance. This is problematic for an alliance that relied heavily on cooperation. While this change occurred within the internal structure of the Italic alliances, I demonstrate that external factors were largely responsible. The addition of non-Italic communities to the alliance network and changes in domestic politics at Rome unsettled the foundations of the Italic alliances by altering the interests of both the Romans and the Italian allies. In this way, this study reveals the need for future research on the Social War to adopt a broad focus rather than treating the conflict as an isolated product of second century Italy.

INTRODUCTION

> During the consulship of Sextus Julius Caesar and Lucius Marcius Philippus, in the six hundred and fifty-ninth year from the founding of the city, when nearly all other wars were at rest, the Picentes, Marsi and Peligni set in motion a most serious war. For although these communities obeyed the Roman people for a great number of years, at this time they began to claim political equality for themselves.[1]

Such was Eutropius' summary of the origin of the Social War. In 91 BCE, a small, though not insignificant, number of Italic communities made the decision to commit to a war against their long-term allies the Romans. As is the case with Eutropius' account above, the Italian rebels are traditionally ascribed the desire for Roman citizenship as a motive for their actions. Yet the nature of the extant sources has often produced a degree of uncertainty about the origin of the war, which has generated a diverse range of modern interpretations and subsequent debate.[2] Eutropius' account, written in the fourth century CE, shares many attributes in common with other ancient narratives on the Social War. The majority of surviving accounts are either brief, as in the case of Livy's *Periochae*, Velleius Paterculus and Florus, or resemble Diodorus Siculus' fragmentary state. Appian's *Civil Wars* provides the only surviving detailed narrative, though this itself is the most heavily criticised of the sources.[3]

The state of the sources is perhaps somewhat surprising given the impact of the war on the later events of the Republic and the eventual formation of the Empire. Not only did the Social War spill over into the civil wars that brought an end to the Republic, but the enfranchisement of the inhabitants of the Italic communities at the conclusion of the Social War also drastically augmented political life at Rome.[4] The newly enfranchised could now directly influence the political process.[5] Furthermore, the enfranchisement of entire communities forced the old and

[1] Eutr. 5.3: *Sex. Iulio Caesare et L. Marcio Philippo consulibus, sexcentesimo quinquagesimo nono anno ab urbe condita, cum prope alia omnia bella cessarent, in Italia gravissimum bellum Picentes, Marsi Pelignique moverunt, qui, cum annis numerosis iam populo Romano obedirent, tum libertatem sibi aequam adserere coeperunt.* Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[2] Often, this modern debate concerns whether the Social War should be considered a revolt against Roman dominance (see Moursitsen [1998], Pobjoy [2000a], Keaveney [2005] and Steel [2013]) or a campaign aimed at acquiring Roman Citizenship (see Gabba [1976], Brunt [1988], and Dart [2014]).

[3] See especially Mouritsen (1998) 11-14.

[4] Enrolling all these people into the Roman census, however, did take over a decade.

[5] Bispham (2007) 161-204.

new Romans alike to consider appropriate ways to administer the new arrangement.[6] For this reason, understanding the origin of the Social War is of great significance.

0.1 – Review of Literature

In recent decades interest in the Social War has increased. This interest largely stems, I suspect, from Henrik Mouritsen's somewhat controversial monograph, *Italian Unification: A Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography*, published in 1998. This work challenged the conventional representation of the war by examining the pre-existing ideologies and historical contexts of both ancient and modern historians in order to gauge the effect these have had on the representation of the war.[7] As a consequence of his investigations, Mouritsen dismisses much of the existing literature on the topic and offers his own reconstruction of the lead up to the Social War based on what he believes to be a neglected secondary tradition present in the ancient sources.[8] Works published since tend to be formulated as a response to his conclusions. Mouritsen's *Italian Unification* thus forms the starting point of my analysis of modern works on the topic of the Social War.

Mouritsen's main argument against the conventional description of the Social War is his most significant contribution. Mouritsen sees the conventional view as being largely unquestioned and unchanged from the nineteenth century, particularly from the seminal work of Theodor Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*.[9] He argues that Mommsen's understanding of the Social War as a seemingly enviable event that would bring about a grant of Roman citizenship to all communities of the Italian Peninsula and ultimately the unification of Italy was modelled on his own nation's experience during the unification of Germany in the aftermath of the Napoleonic era.[10] Mommsen analysed the Social War from a teleological perspective, viewing the origin of the conflict in light of its outcomes, specifically the grant of citizenship to the Italic communities and the unification of the Italian Peninsula.

Mouritsen's criticisms, however, are not restricted to modern reconstructions. He identifies issues in the ancient sources' depiction of the period prior to the war's outbreak. Mouritsen in

[6] Ibid.
[7] Mouritsen's conclusions (1998: 24-33) about nineteenth century German scholars is particularly convincing.
[8] Mouritsen (1998) 5-6.
[9] Ibid. 1-3, 35.
[10] Mommsen (1894) 490-501. Mouritsen (1998) 24-6.

particular calls into question the account of Appian to the point that he disregards much of the ancient writer's evidence entirely. He dismisses the connection between M. Livius Drusus' legislative campaigns of 91 and the outbreak of the Social War as well as the inhabitants of the Italic communities' overall desire for Roman citizenship.[11] This approach to the ancient sources leaves many of his conclusions open to debate since he prefers his own hypothetical, and often unsupported, reconstructions to those found in the sources. He justifies his approach by suggesting that Appian strategically altered the circumstances leading up to the outbreak of the war, most notably its chronology and the representation of Drusus, in order to produce a thematic neatness to his work by linking the Social War to the civil unrest of the same period at Rome.[12] Mouritsen, therefore, offers a rendering of the Social War's outbreak based on his own alternative timeline and characterisations. To quote Mouritsen's own words, he is 'writing history without sources'.[13] Through this process, he avoids the citizenship issue altogether, believing its importance to be a backward projection written to appease a Roman audience adverse to the idea of Italic hostility towards Rome.[14]

Like Sherwin-White and Keaveney before him, Mouritsen concludes that the Social War was not fought for citizenship, but for independence.[15] More specifically, he proposes that the war was a rather 'straightforward rebellion against foreign domination'.[16] This line of thinking was taken up a short time later by Mark Pobjoy. He justifies this same conclusion by claiming that the organisation of the Italian rebels and the subsequent human loss as a result of armed conflict can hardly be associated with a campaign for citizenship rights.[17] Pobjoy does, however, disagree with Mouritsen's claim that the inhabitants of the Italic communities did not desire

[11] Velleius Paterculus (2.15.1) and Florus (3.18.3) both note the connection between the death of Drusus and the revolt of Asculum. This means that the 'tradition' must predate Appian's work by several decades at least. Consequently, it cannot be a product of Appian's supposed chronological rearrangement. The desire for citizenship is noted in all extant sources. See Cic. *Phil*. 12.27; Diod. Sic. 37.2.1-2; Livy *Per*. 71; Vell. Pat. 2.15.1-2; Just. *Epit*. 38.4.13; Strab. 5.4.2; Flor. 3.18.3-4; App. *B Civ*. 1.38; Eutrop. 5.3.1; Oros. 5.18.2. Some of these do, however, indicate a desire for *libertas*, which Mouritsen and others have taken to mean 'freedom' as a statement of independence rather than freedom as a set of political rights. See Kendall (2013) 71-2. Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus (38.4.13) does clearly specify that the Italian rebels were seeking political equality, not independence (*non iam libertatem, sed consortium imperii ciuitatisque*). Galsterer (2006: 299) in particular argues that the contemporary sources all indicate the role of Roman citizenship. See also Wallace-Hadrill (2008) 81.

[12] Mouritsen (1998) 115, 132. Even those scholars who follow the work of Appian closely tend to acknowledge issues with his portrayal of the events. See, for instance, Brunt (1988) 95-99.

[13] Mouritsen (1998) 142.

[14] Ibid. 109.

[15] Sherwin-White (1973) 145; Keaveney (2005) 125. Both these scholars differ from Mouritsen in that they believe the aim of the Italian rebels changed from seeking citizenship to establishing a rival state within the Italian Peninsula.

[16] Mouritsen (1998) 141.

[17] Pobjoy (2000a) 190-3. Steel (2013: 77-9) shares these conclusions.

Roman citizenship prior to the war.[18] Consequently, he faced the problem of explaining how the citizenship issue related to the outbreak of the war. His solution is to assume a change in aim from citizenship to independence.[19] Yet this may be too convenient a solution. As Dench explains, the argument that the allies first sought citizenship before turning their attention to independence 'can neither be supported nor challenged by reference to the evidence'.[20]

Seth Kendall has recently offered a different solution to this problem by regarding the initial phase of the revolt as a *secessio*.[21] According to his reconstruction, the Italian rebels may have believed they stood a better chance of receiving Roman citizenship if they physically removed themselves from the Roman alliance, but they were also prepared to fight for their independence if their demands were not met.[22] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Romans regarded this ploy as an affront to their predominance and responded with force. This suggestion does offer a reasonable solution to the issue. At the same time, though, this reconstruction seems overly rationalised, especially regarding the primary and secondary aims of the Italian rebels. For this reason, there is room to improve upon Kendall's work.

Kendall's *The Struggle for Roman Citizenship: Romans, Allies, and the Wars of 91-77 BCE* offers the most comprehensive reply to Mouritsen. As the title suggests, Kendall attempts to approach the topic from the point of view of the Italic communities in order to reassert the importance of Roman citizenship as the leading cause of the Social War.[23] But in undertaking this process he has a tendency merely to reiterate well-established points already made in previous works. For instance, Kendall dedicates over seventy pages to possible reasons why the non-enfranchised might have desired Roman citizenship.[24] There are several new suggestions, such as the possibility that the spoils of war would become *manubiae* and, therefore, would not be received by the allies,[25] and that allies were kept in service longer than Roman citizens.[26] Far more are simply older suggestions either restated or slightly expanded upon. These include Salmon's suggestion that allies were used to undertake more dangerous

[18] Pobjoy (2000a) 192-3.
[19] Ibid. 193-6. This is a common solution to the issue. See Sherwin-White (1973) 145 and Keaveney (2005) 125.
[20] Dench (2005) 126-7.
[21] Kendall (2013) 229-30.
[22] Ibid.
[23] The citizenship issue remains at the heart of the debate over the Social War's origin and the aims of the Italian rebels. The only major work on the Social War from the current century to avoid this debate is Matyszak (2014).
[24] Kendall (2013) 91-165.
[25] Ibid. 115-6.
[26] Kendall (2013) 99. This point was first raised by Rosenstein (2004: 44-5) but had not been used in this particular argument before.

tasks,[27] and Gabba's claim that Roman and Italian merchants were indistinguishable outside of the Italian Peninsula.[28] Prior to the publication of this work, the reasons why certain allies might have desired Roman citizenship were already numerous and well established. Although Kendall's synthesis of existing explanations is extremely useful, I do not believe that it necessarily progresses the argument or improves our understanding of the Social War's origin, even with several new valid suggestions.

Similar criticisms can also be aimed at Christopher Dart's *The Social War, 91 to 88 BCE: A History of the Italian Insurgency against the Roman Republic* at least in regards to the origins of the war. Much of this work too simply recycles past studies to produce a narrative-driven monograph. Dart offers a thorough overview of the modern and ancient accounts and provides an excellent discussion of the career of Drusus and its relationship to the allies.[29] As the shorter works of Keller, Tweedie and Jehne recognise, however, Drusus' programme or even the wider events of 91 alone do not adequately explain the origin of the war, which instead appears to stem from long-term issues.[30] To be fair, Dart does begin his discussion with the increasingly burdensome and harsh treatment of the allies in the second century.[31] Yet not to consider these alliances from the third and in some cases fourth century risks misjudging the very basis of their formation. This weakness is not restricted to Dart's work but is rather prevalent in studies of the Social War, which tend to choose the Gracchan period as a suitable starting point since it contains the first reference to widespread citizenship legislation.[32]

If Jehne is correct to view the origin of the war as a 'steady accumulation of differences', then it would be best to judge these differences within their proper context.[33] While the second century was indeed a significant period of change, any differences that developed during this era in the relationship between the Romans and the Italic communities can only be fully

[27] Salmon (1967) 306; Kendall (2013) 114.
[28] Gabba (1992) 106-8; Kendall (2013) 120. This had the effect that the inhabitants of the Italic communities were treated on equal terms outside of the Italian Peninsula, but not within its boundaries.
[29] Dart (2014) 76-97.
[30] Keller (2007: 51-3) points towards economic factors that began to gain political influence in the Gracchan period. Tweedie (2012: 123-39) argues for a greater role to be given to Roman factional politics of the 90s, whereas Jehne (2008: 147) describes the origin of the war as a 'steady accumulation of differences' in the second century.
[31] Dart (2014) 43-67.
[32] Salmon (1962), Badian (1970-1), Brunt (1988), Mouritsen (1998), Keaveney (2005) and Kendall (2013) all begin their analysis by considering events in the second century. De Sanctis (1976) chooses to analyse events immediately preceding the Social War. Studying the earlier periods, though, has already yielded some promising results on this topic. Nagle's archaeological survey (1973: 370-2) demonstrates that by extending analysis to the third century, we might understand how third century colonial practices may have affected participation in the war.
[33] Jehne (2008) 147.

explored if the original character of the alliances is established. For this reason, this thesis will consider the relationship from approximately 340 BCE to the beginning of hostilities in 90.[34]

0.2 – Focus

In approaching the analysis of the Social War's origin, scholars have focused on addressing the question of why the Italian rebels decided to make war on their Roman allies after many years of congenial co-existence. This approach, though, betrays a serious flaw. There is the underlying assumption that Rome's allies naturally followed Roman leadership. In this light, the Social War can be portrayed as an unusual and uncharacteristic revolt.[35] But at different times in Roman history, particularly during the late fourth century and Second Punic War, revolts against Rome's leadership were more frequent than is usually acknowledged.[36] Indeed, Eutropius' statement quoted at the beginning of this introduction, rightly implies that allegiance of the Italic communities was conditional. Consequently, we should not assume that Rome's allies were innately complicit. It is important to understand not just why specific revolts took place but also why the Italic communities were compliant to Roman leadership in the first place. This shall be the focus of my thesis.

I will argue that in securing the compliance of the Italic communities, the Romans implemented a strategy to incentivise loyalty and to deter revolts. Here, and throughout this thesis, I use 'Romans' as a general term to refer to the elites who determined the actions of the Roman people. 'Rome' too is used in a similar fashion. I contrast these individuals with the Italian allies who were the inhabitants of other Italic communities in the Italian Peninsula south of the Po River.

My approach reveals the Romans' awareness that alliances required continual management and maintenance. It is my aim to demonstrate that over the course of two and a half centuries of Roman leadership, Rome's alliance management altered in response to new circumstances and

[34] I take 338 BCE as the starting point of what later became Rome's empire. It is from this date that the Romans began a policy of engaging and incorporating neighbours under their leadership. Although Rome often absorbed smaller communities prior to this date, the Romans did not yet demonstrate a hegemonic character.
[35] I use the term 'revolt' here in its broadest sense. This need not suggest that a revolt implies a campaign for independence, only that those engaging in this event were no longer compliant to the direction of Roman leadership.
[36] For instance, Matyszak (2014: 3) suggests that once the Romans had conquered a community that it behaved itself.

external influences. At the time of the Social War, it would seem that the Romans were not providing the allies with the same level of incentives as in earlier periods. As a result, certain allies may have naturally questioned the merit of their relationship with the Romans and, by extension, the validity of the alliance itself. In these circumstances, the decision of several Roman allies to revolt against the Romans would be quite consistent with the revolts of earlier periods.

The issue of Roman military superiority and the capacity (and desire) of the Romans to fulfil the interests of themselves and their allies will be central to the discussion of the changes that the relationship underwent. I seek to prove that these were the two factors that determined the complex equilibrium between the allies' satisfaction and deterrence against revolt. The first of these factors, military superiority, is relatively straightforward to link to the compliance of the allies. That the Romans' military strength in general played an important role in the cohesion of the Roman alliances is well known.[37] Only a few scholars, however, with Rosenstein being perhaps the most prominent, have articulated an explanation of this phenomenon in the Republican period.[38] Much like Rosenstein, I will attempt to link military strength directly to deterrence.

The second of these factors, the fulfilment of interests, is a slightly more complex issue due in part to the ever-changing and varied nature of interests.[39] Indeed, I will argue that it was this very issue that brought the 'Italian question' to the forefront in the early first century. As the Romans incorporated more communities under their leadership from both within the Italian Peninsula and in the wider Mediterranean, the ability of the Romans to satisfy the interests of all their allies became increasing limited due to the finite nature of their resources. Issues associated with innumerable and often conflicting interests meant that the Romans were forced to be selective in their response to allies' needs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Romans in the last half of the second century also became more and more internally orientated since changes within their own domestic politics, namely the increasing influence of the *equites* and

[37] See, for instance, Gabba (1989) 208 and Bispham (2007) 113.
[38] Rosenstein (2007) 236-40.
[39] To narrow motivations down beyond generic pursuit of self-interests would be a problematic task. For instance, in the case of Rome and its expansion during the Republic, Harris (1979: 2-3) attempted to argue that these interests were primarily aimed at economic advantages and military glory. While this may be partly true for some aspects of Rome's campaigns, his hypothesis does not stand up to Gruen's (1984a: 60-9) or Rich's (1993: 45-53) critiques. While this may appear vague in the long-term, it is best to identify a community's interests on a case by case basis. In this way, Terrenato (2014: 57) is right that there is no need to stress any model of Roman expansion over another.

populares, conditioned individual elite Romans to put their own interests first.[40] It is in this context that the inhabitants of the Italic communities, particularly the elites, sought to pursue their interests through their own initiative. A campaign for Roman citizenship followed.

The brief summary I have just given reveals the interconnected nature of the 'Italian question' and changes in the expanding Republican empire. Too often the study of Rome's Italic alliances is treated in isolation, but since relationships with non-Italic communities influenced Roman policy and actions, and to a lesser degree those of the Italic communities, some consideration ought to be given to how these relationships affected the Romans' Italic alliances. Any conclusions reached in this discussion may have modern relevance in light of the recent resurgence of nationalist political movements in Western democracies. The circumstances surrounding any possible modern cases will of course be different, though long-term trends may reveal a certain air of similarity. This again reinforces the need for us to study Romano-Italic relations from the genesis of Rome's leadership because it will provide a foundation from which to assess later changes.

Of course, by tracing the Romano-Italic relationship back into the fourth century we immediately face the issues associated with sources of early Roman history. Since Roman historiography did not gain prominence until the very end of the third century, a few issues arise from the accuracy of accounts written at a much later date concerning these early periods.[41] These accounts betray anachronisms.[42] Given the scarcity of sources on early Roman history even during the late Republic in addition to the literary and rhetorical aims of their genre, ancient historiographers also liberally exercised artistic freedom within their narratives.[43] Furthermore, the interests of the later writers too have affected the representation

[40] Following the introduction of these pressure groups, the political circumstances required that the senatorial elites protect their own interests from these new competitors, who were themselves seeking greater prominence in Roman domestic politics. As a result, Rome's political gaze became more fixed on domestic policies at the expense of non-Roman issues.

[41] Livy (8.40.4-5) held concern for the accuracy of accounts preserving events occurring in 321: 'I believe that the historical account is corrupted by funeral eulogies and the false inscriptions of ancestral images, while each family deceitfully appropriates to itself renown for past deeds and honours. Certainly, from these actions both the achievements of individuals and public memorial of events are confused. Nor is there extant any writer contemporary with that time, on whose authority we might stand with greater certainty'.

[42] Purcell (2003: 14-30), while arguing that the Romans had a reasonable, though incomplete, understanding of their own past, notes that ancient historiographers were 'poor at dealing with change'. See also Woolf (2012) 32-8.

[43] Grant (1995: 94-5) is right to claim that ancient historians did not have the same relationship with the 'truth' as modern historians do. At that time, history shared many more attributes in common with other literary genres than it does in the modern age.

of historical events.[44] With these issues in mind, the historical narratives of the Romans themselves are not likely to always reflect the historical reality. Since modern scholars are not fully cognizant of these historical realities either, it will be at times necessary to speculate. Some amount of speculation is entirely reasonable for a period with as few sources as the Middle Republic. Indeed, Steel's claim, in reference to the Late Republic, that 'establishing what might have happened is a large part of studying history of this period' is even more true of the preceding era.[45]

Issues concerning the quality and quantity of sources also raise the question of how best to approach an analysis of Romano-Italic relations. Since specific evidence of this topic is too sparse for an in-depth study, my focus instead will be on broader structural considerations. To assist in this process, I will be treating the individual Italic communities, including Rome itself, as rational actors who adopt policies and undertake actions based on their own self-interests.[46] Eckstein has previously utilised a similar approach in his study of Roman imperialism by applying Neorealist paradigms to ancient history.[47] His work, however, is at times overly rational to the point where his reconstructions become unrealistic. This problem stems from two issues. First, Neorealists acknowledge that their theory does not provide answers to individual decisions and rather suggest that this is not their goal.[48] While this perhaps suitable for their own purposes in creating a conceptual framework for the interaction of modern states, for the study of history, which is especially concerned with such details, this is a major weakness.[49] Second, although, it is not made explicit by Eckstein, he implements 'perfect' rationality in his reconstructions. This implies that decision-makers possessed all the relevant information needed to make the optimal decision and foresaw all possible consequences that could result for their actions. Accordingly, this process would unrealistically determine that

[44] Livy's moralising of earlier Roman history comes to mind. See, for instance, Smith (2006) 168. The use of exemplarity, common in virtually all Roman historiography, too will have altered the portrayal of past events. Livy's depiction (37.25.4-14) of the Romans' competition with Antiochus over the allegiance of Prusias in 190 can be contrasted with Polybius' account (21.18.1-21-11) to demonstrate the effect *exempla* might have on the historical record (Chaplin [2000] 76-8).
[45] Steel (2013) 7.
[46] I find Carlà-Uhink's argument (2017: 331) that forms of 'self-categorization', the act of identifying with a certain group and seeking its approval, are a better motivation for an Italic community's behaviour than its interests to be unconvincing since the need to 'self-categorize' may in fact be an interest to certain communities but not others. Besides, as Russo (2012: 237) notes, the inhabitants of the Italic communities never used the notion of Romano-Italic kinship as reason to grant citizenship or other political rights.
[47] Eckstein (2006).
[48] Ibid. 31.
[49] For this reason, I have chosen to not adopt a similar approach. Besides, wider Neorealist theories such a 'Balance of Power theory' simply cannot be applied to the Roman era since Rome clearly maintained a level of superiority for an extended period that ought not to have been possible according to the theory's principles.

decision-makers would have *always* made the optimal choice. It seems unlikely that modern decision-makers possess this level of information let alone those belonging to an ancient world in which such information was even harder to attain.[50] Of course in reconstructing a historical decision-making process, there is some risk that through hindsight historians may falsely attribute a greater level of understanding to an individual than would have been possible.[51]

In order to allow for more realistic representation, I have factored 'bounded' rationality into the decision-making process.[52] In contrast to perfect rationality, this form of rationality assumes that there would have been incomplete information concerning consequences of any given decision and a limited timeframe in which the decision-maker could consider his options.[53] Furthermore, it should not be assumed that decision-makers always chose the optimal outcome, but instead one that is satisfactory.[54] By framing the decision-making process in this way, I will be able to account better for the Italic communities' employment of policies that would seem contrary to their best interests and in some cases entirely irrational. For instance, during the Middle to Late Republic several communities like Fregellae chose to revolt against the Romans despite the likelihood of their defeat.[55] Had these communities possessed the level of knowledge implied by perfect rationality, then these events should not have taken place since the decision-makers of the communities would have foreseen the outcome. Bounded rationality, however, does allow for such outcomes.

The importance of the decision-making process will immediately become clear in the opening few chapters of this thesis. A large part of Roman alliance management involved inducing their allies to adopt certain policies that promoted and maintained Roman leadership. They achieved this effect by implementing tactics in line with their strategy to incentivise loyalty and deter revolts that led the allies to make decisions benefitting the Romans. Many of the allies for their own part secured their own political and economic interests as a result of their alliance with the Romans. In extreme cases, to make a decision that in any way disadvantaged or undermined

[50] On military information gathering in the ancient world see Austin and Rankov (1995) 16-38.
[51] Both Heredia's claim (2012: 139) that those responsible for the massacre at Asculum fully comprehended the consequences of their actions and Tan's assertion (2017: 95) that the Romans 'must have known that decision to venture outside of Italy risked enormous wars' likely reflect this act.
[52] While not coined until a later date, Simon (1956) identified the basis of bounded rationality.
[53] Simon (1985: 295) describes a decision-maker as: 'a person who is limited in computational capacity, and who searches very selectively through large realms of possibilities in order to discover what alternatives of action are available, and what the consequences of each of these alternatives are. The search is incomplete, often inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action'.
[54] Ibid. This is referred to as 'satisficing'.
[55] Livy *Per*. 60.

the position of the Romans might have led to military conflict. Given Rome's recognised ability in matters of warfare, many of the Italic communities would have viewed this outcome as undesirable. In most circumstances, as Goldsworthy suggests, it was 'safer to be Rome's ally than its enemy'.[56] The ability to manipulate the decision-making process of others was key to the Romans' success in establishing a long-held empire. The identification of the tactics that achieved this is an integral contribution of my thesis.[57]

0.3 – Chapter Overview

Before I can identify the specific tactics that the Romans utilised to manage their Italian allies' decision-making processes, it will be useful to evaluate other explanations for the cohesion of Rome's alliances. This shall form the focus of the first chapter of this thesis. Two main alternative explanations will be considered: the perpetuality of the *foedera* and the supposed hierarchical structure of the statuses particular to the Roman world. Each of these explanations, however, is flawed. First, while many of the agreements that the Romans established were intended to be perpetual, in reality this was far from the case. As mentioned previously, in certain circumstances revolts did take place even in communities that probably held perpetual *foedera* with the Romans.[58] Second, there seems to be little indication that Rome's system of statuses was hierarchical. In fact, as I seek to demonstrate, the statuses appear to have had more practical function that served to assist in the incorporation of communities under Roman leadership. With these explanations dismissed, the importance of alliance management can form the focus of any analysis.

The identification of tactics that formed the Romans' approach to alliance management will take place in the second and third chapters. These will be split into two chronological eras in order to observe and highlight any long-term changes. The second chapter will cover the years from the beginning of Roman expansion in 338 to the end of the conquest of the Italian Peninsula and the beginning of the Punic Wars. The third will span from the end of the Second Punic War until the beginning of the first century. The split itself seems quite natural since it has often been noted that the Romans appear to have altered their attitude towards the allies in

[56] Goldsworthy (2016) 27. This would represent the most immediate satisfactory course of action.
[57] Harris (2016: 23) refers to these tactics as 'techniques of domination', which was inspired by Mann's (1986: 1-3) 'organisational techniques'.
[58] Certainly, the Latin communities held *foedera* with the Romans at the time of the Latin War (Livy 8.4.11).

the second century as a direct result of the war with Hannibal.[59] A noticeable change in the Romans' approach to alliance management will be observable, particularly regarding the frequency of tactics incentivising loyalty. Indeed, the Romans appear to have been rather more active in the management of their allies in the earlier period. For instance, I will demonstrate that the Romans, in order to strengthen their influence on the Italic communities, assisted the local elites to maintain control of their own communities as well as sharing the spoils of Rome's various campaigns equally among both citizens and allies. During the later period, however, these sorts of benefits were either reduced or stopped altogether. It is perhaps better to view Romano-Italic relations in the second century not so much by how the Romans treated the Italic communities,[60] but how the alliance had ultimately evolved from an earlier time. The fact that the Romans faced no serious opposition within the Italian Peninsula for the position of hegemony in the second century has often been noted, but rarely analysed in terms of its impact on the structure of alliances.[61]

A significant portion of the third chapter will focus on the effect a competitor had on the cohesion of the Roman alliances. The invasion of Hannibal offers a useful case study from which I will ascertain the effects of competition. The Second Punic War was a period of significant instability in the Roman alliance with a number of Rome's allies ceding to the Carthaginian general.[62] It will be necessary then to identify why certain communities revolted at this time and why others did not. Our sources do preserve evidence for several of these revolts. The case of Capua in particular reveals that this was linked to the pursuit of their interests.[63] It appears that those revolting in the Second Punic War felt that their interests would be better served by allying with the Carthaginians than they would by remaining loyal to the Romans. Of course, when circumstances removed all competition from the Italian Peninsula, as was the case in the second century, then the pursuit of interests for the Italic communities became increasing dependent on the Romans. I will demonstrate that such a situation worked in favour of the various parties when their interests aligned, but as the end of the second century neared this was no longer the case.

[59] See Toynbee (1965) 2.113, Wulff Alonso (2015) 86 and Scopacasa (2016) 35.
[60] There were several famous incidents involving the treatment of local elites by visiting Romans (Livy 42.1.7-12, 3.1-11; Gell. *NA* 10.3.3, 17-9).
[61] E.g. Oakley (1993) 11-2 and Cornell (1993) 155. The list of scholars to mention this would be exhaustive. Badian (1958: 53-4) perhaps comes closest to analysis this subject.
[62] A useful list can be found in Erskine (1993) 60.
[63] This is argued best by Fronda (2007: 84-103).

There are two main reasons why the interests of the Romans and many of the inhabitants of the Italic communities became increasingly dissimilar. First, Rome's increasing empire meant that the Romans had to consider the interests of communities from the wider Mediterranean as well as their own and, second, domestic politics at Rome evolved to possess a Romano-centric character during the final decades of the century. These will form the basis of the fourth and fifth chapters respectively.

To determine the effect the expansion of the Rome's Republican empire had on the Romano-Italic relationship, I will first consider how the Romans treated the newly incorporated, extra-Italian communities. In order to assist in this assessment, I have chosen to focus on two regions. The Romans' experience in the Iberian and Greek peninsulas will reveal a different attitude towards these people than that typically expressed towards the Italic communities. Chief among these differences were Rome's decision to bind these communities to itself not through military contributions but often through taxation.[64] The development of taxes, however, was sometime in the making. In the case of the Iberian Peninsula, regular taxation did not take place for a few decades after the Romans became involved in the region, and even then this seems to have experienced periods of disruption. [65] Although the question cannot be answered fully in light of the nature of the sources, it is reasonable to wonder how the treatment of the communities outside of the Italian Peninsula was viewed by those within it. The communities of the *provinciae* did enjoy an element of freedom, at least in the early second century, probably afforded to them by the physical distance between these communities and Rome.

The very nature of this discussion will also lead me to consider the Italian Peninsula's position within the wider empire. It is evident that the Romans believed the peninsula was their possession in contrast to a more complex picture of other regions.[66] This attitude, I will argue, highlighted the problematic position that the Italic communities occupied within the empire. On one hand, they were the allies who had helped secure Rome's success, but, in most cases, they were also people whom the Romans had conquered and were, therefore, subject to Rome's leadership. The latter view was probably disconcerting since this was also the position occupied by the extra-Italian communities, who had not contributed to the expansion of Rome's empire.

[64] Erdkamp (2007) 105-7.
[65] In the Iberian Peninsula the first regular tribute seems to have begun over twenty years after the Romans were first present (Livy 43.2.12). However, almost three decades later a Spanish tribe claimed that this taxation no longer applied to them (App. *Hisp.* 44).
[66] Carlà-Uhink (2017) 30-1.

Turning to the fifth chapter, I will focus on the changes Rome's domestic politics underwent in the last half of the second century, which were in part a product of imperial expansion. My primary concern will be the rise of the *equites*, particularly the *publicani*, and the more frequent adoption of popular politics. I shall demonstrate that these two developments severely reduced the ability of the Italic communities to pursue their interests. Particularly during the final decades of the century, these two loosely-bound groups competed with the established conservative elements of the senatorial order to secure their own interests. The resulting conflict had the tendency to occasionally spill over into matters of foreign policy and undermined the interests of the Italic communities. This is best seen in the case of the Gracchan land commission.[67] Since the Italic communities no longer received similar benefits to those on which the alliance was based, it would seem only natural that some of these communities would have desired to reconsider their position in regard to the Roman alliance.

It is with this context in mind that the events of the first decade of the first century can be analysed in the sixth chapter. Both the issue of the *lex Licinia Mucia*, often cited as the cause of the Social War itself,[68] and the tumultuous tribunate of Livius Drusus reflect the issues associated with the political disruption that the competing pressure groups created. Senatorial competition between Marian supporters and opponents led to the 'illegal' enrolment of non-Romans in the census, which in turn prompted the expulsion of these same people.[69] It would appear that Drusus too had attempted to solve these sorts of harmful political contests through his legislative programmes.[70] As a result of these inward facing and often competing pressure groups, any attempt the inhabitants of the Italic communities made to secure Roman citizenship through political means at Rome failed. This probably forced them to attempt another means of achieving their goal.

Having been in this position, however, does not necessitate that the Italian rebels initiated a war aimed at either gaining citizenship or full independence from the Romans. To view the war strictly within these limitations attributes perfect rationality to the decision-making process of the rebels. As a result, the possibility that the war was the result of unintended consequences and miscalculations on the part of the Romans or the Italian rebels is too readily removed from the picture. This exclusion is disconcerting considering that historians, particularly in the last

[67] Cicero (*Rep*. 3.41) suggests that Tiberius Gracchus neglected the rights of the allies when designing and implementing his legislative programme.
[68] One ancient writer attributes this legislation to the causes of the Social War. See Asc. *Corn.* 68.
[69] This explanation belongs to Badian (1968: 104 and 1970-1: 405).
[70] Morrell (2015: 246-8) offers a recent contribution on Drusus' legislation.

half century, have been more willing to identify examples of military conflicts that have started as a result of such an inattentive decision-making process.[71] Since the extant sources do show some hints that the Social War likely had its origin through a similar process, I offer a reconstruction that allows for these miscalculations to have contributed to the war's outbreak as well as the alleged confusion found in the ancient sources. Considering the Social War in this light allows us to overcome the deceptively strict dichotomy between a war fought for citizenship and one fought for independence.

What follows is an attempt to explain the process that brought about the possibility for conflict between Rome and the Italic communities in the first decade of the first century BCE. While a desire for Roman citizenship evidently played some role, the origin of the Social War lies more in the emergence of the desire for citizenship rather than citizenship itself. I hope to prove that this emergence stems from the evolution of Romano-Italic relationship and the Romans' inability to manage these changes.

[71] Levy (1983: 76-99) offers a strong foundation for this topic. He stresses the role of misperception in his theory of the causes of war. A more classically minded discussion can be found in Hoyos (1998) 275-6.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

1.0 – Introduction

Sound alliance management was the single greatest factor ensuring the cohesion of Rome's alliances from the time of the Latin Settlement in 338 until the outbreak of the Social War in 91. This management involved the use of the 'carrot and stick' approach to promote compliance among the Italic communities, or at least to deter them from revolt. This chapter seeks to highlight the often-overlooked importance of alliance management by considering and subsequently dismissing alternative explanations for the cohesion of Rome's alliance network that do not give importance to the 'carrot and stick' approach.

The first of these alternative explanations suggests that it was the *foedera* that tightly bound Rome's alliances together.[72] Yet although most of these agreements were established to be everlasting,[73] in realty the Italic communities regularly broke their *foedera* in certain periods of upheaval. Furthermore, it is possible that not all of Rome's allies possessed a *foedus*. If the notion of universal *foedera* can be undermined, then, there is further room to question their role in the cohesion of Rome's alliances.

Rome's system of statuses offers another possible explanation for the cohesion of the alliances. This argument, however, relies heavily on the notion that Roman citizenship occupied the highest position in the purported hierarchy of statuses and that Italic communities were willing to display their loyalty to the Romans in the hope that they might receive this coveted status.[74] This does not seem to have been the case since the desirability of Roman citizenship to the Italic communities is questionable in the early phase of the Middle Republic. In fact, it is possible to ascertain an alternative explanation for the existence of the various statuses, if the characteristics of the individual communities are taken into account. Factors, such as language and customs, may have required that a community receive a specific status for practical reasons.

[72] For instance, Lomas (1996) 37-9. Lomas does, however, also give some credit to the role of Rome's increasing power.
[73] As is made clear in the *foedus Cassianum* (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.95.2).
[74] For instance, in Eckstein (2006) 311.

Perhaps the closest explanation that approaches the idea of a strategy of alliance management is the concept of *amicitia*.[75] Through the exchange of beneficial services, the Italic communities might have been willing to remain loyal to the Romans since there were certain advantages to remaining in the alliance. It should not be assumed though that these advantages were sufficient to maintain compliance as the Italic communities may have been in a position to attain even greater gains if, for instance, they ceded from the Roman alliances and became self-determining. While *amicitia* may have represented the 'positive' elements of alliance management from the point of view of the Italic communities, which the Romans themselves no doubt wished to project and emphasise, it is also necessary to consider the 'negative' elements – the deterrents against possible revolts. The combination of these two elements, I will argue, formed the basis of Rome's alliance management.

1.1 – Beyond the *foedera*

Scholars have often argued that all Italic communities, aside from the Latin and Roman colonies, were joined to Rome through bilateral treaties and that these were largely responsible for the compliance of the Italian allies.[76] But a closer investigation into the nature of the *foedera* themselves calls both of these conclusions into question. Before considering these two conclusions further, however, it will be useful to understand the nature of these agreements and the circumstances in which they could be formed. This will help us to understand why they might have played a significant role in the cohesion of alliances.

Despite their importance in establishing relationships between communities, very limited evidence for Italian *foedera* has survived. The work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus preserves the sole surviving example of an Italian *foedus*. The *foedus Cassianum* reads as follows:

> Let there be peace between the Romans and all the Latin cities as long as the heavens and Earth shall remain where they are. Let them neither make war upon one another themselves nor bring in foreign enemies nor grant safe passage to those who shall make

[75] Burton (2011: 161-245) offers the most comprehensive analysis on this topic and its relation to foreign policy. As he notes, many of the relationships the Romans held with other communities were described in terms of *amicitia*.

[76] For instance, Lomas (1996: 37) suggests these bilateral agreements 'created a web of alliances with Rome very firmly at the centre'. While this is an accurate description of Rome alliance network, being the 'one common point of contact' did not limit or determine the frequency of revolts. Similar description of the role of Rome's alliance network appears in Salmon (1982) 66 and Mouritsen (2006) 31-2.

> war upon either. Let them assist one another, when warred upon, with all their forces, and let each have an equal share of the spoils and booty taken in their common wars. Let suits relating to private contracts be determined within ten days, and in the nation where the contract was made. And let it not be permitted to add anything to, or take anything away from these treaties except by the consent both of the Romans and of all the Latins.[77]

As is evident above, the *foedera* established the terms on which the two communities formed their relationship. While all Italian *foedera* likely did not conform to a set pattern with predetermined conditions, this particular example might exhibit the general form of agreements since it possesses a similar structure to those known to us from Rome's dealings with the Mediterranean East.[78] In all Italian *foedera*, then, we might expect to find similar conditions to those present in the example above. Indeed, it would seem best to assume that the clauses concerning the sharing of common enemies and the commitment to military assistance were present in the *foedera* of all Italic communities given their role in supplying troops for Rome's wars. Other conditions, such as the legal context in which private contracts were to be determined, probably varied both in type and in number depending on the circumstances of the community's relationship with Rome. For instance, the *foedus Cassianum* was established following the defeat of the Latins in 493,[79] yet the condition concerning the legal contracts was unlikely to been found in the Latin *foedera* following the end of the Latin War in 338.[80] At this time, Roman legal procedure likely gained wider use.[81]

The Romans, and other Italic communities for that matter, formed these *foedera* in a very limited set of circumstances. Gladhill identifies three different starting points for what he calls the 'script of alliance'.[82] Alliances, he posits, were formed 'to resolve a conflict', 'to obviate a

---

[77] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.95.2 (trans. E. Cary, 1962): Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ταῖς Λατίνων πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις εἰρήνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔστω, μέχρις ἂν οὐρανός τε καὶ γῆ τὴν αὐτὴν στάσιν ἔχωσι: καὶ μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πολεμείτωσαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μήτ᾽ ἄλλοθεν πολέμους ἐπαγέτωσαν, μήτε τοῖς ἐπιφέρουσι πόλεμον ὁδοὺς παρεχέτωσαν ἀσφαλεῖς βοηθείτωσάν τε τοῖς πολεμουμένοις ἁπάσῃ δυνάμει, λαφύρων τε καὶ λείας τῆς ἐκ πολέμων κοινῶν τὸ ἴσον λαγχανέτωσαν μέρος ἑκάτεροι: τῶν τ᾽ ἰδιωτικῶν συμβολαίων αἱ κρίσεις ἐν ἡμέραις γιγνέσθωσαν δέκα, παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν γένηται τὸ συμβόλαιον. ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ταύταις μηδὲν ἐξέστω προσθεῖναι μηδ᾽ ἀφελεῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ Ῥωμαίοις τε καὶ Λατίνοις ἅπασι δοκῇ.
[78] For instance, those of Callatis (*ILLRP* 2.516) and Astypalaia (*IGRR* 4.1028).
[79] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.95.
[80] Baronowski (1988: 174) suggests that in this earlier period there were *foedera* between Roman and individual Latin communities which worked in conjunction with the *foedus Cassianum*, but after the Latin Settlement these were replaced by new ones.
[81] Capogrossi Colognesi (2014: 102) notes that, following the Latin War, Roman law became a medium between different communities.
[82] Gladhill (2016) 2.

potential conflict', or 'to unite in some common cause against a third party'.[83] We might reasonably expect that the conditions present in a *foedus* formed in order to resolve a conflict would have contained harsher conditions than one formed in common cause. Nevertheless, this does not presuppose a hierarchy of *foedera*. There is little compelling evidence for the existence of the *foedus aequum* or *foedus iniquum*.[84]

In short, these agreements determined a number of conditions which the involved communities were expected to abide. The *foedera* did, therefore, establish the basis and nature of an alliance. Furthermore, the establishment and failure of the *foedera* mirrored the establishment and failure of alliances.[85] On this basis, it would seem obvious that the *foedera* ought to possess a leading role in the cohesion of alliances. At a second glance, though, this does not seem to have been the case.

While conventionally scholars believed that every Italic community, with the exception of the Latin and Roman colonies, possessed a *foedus* with the Romans, more recently this conclusion has come into question.[86] This process has perhaps been spurred on by the fact that the *foedera* themselves are sparsely mentioned in the sources. Of the one hundred and fifty allies that Afzelius estimates to have been incorporated under Rome's leadership by the middle of the third century, Rich finds only fourteen of these undisputedly had a *foedus*.[87] He postulates that the belief in universal Italian *foedera* is an assumption that too diligently follows the influential works of Mommsen, Marquardt and Beloch.[88] Prior to these works, Neibuhr had claimed that the Romans had organised their empire within the Italian Peninsula much like the overseas provinces of a later period, with a mixture of agreements forming a relationship between communities and the Romans.[89] Indeed, it is only Harris' assumption that the Etruscan communities established *foedera* with Rome.[90] Livy and Diodorus Siculus in fact both suggest

[83] Ibid.
[84] Gruen (1984b: 14-5) remains the best authority on this debate.
[85] Gladhill (2016: 3) notes that once a *foedus* was struck it either held or ruptured. References to *foedera* outside of these two events are rare.
[86] Rich (2008: 51-75) is the chief instigator of this movement. On the conventional view see Badian (1958) 25-32; Sherwin-White (1973) 119-33; Hantos (1983) 150-83; Cornell (1995a) 365-8.
[87] Afzelius (1942) 62. See also Bradley (2000) 120-8 for a more recent treatment of the number of communities possessing a *foedera* in the Italian Peninsula during the Republic. Rich (2008) 67-9.
[88] Rich (2008) 55. Gladhill (2016: 38), however, dismisses Rich's scepticism on many of the potential *foedera* and notes that being recorded on bronze these tablets were likely melted down. Fronda (2010: 23, n. 3) is similarly dismissive of Rich.
[89] Niebuhr (1832) 611–41, 726–7. Gruen (1984b: 13-53) is the usual authority on the differences between diplomatic relations within the Italian Peninsula and those of the wider Mediterranean. His views, though, have been recently challenged by Gladhill (2016: 39-48).
[90] Harris (1971: 94-5) considers *indutiae* incapable of establishing a long-term relationship and assumes the Romans must have established this through *foedera*.

the Romans regularly renewed their *indutiae* with these communities.[91] Consequently, there is some likelihood, as Matthaei argues, that many writers of the Late Republic perhaps made no effort to discern different sorts of allies within the Italian Peninsula, and unwittingly merged them all into a single type.[92] These Late Republican accounts have likely shaped modern understandings of Roman alliances.

It is perhaps necessary, therefore, for scholars to be open to the possibility that there were alternative forms of agreement establishing Rome's alliances. This may be best achieved by envisaging the *foedera* as a means through which parties exchanged *fides*.[93] Livy records that in 343 the Campani came to be *in fidem* of the Romans not through a *foedus*, but through a *deditio*.[94] While establishing a *foedus* was likely the most common method of exchanging *fides* between communities, *indutiae*, *deditiones*, and *amicitia* could also achieve this goal.[95] For this reason, Gladhill includes these as a means of establishing alliances.[96]

There are, as Rich rightly points out, several narratives in the historical record that are consistent with the view that not all Italic communities possessed *foedera*.[97] To borrow one of his examples, Polybius' statement that 'there is safety for exiles in the communities of Naples, Praeneste, Tibur and others with whom the Romans have agreements' is better read without the assumption of universal *foedera*.[98] Had all Italic communities held *foedera*, Polybius' description of the other communities where exiles could reside appears quite strange since there would be no need to single out *foedus* holding communities. The passage would again seem to imply that not all Italic communities held *foedera* and that alternative means of being attached to the Romans existed.

---

[91] Livy 9.37.12, 41.7; 10.37.5, 46.12; Diod. Sic. 20.35.5, 44.9.
[92] Matthaei (1907) 187.
[93] Gladhill (2016: 19-20) outlines the necessary religious process needed to establish a *foedus* and the *foedus*' relationship to *fides.*
[94] Livy 8.2.13. I take *in fidem* to mean that the Campani have come to be under Rome's leadership. This *deditio* is somewhat controversial, though see now Oakley (1997-2005) 2.286-9.
[95] Oakley (1997-2005: 3.274) notes the connection between *indutiae, deditio, amicitia* and *fides*. Rich (2008: 58-65) argues for the prominence of *deditiones* as a means of incorporation, while Burton (2011: 114-7) believes that those who performed *deditio* entered into *amicitia*. Cicero (*Balb.* 29) identifies *societas, amicitia, sponsio, pactio* and *foedus* as ways to bind another community to Rome, though his evidence may reflect practices in his own time. The subject is a matter of considerable debate. For instance, Aston (2000: 20-5) supports the idea that *sponsio* could establish an alliance, while Crawford (1973: 3) denies that this was possible.
[96] Gladhill (2016: 34) does stress the prominence of the *foedera* in the Romans' 'global perspective' but suggests other means of establishing alliance should also be included.
[97] Rich (2008) 70-2.
[98] Polyb. 6.14.8: ἔστι δ' ἀσφάλεια τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἔν τε τῇ Νεαπολιτῶν καὶ Πραινεστίνων, ἔτι δὲ Τιβουρίνων πόλει, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, πρὸς ἃς ἔχουσιν ὅρκια.

Although the discussion above does undermine the universality of the *foedera*, it cannot truly injure the argument that such agreements, whether *foedera*, *indutiae*, or *deditio*, established and preserved the compliance and loyalty of the allies. One might simply extend the argument to include other forms of agreements establishing loyalty and compliance. Yet while many of these alliances were theoretically perpetual, in practice this was not the case.[99] On this matter, we may look to Appian who has a senator declare in a debate over the treatment of Carthage that virtually all those under Rome's leadership had at one stage revolted.[100] A quick glance at the *Fasti Triumphales* or books eight to ten of Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* confirms the frequency of revolts.[101] While there were certainly moral and religious motivations for not being the party responsible of breaking these agreements, the *foedera* were in practice far from perpetual as the case of the Social War clearly proves.[102] Much like in the case of *bellum iustum*, appropriate grounds for breaking these agreements could no doubt be found, or indeed invented.[103] It is, therefore, difficult to maintain that the *foedera*, or similar agreements, themselves ensured the continual compliance of Italic communities. An answer must lie elsewhere.

1.2 – The Role of the Statuses

Another area that scholars, such as Eckstein and Salmon, have occasionally highlighted as a possible means through which the Romans achieved the compliance of the Italic communities is the system of legal statuses. Their arguments suggest that the hierarchical nature of the statuses – ordered in decreasing value *civitas*, *civitas sine suffragio*, *Nomen Latinum*, *socii* – allegedly ensured that those communities which held a 'lower' status could attain a 'higher' status through their loyalty.[104] Yet, as will become evident below, it is probable that at least in

[99] It is likely that most *foedera* that established Roman alliances were perpetual, including the *foedus Cassianum*, though some also had a limited timeframe. The *foedus* established with the Lucani and Apuli in 326, for instance, seems to be an understanding that assistance would be given only for the duration of a war with the Samnites (Livy 8.25.3).

[100] App. *Pun*. 58 (trans. White, 1972): 'Although all the neighbouring peoples round about us often revolted and were continually breaking treaties, our ancestors did not disdain them, neither the Latins, nor the Etruscans, nor the Sabines. Afterwards, when the Aequi, the Volsci, the Campanians, also our neighbours, and other various peoples of Italy, committed breaches of their treaties, our fathers met them calmly'.

[101] See especially Degrassi (1954) 95-101.

[102] Gladhill (2016: 58) suggests that breaking the religious bonds of the *foedus* might have been envisaged as a re-performance of the piglet's brutal sacrifice which established the agreement.

[103] Yakobsen (2008: 67) argues that in the right circumstance the notion of a just war could be stretched to cover even aggressive policies. Given the contrast in Cicero's description of a *bellum iustum* in his *De Officiis* (1.36) and *De Republica* (2.31; 3.34), Ager (2008: 20) wonders whether simply having a cause at all was 'just' reason enough.

[104] See Eckstein (2006) 311. Salmon (1982: 71) claims that the multiple statuses ensured that there was always a conflict of interest between the holders of different statuses. In short, it is believed that the Latins needed to

the fourth and third centuries the Italic communities did not regard Roman citizenship, purportedly the highest status within Rome's system, as highly valuable. During the first century of Rome's hegemony over the Italian Peninsula, the sources record both communities and individuals rejecting the offer of citizenship.[105] Moreover, some Romans were willing to give up their Roman citizenship when they immigrated to colonies of a Latin status.[106] Had Roman citizenship been so highly desired, neither of these events would likely have occurred. This severely undermines the purported 'promotion' of communities as a reward for loyalty. It also would seem misplaced, then, to attribute revolts to the type of status a community received from the Romans, when the simpler explanation might be that a community revolted against the very idea of its subordination to the Romans.[107] For these reasons, the hierarchical structure of the status system does not seem to be very plausible.

In light of these issues, we might instead view the various statuses as a horizontal structure in which a community's status depended on a number of internal and external factors.[108] As such, this system of statuses appears to have determined the position each community inhabited within Rome's legal apparatuses and defined the community as a member of the alliance network under Rome's leadership.[109]

The first status that an Italic community might receive upon incorporation was simply Roman citizenship. *Civitas*, the so-called 'full' citizenship, had been used in the past as a means of incorporation, most likely a form of synoecism. However, seemingly since the case of Tusculum in 381,[110] the Romans could also grant this status to communities while at the same time preserving their civic structure.[111] The Romans recognised such communities as

maintain their Roman connection in order to preserve their relatively prominent position (Salmon [1982] 66), and that those possessing *civitas sine suffragio* through loyalty and acculturation could be promoted to the 'full' citizenship (Eckstein [2006] 253-4).

[105] See Section 4 of this chapter for a fuller discussion.

[106] On this topic see Salmon (1969) 100-1.

[107] Salmon (1967: 229-30) claims that Satricum had revolted in 320, or possibly 316, on account of its resentment for its status, which was *civitas sine suffragio*. Lomas (1996: 35) suggests that incorporation via *civitas sine suffragio* was 'fiercely opposed', while Toynbee (1965: 2.123) describes the status as the most undesirable.

[108] These factors would depend on the particular characteristics of the community in question and their pre-existing relationship with Rome and its legal institutions. The summary that follows for the purpose of this thesis is necessarily simplified and static. A more accurate picture of these statuses might be achieved by taking into account the evolutions within Rome's institutional and legal framework that occurred in the two centuries of its hegemony over the Italian Peninsula, but this work is beyond the focus of this thesis.

[109] Nicolet (1980: 21) states that the various statuses gave their holders a 'political character' expressed in the participation within 'a coherent system of rights and duties'. While Ando (2011: 4) is correct to note that different forms of citizenship were used to embrace conquered populations, other statuses also served this function.

[110] Livy 6.26.8.

[111] See Galsterer (1976) 73, David (1996) 3 and Forsythe (2005) 292. Toynbee (1965) 1.228-9 is still useful.

municipia. The inhabitants of these communities in theory held the same rights and obligations as those Roman citizens who lived at Rome.[112] As we shall see below, this would have required a reasonable understanding of the Latin language and Roman customs. It is significant that almost every Italic community that received Roman citizenship prior to the Social War was either Latin itself or had adopted the language to some degree.[113]

A second status that an Italic community might receive was *civitas sine suffragio*, sometimes called 'partial' or 'half' citizenship. As the name suggests, these citizens appear to be subject to the same obligations as the 'full' citizens but did not receive the right to vote or hold office at Rome.[114] For this reason, scholars, including Cornell, have often posited that the Romans only bestowed this form of status on communities as a form of punishment.[115] However, it has also often been noted that these communities were inhabited exclusively by non-Latin peoples.[116] Consequently, the status is the subject of considerable debate to which I will add my own argument shortly.[117]

The *Nomen Latium* is the third possible status a community might hold. Initially after the Latin Settlement this status belonged to those people, like in the case of Tibur and Praeneste, who were ethnically Latin.[118] This status, therefore, likely owes itself to a long held relationship between the Romans and the Latin communities.[119] In the following decades, though, this status divorced itself from this ethnic criterion as a result of the foundation of Latin colonies whose colonists, or at least their pre-existing population, may have been of a non-Latin origin.[120] Indeed, the original Latin allies, sometimes referred to as the *prisci Latini*, and the Latin colonists seem rather to have possessed different legal rights even though they appear under the same name. Latin colonists, for instance, alone appear to have possessed the right to

[112] Nicolet (1980) 21.
[113] Oakley (1997-2005) 2.552.
[114] Sherwin-White (1973: 42) likens this form of citizenship to isopolity. A useful summary of the topic can be found in Oakley (1997-2005) 2.544-56. Though see also Humbert (1978) 205-7 and Cornell (1989) 367.
[115] Cornell (1995a: 351) suggests this form of citizenship was granted specifically to those defeated by Rome. Humbert (1978: 176-220) has done the most to further this argument, though some communities he identifies as possibly being incorporated following a defeat are debatable, such as with Acerrae. See also Howarth (2006) 171-85.
[116] For instance, Crawford (1992) 37 and Badian (1958) 18.
[117] Mouritsen (2007: 141-50) offers a considerable discussion on the various arguments concerning *civitas sine suffragio*.
[118] Livy 8.14.9-10.
[119] Galsterer (1976) 84.
[120] Sherwin-White (1973) 96. Galsterer (1976: 84) in fact identifies three different types of Latins after 338, but there seems to be no need for the Latins formerly of the Latin Leagues to be separated from those with individual *foedera* with Rome. Both Bradley (2006: 172-7) and Roselaar (2010: 77-8) are open to the idea that at least overtime some *incolae* could appropriate the status of the new colony.

emigrate to Rome and attain Roman citizenship.[121] This probably stems from the likelihood that many of these colonists were either themselves former Roman citizens or their descendants.[122] It is unlikely that after the Latin War the inhabitants of the original Latin communities possessed this right.[123] Moreover, the other traditional Latin rights, *commercium* and *conubium*, outlined in the *foedus Cassianum* above, do not seem to be possessed either.[124] In this way, the legal rights of the non-colonial members of the *Nomen Latinum* may not have been all that different from the *peregrini* who inhabited the Italic communities that collectively formed the allies.[125]

The last status too seems to be the amalgamation of Italic communities under the umbrella term *socii*, though each likely possessed slightly different rights and obligations. Nonetheless, these communities did seem to share certain aspects of their relationship with Rome in common. While these communities enjoined a great deal of internal autonomy owing largely to their independence, the allies were still required to supply the Romans with soldiers for their wars, which was no doubt stipulated in each *foedera*, and adhere to Rome's leadership.[126] In regard to legal institutions and practices, within the allied communities these continued to be largely self-determined except in cases involving a Roman citizen or in certain unique and infrequent situations.[127] In a case between an ally and a Roman citizen, a Roman praetor would act as a judge.[128]

Each of these four statuses primarily provided the Romans with a means to categorise the Italic communities into appropriate legal groups depending on their characteristics and circumstances. For instance, those with knowledge of Latin customs could be assigned either *civitas* or Latin status, while non-Latins typically received one of the other statuses.[129] Over time, certain statuses either became extremely exclusive, such as *civitas*, or seem to have fallen

[121] Broadhead (2001) 89.
[122] Roselaar (2012) 405.
[123] Broadhead (2001) 89. See also Roselaar (2013) 113 and Coşkun (2016) 534-42.
[124] Sherwin-White (1973: 32-7) in his seminal work suggests that these rights were restored to the Latins shortly after the Latin Settlement. Recently, though, Roselaar (2012: 404; 2013:111) convincingly argued that this was likely not the case. See Livy 8.14.10.
[125] Roselaar (2012) 404. On the Latins being positioned above the *peregrini* in the status system see Galsterer (1976) 89.
[126] Sherwin-White (1973) 119-23; Lomas (1996) 37-9.
[127] Harris (1972) 639-45. In situations where the Romans perceived a serious threat to their alliances, such as the case of the Bacchanalia, the allies might be forced to adopt a law issued by the Romans.
[128] Brennan (2000) 133-5.
[129] Other factors, perhaps population and geographical location, were likely in play to determine precisely the status a community received.

into disuse, as with *civitas sine suffragio*. This evolution complicated the picture, but the general structure remained.

While these statuses evidently played a key role in the functioning of Rome's legal apparatuses, it is difficult to attribute an influential role in the decision of communities to stay compliant or revolt. No clear pattern emerges to suggest that a community possessing one status would act more predictably than another when given the opportunity to revolt. The Italian rebels of the Social War were of course predominantly *socii*, but two Latin colonies in Venusia and Aesernia as well as the Roman colony at Salernum also joined the rebel's cause, albeit under some duress.[130] Fronda also rightly points out that during the Second Punic War the revolt of many Campanian communities cannot be the result of their status because Cumae, Suessula and Acerrae did not cede to join Hannibal's cause despite possessing *civitas sine suffragio*.[131] It is clear from these instances that additional factors were at play when a community made a decision to remain loyal to the Romans or to revolt.

1.3 – *Amicitia* and the Benefits of Compliance

If the Italic communities were inclined to remain compliant to Rome's hegemonic leadership, then this must have been in part the conscious decision made by those local elites who were largely responsible for selecting the policies and action of their own communities.[132] Indeed, it has often been noted that Rome's success in establishing its hegemony depended on the acceptance of its rule by the Italic communities themselves.[133] This has the implication that the local elites and the communities themselves likely received a degree of incentive to remain loyal.

The exchange of loyalty for certain benefits would correspond perfectly well with the Roman concept of *amicitia*. The extant sources describe the relationship between the Romans and many of the Italic communities precisely as *amicitia*.[134] While it would be presumptuous to believe that all Italic communities had developed a similar concept to the highly-defined

[130] App. *B Civ.* 1.39, 42; Diod. Sic. 37.2.9. Appian (*B Civ.* 1.42) also records that even some Roman citizens who had been captured after the siege of Nola chose to fight for the Italian rebels.
[131] Fronda (2010) 118.
[132] See Chapter 2.2.
[133] For instance, Galsterer (1976) 76 and Salmon (1982) 67.
[134] e.g. Latins and Hernici (Livy 6.2.3); Samnites (7.19.4, 29.3-5); Campani (7.30.2); Lucani and Apuli (8.25.3), Allifae, Callifae, Rufrium (8.25.4-14); Neapolitani (8.26.6); Camertes (9.36.7-8); Etruscans (9.40.20); Oriculani (9.41.21); Marrucini, Marsi, Paeligni, and Frentani (9.45.18); Vestini (10.3.1).

expectations placed on Roman *amicitia* known to us from the Late Republic, an understanding of the relationship's core premises might be assumed.[135]

Cicero outlines the core values and principles of *amicitia* in his work *De Amicitia*. The very essence of *amicitia,* he claims, is 'the most complete agreement in policy, in pursuits and in opinions'.[136] This element of *amicitia* can be observed, for instance, when compliant communities supported the Romans in their wars. Although it is certainly true that the Romans determined the policies and pursuits of the Italian allies, this was the result of Rome's position as the superior member of the alliance rather than any requirement of the relationship.[137] Furthermore, relationships of *amicitia* were largely founded on the exchange of services (*officia* or *beneficia*) in return for goodwill (*gratias*).[138] A friend might preform a service for another friend whom the terms of *amicitia* would have in turn bound to reciprocate the favour.[139] A series of exchanges would naturally have replicated itself, meaning that there was potential for the relationship to endure for a long time. As a result, the exchange of services could yield profitable benefits. In this way, there were certainly some advantages for the Italic communities if they remained loyal to the Romans.

An example of how this exchange of services took form within Rome's alliances would prove useful to understanding how the relationship might have functioned from the point of view of the Italic communities. In his account of the sack of Rome, Livy has his Camillus argue that the people of Ardea should requite Rome's past *beneficia* by aiding in the rescue of the Roman people, whose Capitol the Gauls had besieged.[140] Regardless of the episode's questionable historicity, this anecdote does highlight the expectations which were likely placed on Rome's allies in the later centuries of the Republic. It seems probable that Livy has re-envisaged this

[135] It is a matter of debate whether *amicitia* or *clientela* is a better description of the relationship between Rome and the Italic communities. See especially Badian (1958) 5-7, Rich (1989) 128-9, Burton (2011) 3-5 and Wulff Alonso (2015) 73-92. This debate, though, may actually be at the very heart of the issue regarding the position of the Italic communities prior to the Social War. Certainly, the candour with which the Italic communities sought enfranchisement suggests they believed themselves to be *amici*, but equally, given the Romans' treatment of these people, they might better be described as *clientelae*.

[136] Cic. *Amic*. 15 (trans. Falconer, 1979): *id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*.

[137] It does not follow, then, that the Italic communities handed over control of their foreign policy to the Romans when they were incorporated (e.g. Rosenstein [2007] 235), though in practice the Italian allies' ability to determine their own external policy became increasingly limited. See Stone (2013) 30.

[138] Cicero (*Amic*. 58) sees this as the secondary view of friendship but is not what he would identify as 'true' *amicitia*. A deeper discussion on this exchange can be found in Sen. *Ben.* 2.14.1-2.

[139] Burton (2011: 64-9) notes that this process may occur at an unequal rate indebting one friend to another and creating an asymmetrical friendship. See also Dixon (1993) 456-7 and Sen. *Ben.* 2.28.5.

[140] Livy 5.44.3-7. The Romans had previously saved the Ardeates from a Volscian siege and assisted in an episode of internal strife (Livy 4.9.12-11.5).

event by making anachronistic assumptions. In this episode, Livy depicts the Ardeates as being mindful of the services that the Romans had rendered to them in the past.[141] In these circumstances, it would appear that the Ardeates were in a way burdened by Rome's earlier services. The Gallic disaster then provided them with an opportunity for repaying their thanks (*gratiae referendae*).[142] The Ardeates likely felt that this service itself would be reciprocated by the Romans, rendering further benefits to themselves. As the cycle of reciprocity continued, the two communities would have become increasing bound to each other.

But goodwill alone could not establish an empire the size of Rome's. While those in a position of *amicitia* certainly enjoyed a number of benefits as a result of their relationship,[143] there was always the possibility that communities might have been able to attain better and more frequent benefits for themselves outside of a Roman alliance. Without any other reason beyond simply the benefits that could be precluded within such a relationship, over time there would be a natural tendency for allies to move towards an existence independent of the superior member of the alliance as the interests of the two parties changed.[144] This would particularly be the case for Rome's alliances during the early second century when it became obvious that the alliances became heavily imbalanced in the hegemon's favour.[145] Something more was needed to work in conjunction with these benefits in order to reinforce Rome's alliances.

Thucydides provides the missing element in his *Mytilenian Debate*. In the debate over the treatment of the Mytilenian people, Thucydides has Cleon proclaim to the Athenians that 'leadership depends on superior strength, not on any goodwill of theirs (sc. the Athenian allies)'.[146] Cleon goes on to demand that the Mytilenians be made an example to other allies by means of harsh punishment, which would in turn deter other allies from revolting.[147] Diodotus too, although urging moderation, concedes that some punishments ought to be dealt out.[148] Such punishments instilled a certain amount of fear in those allies, who might have been contemplating a revolt aimed at independence, deterring them from choosing that path.[149]

[141] Livy 5.44.3.
[142] Ibid.
[143] These will be outlined in the following chapters.
[144] Burton (2011: 53) identifies relationship drift, a growing difference in interests between friends, as a major cause of relationship breakdown.
[145] Scopacasa (2016) 35.
[146] Thuc. 3.37 (Trans. Warner, 1972). This point is never fully challenged by Diodotus' reply.
[147] Thuc. 3.39-40.
[148] Thuc. 3.46.
[149] Rosenstein (2007: 229-32) has done much to highlight the role fear plays in Roman peace, and consequently in the cohesiveness of Rome's alliances. See also Mattern (1999) 162-94.

While the Romans themselves may not have justified their actions in this way, there is little doubt that the approach bore this effect.[150] Rosenstein concludes that '[p]eace for the Romans… was founded on the potential violence that kept those weaker than Rome cringing'.[151] Yet an overreliance on fear of punishment alone would have caused its own problems. Not providing enough incentive in the form of fulfilled interests for allies would have encouraged them to seek independence when an opportunity presented itself. The revolts of the Delian League might be the best example of such circumstances playing out.[152] Indeed, as Thucydides' Diodotus suggests, the senior member of an alliance might treat its allies with such goodwill that they may not even contemplate revolt in the first place.[153] The key to alliance management, then, was perhaps something of a balance between the rewards for loyalty and punishments for non-compliance. [154]

1.4 – Identifying the Tactics of Alliance Management: The Case of Citizenship[155]

A small number of scholars, including Harris, have made similar observations about the need for hegemonic powers to undertake such an approach to managing their alliances, and by extension their empire.[156] Strauss, for instance, articulates his hypothesis neatly in the following way: 'The art of hegemony required a combination of military power and diplomatic skill, of propaganda and self-abnegation, of force and compromise'.[157] The importance of such an approach did not escape the observations of Eckstein, who also partially attributes Rome's

[150] Mattern (1999: 194) argues that during the Imperial era the Romans justified such actions in terms of honour. Yet Rosenstein (2007: 237) seems right to suggest that the Romans would not have 'put the matter in the cold terms of realpolitik. Matters would have been couched in the language of morality and honor – upholding the majesty and dignity of Rome, punishing arrogance, humbling the proud, protecting the weak, defending the Republic's friends'.
[151] Rosenstein (2007) 229.
[152] Strauss (1997: 134-5) offers a useful discussion on Athens' treatment of its allies, who revolted when the Athenians lost their advantage during the Peloponnesian War.
[153] Thuc. 3.46.
[154] Harris (2016: 32) suggests that the power with which the Romans affected their leadership was 'imposing enough, but also acceptable enough'.
[155] The majority of this section was published in *Antichthon* 51 (2017) 186-201 under the title 'Citizenship as a Reward or Punishment? Factoring Language into the Latin Settlement'.
[156] Harris (1979: 61) describes the Roman political system as 'a well-judged combination of severity and moderation', and more recently (2016: 23-33) outlines a series of 'techniques of domination' employed by the Romans. Strauss (1997: 127-36) assessed the ability of Athens and Sparta to utilise the 'carrot and stick' approach to maintain their alliances by comparing these *poleis*' success to that of Rome.
[157] Strauss (1997) 128.

success to this factor.[158] The following sections and chapters will demonstrate that this was the approach the Romans took towards managing their empire.

While it now seems beyond question that the Romans implemented tactics to promote compliance, the identification of these tactics are the subject of some debate. Both Strauss and Eckstein have identified citizenship as a key form of benefit a community would receive as a reward for fidelity.[159] Typical is this passage from the conclusion of Eckstein's work:

> Rome after 340-338 replaced ethnicity and geographical location as the basis of membership in the polity with a ladder of legal status-groups not tied to either ethnicity or geography: non-Romans (the *socii*), halfway citizens (the *cives sine suffragio*), full citizens (*cives*). And because the Romans were relatively generous in allowing non-Roman individuals and even (very occasionally) whole non-Roman polities to climb up the status hierarchy, Rome gained an enhanced capacity to win loyalty, or at least acquiescence.[160]

While it would be misguided to claim that there were no individuals who would be swayed by the prospects of Roman citizenship, the likelihood that many communities would have actively sought 'full' *civitas* as the highest of these statuses should be questioned, as I have already suggested. Roman citizenship of the fourth century did not have the same benefits that the status had acquired in the late Republic; I will thoroughly explore this point in a later chapter. Furthermore, as we shall see, there is little indication that bestowing Roman citizenship itself was used as a tactic to promote compliance among the allies.

The identification of strategy regarding the granting of citizenship belongs not only to the work of Eckstein and other scholars but can also be found in the works of ancient writers, particularly in Livy's account of the Latin Settlement of 338.[161] However, a close analysis of Livy's description of these citizenship grants, while perfectly suited to his moralising history, undermines the credibility of his narrative.

According to book eight of Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, the decision to enrol communities into either the *civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio* in the Latin Settlement of 338 BC was based on the

[158] Eckstein (2006: 250-7) also stresses the inclusiveness of the Romans as a vital factor.
[159] Strauss (1997) 134; Eckstein (2006) 250-7, 311. Similar sentiment is also suggested by Walbank (1985: 72).
[160] Eckstein (2006) 311.
[161] Livy 8.14. See also Cass. Dio 7.35.10.

circumstances surrounding each community's incorporation.[162] Livy suggests that, following the conclusion of the Latin War, each community was assessed and then offered a form of citizenship based on that assessment – traditionally, with one form representing a reward for 'good behaviour' and the other representing a punishment for 'bad behaviour'. But Livy's view of Roman citizenship in the fourth century BC is widely acknowledged to be anachronistic, as it is based on the retrojection of the franchise's supposed value in the late Republic and early Empire.[163] Roman citizenship and full access to Rome's political and legal systems were important rights in those later periods. This retrojection has led to inconsistencies in Livy's understanding of early Roman citizenship and consequently undermines his account of the fourth century BC settlement, as different values are often attributed both to *civitas* and to *civitas sine suffragio* (see below). Had Rome rewarded loyalty with one type of citizenship and punished rebellious behaviour with the other, some uniformity ought to be expected. This is not the case. Despite this, many modern scholars have adopted Livy's interpretation in their analyses, although they have had to offer a variety of explanations for his inconsistencies. Some, such as Howarth, have suggested that communities given 'full' *civitas* were the punished parties,[164] while others, like Cornell for instance, have concluded that granting citizenship without suffrage amounted to the punishment of a community.[165] Based as they are on Livy's inconsistent and anachronistic account, both these solutions are inevitably problematic. Contrary to these views, I argue that the differing statuses are, at least in part, the result of pre-existing cultural differences within the communities – most notably linguistic differences – and that these were significant on account of the formalities of Rome's legal and political systems. The choice by Rome to grant communities either *civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio* may therefore have been the result of a conscious appraisal by Rome (and sometimes by the communities themselves), not of their behaviour or attitude towards Rome, but of their ability to integrate successfully into Rome's legal and political systems.

The idea that language played a role in the decision to grant either *civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio* is not a new one, and indeed it has been around in one form or another since at least the 1950s, when it was advanced by Badian, and it has been endorsed more recently by

[162] Livy 8.14.1.
[163] Oakley (1997-2005) 2.538-9.
[164] Howarth (2006: 171-85) claims that these communities were conquered by Rome. Howarth, and others too, often also point to the obligations that came with these different forms of citizenship, and to the grant of *hospitium publicum* to Caere, believing it to be the original form of *civitas sine suffragio* (Livy 5.50.3). For the original argument, see Sordi (1960) 36-49.
[165] Cornell (1995a) 351.

Crawford, among others.[166] Rome was a Latin community and thus shared a special bond with the other peoples and communities of Latium, as can arguably be seen in the broad cultural koiné of Latinity (visible not only in language, but also religion, etc.) as well as in the existence of Latin Rights and the enigmatic Latin League. In this environment, it would have been incredibly difficult to distinguish 'Roman' from 'Latin' in any meaningful way, beyond simply noting where someone lived. The argument that pre-existing cultural connections, such as language, therefore lay at the core of the various conceptions of citizenship and identity developing within Latium in the fourth century BC makes some sense. Indeed, this very consideration has been proposed as one factor in Rome's approach to citizenship in later periods, as various forms of citizenship (*civitas*, Latin Rights, etc.) are often thought to correspond to differing levels of acculturation in the late Republic and Empire.[167] However, the idea that this cultural and linguistic connection went beyond traditional associations and could have real-world implications in the middle Republic has rarely been explored in any real depth. The authors of our literary sources for the period lived in a world where such cultural considerations were understood to be secondary to the political realities of citizenship of their day. But underneath the anachronisms in the literary evidence for the Latin Settlement, some hints of the importance of these cultural and linguistic bonds in the fourth century BC are perhaps still visible, and indeed are worth a second look when considering Rome's renegotiation of identity with its regional neighbours.

Before delving into the subtext of the Latin Settlement, however, it is first necessary to look more closely at the inconsistencies in Livy's account and to attempt to determine the origin of them. Livy states twice that the communities involved in the Latin War would be assessed *pro merito cuiusque*, thereby implying that some communities were to be rewarded while others were to be punished.[168] He then goes on to discuss the different types of citizenship granted to various communities, implying that this was how the 'rewards' and 'punishments' were meted out – again, traditionally, with one form of citizenship seemingly representing the 'reward', and the other 'punishment'. For this explanation to be plausible, it would be reasonable to expect that the differing grants of citizenship, as either a reward or a punishment, would be consistent across the board. However, in books eight and nine of Livy's work, grants of *civitas*

[166] See in general Crawford (1992) 37; Salmon (1969) 50; Toynbee (1965) 204-5; Badian (1958) 19. A related argument based more on the ethnicity of the Latins has also been put forward. See Humbert (1978) 177 n. 78.
[167] See, for instance, Walbank (1985: 69), who argued that '[u]sually the granting of *civitas* and Latin rights is the recognition of Romanisation already achieved; and this goes steadily ahead, eroding national distinctions'.
[168] Livy 8.12.1, 8.14.1.

and *civitas sine suffragio* are each said to have been used both as a reward and as a punishment in different contexts. For instance, Livy implies that the Campanian knights received full citizenship as a highly valuable reward for their continued support of Rome, suggesting that this was how the Romans rewarded their faithful allies.[169] However, this assessment is seemingly undermined just two chapters later when he puts the following words into the mouth of Camillus in an address to the Senate: 'Do you wish, by the example of our ancestors, to enlarge the Roman state by accepting the conquered into the citizenship?'[170] In this case, while full citizenship was not necessarily reserved for defeated communities, direct military opposition was evidently not a disqualification either. As for citizenship without suffrage, the status is clearly portrayed as a reward for loyalty when Livy says that 'citizenship without suffrage was given to the Campani for the sake of their knights' honour, because they had not wished to rebel with the Latins, and to the Fundani and Formiani, because the route through their borders had always been safe and undisturbed',[171] but it is just as clearly presented as something imposed upon the defeated when Livy later reports that the people of Anagnia and the other Hernican people who had warred against Rome had received this status.[172] Military support, or revolt, were clearly not the only factors in play.

To complicate things even further, there is one instance in Livy's account of communities supposedly being given a choice in the status they were to have. Livy records that the Hernican peoples of Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum kept their own laws after a revolt in 306 BC, allegedly because they preferred them to Roman citizenship.[173] This sentiment is reiterated and expanded upon two chapters later.[174] If the status given to a community had depended solely on factors such as the community's previous behaviour or attitude towards Rome, there would be no need to take into account the wishes of that community. Furthermore, the Hernican episode reveals that those communities which were given a choice rejected the supposedly more favourable citizenship, regardless of whether this was *civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio*. Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum did not take up arms against Rome and so, according to this explanation, ought to have been given the more preferable of the two types of citizenship. Rejections of this sort appear even as late as 216 BC, when a troop of soldiers from Praeneste

[169] Livy 8.11.15-16.
[170] Livy 8.13.16: *voltis exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo*?
[171] Livy 8.14.10: *Campanis equitum honoris causa, quia cum Latinis rebellare noluissent, Fundanisque et Formianis, quod per fines eorum tuta pacataque semper fuisset via, civitas sine suffragio data.*
[172] Livy 9.43.24.
[173] Livy 9.43.23.
[174] Livy 9.45.7-8.

supposedly refused an offer of 'full' citizenship.[175] This episode in particular should serve as a reminder of something which is most clearly stated by Dench, that one must be careful when attributing value and desirability to *civitas* at different times and to different people.[176] The status in the fourth century did not offer the same advantages that it did to those who acquired *civitas* in the later Republic.[177] Even then, however, we are told that Neapolis and Heraclea were reluctant to accept *civitas* when it was openly offered to the allies during the Social War.[178]

In light of these inconsistencies, it is necessary to compare other accounts, to see if they can shed any light on the problem. Velleius Paterculus' discussion of the extension of Roman citizenship in the middle Republic has received little in-depth analysis in comparison with Livy's narrative of the Latin Settlement, but his version, although less detailed than Livy's, contains some interesting features. The most prominent of these is the longer timeframe in which Rome is said to have enacted the changes associated with the settlement.[179] As Oakley has pointed out, Livy's account implies that a radical new system of relationships was implemented in less than a year.[180] I would suggest that these particular differences between the accounts of Livy and Velleius are more likely to be a result, not of Velleius' brevity, but of the use of different sources.[181] It is therefore possibly significant that Velleius' version contains no notion of 'reward' or 'punishment' in relation to the granting of citizenship; instead, Velleius simply provides a list of communities that were admitted to the Roman franchise.[182] This should be particularly disconcerting for those who adopt Livy's explanation, given that Velleius generally reacted positively to the spread of Roman power and its role in unifying the peoples of the Italian Peninsula.[183] Velleius could easily have drawn on the idea of reward and punishment in order to highlight the character of Rome's tactics. Yet he does not. An argument *ex silentio*, and moreover from an abbreviated account, is admittedly always problematic. However, as he was writing slightly later than Livy, Velleius would presumably have been

[175] Livy 23.20.2.
[176] Dench (2005) 120.
[177] For instance, the benefits provided by the introduction of the *leges Porciae* (Livy 10.9.3-4; Cic. *Rep*. 2.54) and the suspension of *tributum* (Plin. *HN* 33.56) can all be dated to the second century BC.
[178] Cic. *Balb.* 21.
[179] Vell. Pat. 1.14.3.
[180] Oakley (1997-2005) 2.539. Livy's account appears to suggest that the decision-making process took place before the consular elections of the following year (Livy 8.13.10).
[181] Oakley (1997-2005: 2.539-40) suggests that either Livy or one of his sources has compressed the account of the Latin Settlement. If one of Livy's sources was responsible, its influence is clearly missing from Velleius' account.
[182] Vell. Pat. 1.14.1-15.5.
[183] Gabba (1962) 1-9.

aware of this tradition, so its absence from his work may possibly imply the existence of an alternative tradition. The idea of granting *civitas* and *civitas sine suffragio* as 'rewards' and 'punishments' may therefore be a later rationalisation of events and not a core aspect of the tradition.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that Livy's version contains anachronistic assumptions about the nature of fourth century foreign policy. Not being fully cognizant of the ways in which the past had differed from the present, or at least not willing to let any differences change their narrative, Livy and his sources may have retrojected the conditions of their own day into the past.[184] As a result, they may have modelled past events on more recent ones.[185] The reasons given by Livy for the outbreak of the Latin War in 340 BC, for instance, appear to match the general grievances of the allies at the onset of the Social War in 91 BC.[186] Livy's account of the Latin Settlement may have also been subject to a similar process of 'modernisation' – although it should be noted that while some communities did desire *civitas* during the late Republic, others still rejected the offer of it. The value of *civitas* and the status of the Italic communities were still debated for quite some time.

There is also a strong probability that Livy's inconsistency at least partially originates from the works of the second and first century annalists, who are often argued to have expanded their accounts, both literarily and rhetorically, and frequently with erroneous results,[187] and whom Livy used as his immediate sources. Some of these writers may have based their perception of *civitas sine suffragio* on the treatment of Capua and the other Campanian communities that went over to Hannibal during the Second Punic War.[188] There is little doubt that the removal of Capua's autonomy was intended as a punishment.[189] It is conceivable that these writers assumed that the limitations placed upon Capua in 211 BC had also applied to other communities treated in the same way in earlier times.[190] On the other hand, a number of these annalists lived through the Social War, when the Roman franchise was highly sought after by

[184] Miles (1995) 18-19; Raaflaub (2006) 129.
[185] Miles (1995) 18.
[186] For the Latin War, see Livy 8.5.3-6; the grievances of the allies in 91 are found at App. *B Civ*. 1.34-5; in general, see Oakley (1997-2005) 2.409.
[187] Cornell (1995a) 6-7, 242.
[188] Concern over later speculation affecting the perception of *civitas sine suffragio* is also raised by Galsterer (1976: 70-1).
[189] Livy 26.16.5-12.
[190] It is worth noting that Anagnia was also said to have been prohibited from electing magistrates in 306 (Livy 9.43.24).

certain Italic communities.[191] To the writers of this era, a grant of Roman citizenship may have appeared to be an act of generosity and this may have influenced them to present enfranchisement in a favourable light. In short, the different views of Livy's different sources and the impact that their views had on the handling of past events may have been the cause of the inconsistencies in Livy's own handling of those events.

Modern analyses of the Latin Settlement which are based on Livy's explanation inevitably have to deal with these inconsistencies, and the usual solution is to handle the evidence in a selective manner, so that a coherent account can be pieced together. If *civitas* is taken to be a reward for loyalty, the hostility of the Pedani, Lanuvini, Veliterni, and Antiates immediately prior to their enfranchisement must be ignored.[192] Equally, for the granting of *civitas sine suffragio* to qualify as an expression of favour, it is necessary to disregard the Campani's involvement in the Latin War as well as that of the Volsci who sided with the Latins.[193] This need to handle the evidence selectively makes any reconstruction based on this evidence alone aprioristic. The evidence implies that, of the hostile forces that Rome faced in the Latin War, some subsequently received 'full' *civitas* but others *civitas sine suffragio*. This means that any explanation of the Latin Settlement based on the idea of a straightforward policy of reward or punishment (where one classification is considered a 'reward' and the other a 'punishment') is difficult to maintain. There is another solution, however, which is to consider the importance of cultural factors in the decision, most notably language. The reason for considering language to be an important factor becomes immediately apparent when a comparison is made between the statuses of the communities, as detailed by Livy in his account of the Latin Settlement (Table 1), and the primary languages those same communities spoke (Table 2).[194]

[191] A general summary of Livy's sources can be found in Oakley (1997-2005) 1.16-18.
[192] Livy 8.12.7. The *fasti triumphales* also record victories over these people in the year 338. See Degrassi (1954) 95.
[193] Livy 8.10.9, 11.9-13. Apart from Privernum, the Volscian communities are left unspecified by Livy. Only the Campani are mentioned in the *fasti triumphales*. See Degrassi (1954) 95.
[194] The content of Table 2 is based on the analysis of Toynbee (1965: 204-5). The primary language of a community would likely be the language used in an official capacity. The language would be chosen specifically for its wide, if not universal, use within the community. After the Latin Settlement, non-Latin communities continued to use their native languages in this official capacity. Cumae only adopted Latin in 180 (Livy 40.42.13). Capua too maintained its Oscan character for some time. See Frederiksen (1984) 221. The official languages of the remaining non-Latin communities are less certain, but there is a general consensus on the matter. Only Velitrae and Antium are controversial cases. However, a single inscription should not be used as evidence that Velitrae, a pre-existing Latin colony, was a Volscian community at the time of the Latin Settlement, as Salmon (1982: 48) does. See Crawford (2011) 340. Given that Antium became a citizen colony (Livy 8.14.8), it is perhaps safe to assume that Latin was the official public language after 338 BC; this would explain the only variance between the two tables.

Status	
civitas	*civitas sine suffragio*
Lanuvini	Campani
Aricini	Fundani
Nomentani	Formiani
Pedani	Cumani
Tusculani	Suessulani
Veliterni	
Antiates	

Table 1 – Citizenship status after the Latin Settlement

Primary Language	
Latin	Non-Latin
Lanuvini	Campani
Aricini	Fundani
Nomentani	Formiani
Pedani	Cumani
Tusculani	Suessulani
Veliterni	Antiates

Table 2 – Primary language at the time of the Latin Settlement

The close match between the status of each community and the primary language used in official contexts within it is unlikely to be a coincidence. Moreover, there is a passage in Strabo that implies that the adoption of the Latin language and the involvement in Roman government, and by extension the possession of 'full' citizenship, were related.[195] Language and political affiliation were evidently linked. This may seem unsurprising given that, until 139 BC, the voting procedure within the tribes required an oral response from each individual.[196] A voter would indicate his approval or disapproval of any proposed legislation or, in the case of an election, the name of his preferred candidate to a *rogator*.[197] While the actual casting of a vote may have only required the barest grasp of Latin, the understanding necessary to make informed decisions about legislation may have been beyond those who did not have a good command of the language.[198] It has previously been argued that, for this simple reason alone, some communities were granted *civitas sine suffragio*, so that they were excluded from voting.[199]

[195] Strab. 6.1.6: πλὴν εἴτε διὰ ταῦτα τοὔνομα τῇ πόλει γέγονεν, εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς πόλεως ὡς ἂν βασίλειον τῇ Λατίνῃ φωνῇ προσαγορευσάντων Σαυνιτῶν διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρχηγέτας αὐτῶν κοινωνῆσαι Ῥωμαίοις τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ χρήσασθαι τῇ Λατίνῃ διαλέκτῳ, πάρεστι σκοπεῖν, ὁποτέρως ἔχει τἀληθές. ('However, it is possible to consider which of these two accounts holds the truth, whether the name for the city [sc. Rhegium] came into being on account of this, or on account of the city's distinction such that the Samnites named the city by the Latin word for royal, because their leaders shared in the polity of the Romans and often used the Latin language.')
[196] L. R. Taylor (1966) 34.
[197] Ibid. Vishnia (2012) 129.
[198] For different degrees of bilingualism, see Adams (2003) 3-8.
[199] This argument is made explicitly by Crawford (1992: 37) and Badian (1958: 19).

Despite these arguments for the importance of language in the Latin Settlement, the position is far from settled and indeed it has most recently been argued that language is not significant enough an explanation for the differences in grants of citizenship, especially when it comes to communities in which bilingualism and multilingualism may have been common.[200] However, to dismiss language as a factor would be to underestimate the orality of law in Rome and Latium, and the importance of local norms and rituals. The Roman legal framework prior to the second century BC was based on a foundation of oral formulae and this was presumably due to its ritualistic origins.[201] The need for a strict adherence to these formulae in the *legis actio* procedure is exemplified by a case preserved by Gaius, in which a man was said to have lost his legal case because he had used the word *vites*, 'vines', instead of *arbores*, 'trees', as it appeared in the Twelve Tables.[202] We may also note that the deaf and mute were restricted in their legal capacity, specifically because of their inability to carry out the verbal exchanges required by law.[203] Although there is no record of how non-native speakers of Latin fared in such exchanges, the strictness of these set phrases may have been beyond them; indeed, it is possible that such phrases may have even flummoxed native Latin speakers who were not used to them. To complicate matters further, the correct phrases required by Rome's legal systems were only made publicly available at the end of the fourth century BC; before that happened, an individual had to approach a pontiff in order to attain the necessary formula.[204] Even this task would demand a certain level of proficiency in Latin.

Due to the orality of Roman law and society, it could be argued that the exclusion of those who did not speak Latin fluently from voting is equally well explained by the process of census enrolment.[205] As part of the census, each male citizen of Rome was required to give an oath in Latin swearing to the truthfulness of the stated value of his property.[206] Although the wording of this oath has not survived, Livy's phrasing of the *commune omnium civium ius* implies that its form was indeed fixed, and may reveal a legal nature.[207] Much like the other legal formulae

[200] Cornell (1995a: 349) dismisses language as a factor but offers little explanation, while the connection between a community's language and the form of citizenship it received is acknowledged, but dismissed, by Howarth (2006: 173).
[201] Mousourakis (2007) 21.
[202] Gai. *Inst*. 4.11. For the general strictness of the *legis actio*, see Gai. *Inst*. 4.16, 30 and Cic. *Mur*. 25-6.
[203] A good summary of the legal restrictions on the deaf and mute can be found in Gardner (1993) 159-67.
[204] *Dig*. 1.2.2.6-7. On the development of the *legis actio*, see Mousourakis (2007) 28-30.
[205] The Formiani, Fundani, and Arpinates were assigned to tribes only after they were granted the right to vote (Livy 38.36.7-9). Furthermore, the Campani were included in the Roman census sometime after they were granted *civitas sine suffragio* and seem to have held their own census prior to this (Livy 38.28.4). On the topic of the census and *civitas sine suffragio*, see Lapyrionok (2013) 137-9.
[206] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 4.15.6; Livy 43.14.5-6; Gell. *NA* 17.21.44.
[207] Livy 43.14.5.

of the period, precise and correct pronunciation of the words would presumably have been required. Again, this may have been beyond the capabilities of many non-native speakers of Latin and may have necessitated the exclusion of these people from the processes involved in allocation to a tribe and census class. However, if these sorts of exclusions applied extensively across Rome's legal structures, this would have also necessitated the restriction of these individuals' legal capacity far beyond the right to vote.[208] This was not the case. It may be significant then that citizenship without the vote was only ever granted to communities and never to individuals.[209] This may supply the key to understanding the status itself.

By shifting the focus from individuals to communities, we may overcome the issue of the exclusion of those non-native speakers of Latin who may have been perfectly capable of the uttering the various formulae with the required level of accuracy and precision while native speakers who were perhaps not so capable were nonetheless included. At the time of the Latin Settlement, the communities of Latium had been closely linked to Rome's political and legal structures since at least 493 BC, although their relationship certainly predates this.[210] The *foedus Cassianum* offered something resembling an alliance structure, while the traditional *ius Latini* (which included rights of *commercium*, *conubium*, and *migratio*) presumably gave all Latins access to Rome's legal system and Romans access to those of the Latin city-states, thereby creating a 'form of legal community'.[211] We might even suppose, as Capogrossi Colognesi does, that these circumstances amounted to the partial assimilation of all Latins into the local citizenship of each individual city-state that was a member of the Latin League.[212] The move to assimilate these city-states entirely into the Roman citizen body after 338 BC may therefore not have been perceived as a radical step. Not only were Latins more suited to the oral performance of the various formulae, they were probably also relatively familiar with the formulae's form and function as a result of their close interaction with Rome. It is possible, therefore, that the Romans were more willing to integrate Latin city-states due to their exposure

[208] There may be some basis for questioning the applicability of the term *civitas sine suffragio* in the fourth century, but the explanation for the term's origin given by Mouritsen (2007: 155-6) is unconvincing.
[209] The closest term to the modern phrase *cives sine suffragio* is found in Gell. NA 16.13.7, who writes of *municipes sine suffragii iure*. There appears to be a similarity with *civitas sine suffragio* and Festus' understanding of *municeps* (Fest. 126L), however Festus gives conflicting definitions. Given this confusion, it should not be assumed that the term *municipes sine suffragii iure* has a direct relationship with *civitas sine suffragio*.
[210] A version of the *foedus* of 493 can be found in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.95. An earlier *foedus* dating to the mid-seventh century is purported by Livy (1.32.3).
[211] Capogrossi Colognesi (2014) 93.
[212] Ibid.

to Roman law and its formulae, as well as the cultural and religious significance of such customs, many of which may have been shared.

A similar level of familiarity with Roman law and its associated formulae cannot be taken for granted in the case of those communities that received *civitas sine suffragio* as a result of the Latin Settlement. This is not to say that interaction between certain non-Latin communities and Rome did not occur regularly; there is certainly ample evidence of such relationships. But these relationships do not suggest that a similar level of assimilation or acculturation existed.[213] In these communities, the pre-existing political and legal structures would presumably have been maintained after the settlement. They would likely have continued to operate in the local language and local practices would no doubt have possessed a cultural and religious significance of their own.[214] Roman law was not absent from these communities altogether; it was presumably utilised when 'full' Roman citizens were involved or perhaps when local inhabitants desired its use.[215] However, it was unlikely to be the norm and the very need for this rather flexible, perhaps parallel, legal system is noteworthy. Although the true motivation behind it is obviously beyond us, the deployment of either local or Roman law in particular situations hints that there was some awareness on the part of both the Romans and the members of the local population of the inappropriateness of enforcing Roman laws and practices across the board. Indeed, on a wider level, there is no evidence – archaeological or otherwise – to suggest that the Romans attempted to influence other aspects of life in these communities, for instance with local cults or religious practices, and indeed quite the opposite appears to have been the case.[216] I would therefore suggest that the use, and the continued use, of the local language and customs associated with the political and legal systems of non-Latin speaking communities influenced the decision to grant such communities only citizenship *sine suffragio*.

The question still remains as to why communities possessing *civitas sine suffragio* were specifically restricted from voting or holding office in Rome. On account of their lack of familiarity with Latin, Rome may have created a separate legal status whereby these Roman

[213] For example, the willingness of Caere to protect Rome's sacra from the Gauls (Livy. 5.50.3) suggests an amicable pre-existing relationship. However, the grant of *hospitium publicum*, and therefore access to Rome's body of law, came only after 387.
[214] The evidence for the local laws of incorporated communities is scarce, but the cases of Capua (Livy 9.20.5, 23.5.9) and Antium (Livy 9.20.10) suggest that the legal regulations were usually left in the hands of the communities themselves. On the topic of *civitas sine suffragio* and local laws, see Humbert (1978) 304-7.
[215] Capogrossi Colognesi (2014) 100-3.
[216] Terrenato (2013) 57-8. Building on this point, one might even ask if it were precisely the issue of religious practices that prescribed the maintenance of local laws and customs.

citizens were allowed to keep their local laws, in their local language, for day to day use as a practical measure. However, perhaps as part this arrangement, these communities were only permitted to elect their own local magistrates and not Rome's magistrates.[217] The flexibility that these communities enjoyed in having a choice between applying Roman or local laws may have made it inappropriate for individuals from them to have a say in the passing of legislation at Rome. It is possible, perhaps on account of the auspices or even simple political practicalities, that citizens were not supposed to be able to institute laws or hold office in more than one community at a time. Individuals in Central Italy may have been forced to choose their political association.

While the relationship between enforcing Roman law and holding a vote at Rome was not always present in the later Republic, the historical context in which *civitas sine suffragio* developed may offer some clues to explaining this restriction of voting rights. Prior to 338, it is reasonable to assume that a relatively strong overlap existed between citizenship, law, community, and territory.[218] Populations absorbed into Rome's fledgling empire received 'full' citizenship and, to the best of our knowledge, were completely assimilated – as seen, for instance, with the creation of new tribes on the ager Veientanus.[219] In Latium, with the possible exception of Tusculum (which became the first *municipium* in 381 BC), these circumstances only changed after the Latin Settlement, with the introduction of *civitas sine suffragio* and the Latin status. As the hitherto coinciding identities of 'Latinity' and the emerging sense of '*Romanitas*' slowly separated, the need for an alternative form of political affiliation may well have become evident – located somewhere in between the identity associated with full Roman citizenship and a distinct Latin identity. Apart from anything else, the continued use of alternative legal structures within these communities likely warranted the grant of an alternative citizenship. We might suppose then that *civitas sine suffragio* was the initial mechanism devised for dealing with non-Latin communities incorporated into Rome's empire in this liminal position. It should be expected that, as the developments in Rome's legal sphere and even the practice of empire itself influenced the concepts of citizenship, law, community,

[217] Possessing *civitas sine suffragio* only restricted suffrage in relation to the Roman political system. Sherwin-White (1973) 42.
[218] On the importance of this overlap in Roman perceptions of empire and problems with such a view, see Ando (2015) 8-13.
[219] Livy 8.13.16. Capogrossi Colognesi (2014: 14-15) outlines the nature of Rome's early conquests.

and territory, the mechanisms Rome utilised to bind its dependent allies would have evolved concurrently.[220]

If this hypothesis is correct, the ability to maintain and use local laws, even though that came at the expense of voting in Rome (something which, it must be noted, may not have been practical or possible for most anyway), need not be viewed in a negative light. A more neutral understanding of the status is possible. While Rome may very well have *utilised civitas sine suffragio* as a way to limit the ability of some communities to influence politics in Rome, varying levels of citizenship may have also allowed incorporated communities the option of moderating their level of inclusion; this is hinted at in those instances where communities and groups were offered a choice of status. We may equate voting rights in Rome with power, but there may have also been power in separation, something which was often expressed through linguistic means, as can be seen, for instance, in the inscriptions and coinage of Samnium. Although many in southern Italy would have spoken Latin and Oscan – Ennius represents the most obvious example – the continued use of Oscan in ritual contexts seems to reflect the maintenance of a distinct local identity.[221] This is not to say that the granting of either *civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio* was always politically neutral. Incorporating, or not incorporating, a community against its will could obviously represent a form of punishment. However, it is possible that, in the abstract at least, each type of citizenship (or non-citizenship) carried equal value and importance. The aspect of reward or punishment came down to context and specific application. In this way, if we are to salvage any aspect of Livy's suggestion that the granting of various types of citizenship was done in a policy of 'reward' or 'punishment', it might be that it was not the specific type of citizenship which was the reward or punishment, but rather the choice of which one was the most suitable in the given context.

Even if we accept that language was part of what separated *civitas* from *civitas sine suffragio*, there is no need to assume that the granting or withholding of the right to vote was intended to promote the spread of the Latin language.[222] The existence of a systemised language policy aimed at encouraging the spread of Latin with the incentive of 'full' citizenship in the

[220] Initially, other than the special case of the Latins, it may have been believed that only by granting a form of citizenship could communities be integrated directly under Rome's leadership. However, later developments may have made this practice obsolete. The increasing 'secularisation' of Roman law and the innovation of alternative legal mechanisms for dealing with foreigners in the third century seem particularly relevant. See Capogrossi Colognesi (2014) 126-7, 132-4. It would be difficult to maintain, though, that this change occurred in a uniform fashion.
[221] Scopacasa (2015) 278-94.
[222] As argued, for instance, by Kunkel (1966: 37).

Republican period is unlikely, simply because Rome lacked the means, and doubtless the interest, to undertake such a programme.[223] In the absence of such a policy, the use of these different statuses can only have originally been envisaged as recognition of the existing status quo and the different characteristics of individual communities that extended through language into legal, religious, and cultural contexts. By taking this view, it can be suggested that the creation of *civitas sine suffragio* for the Latin Settlement might have been an innovation designed to facilitate what can be referred to as 'the cultivation and management of difference'.[224] Ancient empires, when controlling diverse territories with heterogeneous populations, implemented strategies to regulate such differences, but also benefit from the effect they had upon their rule.[225] A model of this sort may help to explain the clear linguistic division between those granted *civitas* and those granted *civitas sine suffragio* in the Latin Settlement.

In constructing a model of this sort, it is useful to focus upon how Rome managed the incorporated communities. Rome's heavy reliance on the local elites in controlling local communities has been well attested in modern scholarship.[226] It was in Rome's interests to keep the local elites happy and this policy may very well have accomplished that. It is likely that at least some elites would have benefited from the local political and judicial structures continuing to function in accordance with the norms of their own communities, particularly in communities where the shift to Roman law and political systems would have been dramatic, requiring linguistic and religious changes. Indeed, the wholesale introduction of an entirely new basis for legal and political interactions may have created quite a bit of tension between the local elites and the local population and therefore also between the local elites and Rome. The general preservation of the existing legal and political systems within these communities, along with the occasional deployment of Roman law when needed, may have assisted the local elites in managing these systems on a day to day basis. Such a strategy would in turn have benefited Rome. If elites friendly to Rome could exert influence and control within their own communities, Rome's hold on those communities would become more secure.

The granting of citizenship, then, does not appear to be related to the promotion of compliance among the Italic communities. Instead, the granting of the statuses, particularly *civitas* and

[223] Kaimio (1979) 327-8; Farrell (2001) 2-3. Further problems with this model have been highlighted by Mouritsen (2007: 148-50).
[224] Ando (2015) 54.
[225] A brief, but useful, outline of this topic can be found in Lavan, Payne and Weisweiler (2016) 1-2.
[226] Most recently in Fronda (2010) 30-4.

civitas sine suffragio, seems to have performed a practical role in the functioning of Rome's empire, especially in regard to legal framework of the Italian Peninsula. We must look elsewhere if we are to identify the specific tactics that the Romans utilised within its strategy of alliance management.

1.5 – Dynamic Alliance Management

When considering the tactics that the Romans used to promote compliance among the Italic communities, it is important to remember that the political power and military superiority of the Romans was not constant. Since these were important factors in securing compliance through deterrence, the tactics with which the Romans secured the loyalty of the Italic communities during the Italian conquests are unlikely to have been the same as those used during periods of Roman dominance, or perhaps rather they were not relied on to the same degree. For instance, Rome's colonisation programme within the Italian Peninsula was prominent in the late fourth and early third centuries, but aside from the early decades of the second century there were few colonies established after Rome's conquest of the region.[227] This probably means that this particular tactic was not favoured in the later period or was largely unnecessary.[228] We should be aware, then, that for a hegemon to maintain its control over those incorporated into its leadership the tactics that it employed probably needed to be dynamic and alter depending on circumstances. Studies in Roman situational ethics demonstrate that the Romans did think along these lines,[229] but over the course of two centuries changing circumstances meant that Rome's approach yielded mixed results. The following chart demonstrates how the Romans' maintenance of compliance might be envisaged.

[227] Salmon (1967: 110-1, 159-65) provides lists of Roman established colonies. The predominantly northern colonies of the early second century were most likely guarding against future attacks from of the Gauls and perhaps even an ambitious campaign undertaken by a foreign power similar to Hannibal's.
[228] On the role of colonies as a tactic of alliance management see Chapter 2.1.
[229] See, for instance, Langlands (2011) 108-19.



Chart 1: The Cycle of Allied Compliance

Initially, the Romans placed communities under their leadership by either defeating them or receiving their surrender. These communities then entered into a *foedus* or similar form of agreement with Rome. This placed them in what might be called 'the allied condition' (identified in the chart as a double circle). Being in the allied condition, at least for an Italic community, meant that it possessed a status, giving the community a place in the legal framework of Rome's empire, and, either formally or informally, *amicitia* or possibly *societas*, which acknowledged its relationship with Rome as well as defining associated obligations and expectations. How satisfied a community was with these obligations and expectations is the first factor (identified as the boxed '1') that could determine whether a community was compliant with Roman leadership or sought to be non-compliant, usually in the form of revolt. Seen in the example of the Delian League, if allies were not treated to their expectations, a revolt might have taken place given the right external pressures. External pressures also influenced whether a community was compliant or non-compliant (this is the second factor, identified as the boxed '2'). These pressures were subject to change relative to Rome's military superiority in the Italian Peninsula. A stronger Rome would be more capable of deterring communities against revolting. Even if a community found its situation unfavourable

concerning the fulfilment of its interests and the external pressures were in Rome's favour, that community would probably be committed to a cycle of compliance as a result of deterrence. Similarly, if a community was satisfied with their situation and the external pressures were in Rome's favour, then the community would commit itself to the compliance cycle. It is, therefore, necessary to acknowledge the influence of both these factors on the cohesion of the Roman alliances, but more specifically that external pressures played a guiding role. Since both the satisfaction of the communities and military superiority of the Romans fluctuated between the mid fourth century and the outbreak of the Social War, it is best to analyse any changes within the context that they occurred.

ACHIEVING PENINSULAR HEGEMONY

2.0 – Introduction

For the purpose of analysing the Romans' approach to alliance management, it is possible to divide this study roughly into two periods. The first of these, the era of the Italian conquest (340-264) is the focus of this chapter. We will begin by considering the character of the Romans' superiority at this stage in their rise to Mediterranean hegemony.

Rome is usually depicted in modern scholarship as dominant within the Italian Peninsula prior to the Punic Wars. But this representation has been influenced by Rome's later position as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. Even the traditions of the Romans themselves tended to focus on the preconceived importance of the city from an early period.[230] The teleological features of these traditions, as well as the modern perception of the rise of Rome, have produced a static and incomplete picture of this process. The notion that Rome was 'destined' to reign over an empire encompassing the Italian Peninsula, let alone the Mediterranean, is deeply problematic.[231] The circumstances surrounding its rise were more complicated. We should not assume, then, that the processes enabling Romans to manage those under their leadership in the second century are the same processes that the Romans adopted in the fourth and third centuries. The Roman attitude towards empire is also likely to have been different at this time.

It is common for scholars of Roman history to overlook the geopolitical situation within the Italian Peninsula in the fourth and early third centuries.[232] Yet this factor alone would seem to undermine the notion that the Romans possessed overtly hegemonic powers in this period and regularly employed unilateral policies. The frequency of wars and revolts against Rome suggests that its leadership was less secure than is usually portrayed (see below). In this situation, it is difficult to imagine that the Romans were capable of the domineering character often exhibited in the later Republic. We might rightly expect a more complicated picture of

[230] The teleological depiction of Rome's rise is imprinted in the writings of Livy (1.4.1) and Virgil (*Aen*. 8. 630-728), among others.
[231] Polybius (1.6) famously identified the sack of Rome, traditionally dated to 390, as the point at which the Romans began a deliberate policy to expand their dominion. Of course, as Walbank (1972: 165) notes, when Polybius came to Rome in the middle of the second century, its established position of dominance likely made the rise of Roman power seem in retrospect more 'inevitable'.
[232] Bederman (2001: 46) calls for 'a more realistic attitude towards Roman strength' in this critical period of Roman expansion.

Rome's leadership. While the evidence for this period is generally poor, some evidence for Rome's approach to alliance management can be found.

This chapter will outline and analyse several tactics that the Romans implemented to keep the Italic communities compliant to their leadership during the early Republican period. I will focus first on the formation and management of relationships with the local elites. Through the granting of benefits, the Romans were able to ensure that it was in the interests of these elites, and by extension their communities, to remain loyal. On the other hand, the Romans seem to have removed or punished any hostile elites from these communities. Such repercussions would deter other elites from opposing Rome's leadership. This approach granting benefits for loyalty and establishing deterrence against defiance replicates perfectly the strategy outlined in the previous chapter. In this way, the Romans offered what Rosenstein calls 'the carrot of generosity and the stick of savagery'.[233] Those willing to cooperate would receive rewards, but non-compliant elites would be punished. It is also possible to identify a similar approach relating to the communities as a whole. These tactics too will be outlined. Through this dual-focused approach directed at certain individuals and the wider community, the Romans secured the compliance of the Italic communities.

2.1 – The Fragility of Rome's Leadership

Before investigating Rome's strategies for managing its empire in greater detail, it is worthwhile to consider the fragility of Rome's leadership during its incorporation of Italic communities in the late fourth and early third centuries. This fragility necessitated a more cooperative style of leadership. I will return to this subject in due course.

Prior to the Punic Wars, a large number of Italic communities which were incorporated under Rome's leadership rebelled against the Romans.[234] While Livy's rendering of these occasions as 'revolts' (*defectiones*) *may* be reflective of an anachronistic view on Roman power at the time, the potential anachronism has no bearing on my argument. These revolts clearly demonstrate Rome's inability to secure the compliance of surrounding communities regardless

[233] Rosenstein (2007) 235.
[234] A brief outline of the 'revolts' of the fourth century with some references can be found in Kent (2012) 75. Oakley (1997-2005: 3.300-3) offers a more in-depth discussion for the crucial year of 314.

of their relationship with the Romans.[235] The frequency of these revolts would suggest that every Italic community did not consider Rome's military strength a strong deterrent in this period. In short, there were revolts of the Apuli, Campani, Etruscans, Hernici, Lucani and Volsci between 340 and 264.[236] As a low estimate, I have calculated that thirty-seven revolts took place in this timeframe.[237] For this reason, Kent is not overambitious in saying that 'many of Rome's allies "revolted" at one point or another, often multiple times'.[238]

The possible motivations for these revolts are not difficult to grasp. The expansion of Rome's empire did not occur in a vacuum. Until the 260s both the Samnites and Tarentum were considerable geopolitical powers within in the Italian Peninsula. These communities were also capable of binding communities to themselves in alliances and likely sought to maximise their own influence on other Italic communities just as Rome had done.[239] The very length and scale of the Samnite and Pyrrhic Wars themselves are testament to the capabilities of these peoples. For this reason, the hegemony of the Italian Peninsula did not truly belong to the Romans until after the Pyrrhic War.[240]

There is reason to believe that prior to that war's conclusion the Samnites and Tarentines were equally viable candidates for potential alliances to Italic communities of smaller military strength. To those communities requiring external assistance from the constant warfare of the Italian Peninsula, allegiance with other communities was not only desirable, but seemingly a necessity.[241] Protection against a hostile force was perhaps the most immediate benefit of these

[235] For instance, Livy (8.3.8) characterises the Latin War of 340 as a revolt of the Latin communities (*defectio*), however, the extent to which these communities were under Rome's leadership at this time is questionable. Elsewhere, Livy (7.42.8) records in the year 342 that the Latins had been 'unfaithful' to their *foedera* for some time. I do not believe, however, that the *foedus Cassianum* granted the Romans the leadership of the Latin League in 493.

[236] These revolts at times generalise the demographics of the participants. In some cases, a single community was identified, in others an entire region. For instance, Apuli (Livy 9.26.1; 10.15.1); Campani (Livy 8.22.10; Diod. Sic. 19.65.7); Etruscans often rebelled with Umbrians (Livy 9.37.1, 41.8-9; 10.18.2, 45.6); Hernici (Livy 9.42.10); Lucani (Livy *Per*. 11.12; 12.12); Volsci (Livy 9.12.5, 23.2). See also Degrassi (1954) 95-101.

[237] See Chart 2 in Chapter 3.1 for further details on this calculation.

[238] Kent (2012) 75.

[239] The Samnites regularly allied with the Campani, Etruscans and Lucani. But as Dench (1995: 205-9) has proven, the term 'Samnites' could constitute a more diverse group than the singular term might suggest. In the case of Tarentum, this community was effectively the hegemon of the Italiote League for some time, but had declined by the time it came into contact with the Romans. See Lomas (1993) 39-48.

[240] Here I follow Sherwin-White (1973) 39, Staveley (1989) 420 and Stone (2013) 35. Carlà-Uhink (2017: 30-1) and Williams (2001: 128) too stress the importance of the Pyrrhic War on Rome's claim to the Italian Peninsula. Pallottino (1991: 129) dates Rome's hegemony from 295 after the Battle of Sentium, but this point of view underestimates the size and importance of the conflicts that occurred between the Romans and other Italic communities until 264.

[241] A line that Appian (*Sam*. 7.3) attributed to a Tarentine elite suggests as much: 'to fight without allies is hazardous' (trans. White, 1972).

alliances. The Romans, however, were not unique in their willingness to offer this sort of assistance to its neighbouring communities. Indeed, the surviving evidence for the fourth and third centuries clearly indicates that many alliances existed between many communities.[242] To offer just one example, the Etruscans often allied with the Samnites in the first half of the third century.[243] Italic communities had options when selecting allies. At the same time, though, there were more communities of greater strength who might force an alliance on them.

The frequency of alliance creation and realignment in this period is likely a product of these circumstances. Several communities changed alliances on multiple occasions. According to Livy, the Lucani changed allegiances between the Romans and the Samnites in 326, once in 298 and on at least one occasion after 290.[244] A similar realignment can be seen in the case of the Lucerini between 321 and 314,[245] as well as some of the Campani in 340 and 326.[246] Kent's recent work supplies an explanation for the frequent changes of allegiances in this period. By tracing the alliance of the Campani and Samnites during prior to the Latin War, he concludes that these early alliances were rather fluid since they were more concerned with short term goals.[247] Initially, in 343, the Campani had approached the Romans for assistance against the Samnites, only to unite with the Latins against these people when Rome made peace with their enemy in 341.[248] Once the Romans were friendly towards the Samnites, there was little guarantee that the protection they sought from the Romans against the Samnites would be forth coming.[249] The Campani, therefore, needed an alternative alliance through which to secure this interest. In turn though, the Campani-Latin alliance prompted the formation of the Roman-Samnite alliance which was ultimately successful in the war. It was not in the interest of the Romans or the Samnites for the Latins and the Campani to form an alliance with enough military strength to threaten them individually. The formation of these alliances, much like others of the time, was a response to self-interests and external pressures.

---

[242] The existence of nominally ethnic leagues throughout the Italian Peninsula denotes forms of military alliances. For a brief outline of military alliances independent of Rome's influence, particularly of alliances in Magna Graecia, see Pallottino (1991) 122-5.
[243] Livy 10.18.2.
[244] Livy 8.25.3, 27.10; 10.12.2. Degrassi (1954) 96-8.
[245] Livy 9.2.5, 26.1.
[246] Livy 8.2.6-7, 12.5, 22.10. The 'revolt' of the Campani in 326 involved seemingly only Naples and Nola.
[247] Kent (2012) 75-7.
[248] The relevant accounts are Livy 7.30.1-31.12, 8.2.1-3.3.
[249] Regarding the Sidicini, Livy (8.2.3) claims that the Romans had left the decision of whether the Samnites could to go to war with these people up to them since it did not break any existing *foedus*. Although the situation of the Campani was different, the freedom afforded to the Samnites would have been unsettling to them. It is reasonable to expect, however, that Livy gives too much authority over the Samnites' foreign policy to the Romans in this episode.

Since short term goals heavily influenced such alliances, we may be able to speculate upon how these affected the decision-making process of a community in regard to its choice of allies. Eckstein introduced the Realist concept known as the 'security dilemma' to the study of Roman imperialism. According to this doctrine, the primary goal of any community was to ensure its own survival.[250] Following this theory, it is possible that communities closest to large territorial powers may have felt compelled to align with the larger community out of pressure or fear of their military strength. It was safer for a community to submit to a greater power than to face potential destruction as a result of conflict. Some evidence of these considerations can be found in the ancient evidence. Aside from a small number of exceptions, the Latins do not revolt against the Romans after 338.[251] Presumably, this is partly due to their proximity to Rome and the military strength that the Romans could have raised quickly. The existence of alternative powers within the Italian Peninsula, such as the Samnites and Tarentum, does, however, mean that these considerations could have worked against the Romans. In 326, Livy tell us that the Samnites had supported the revolt of Palaepolis.[252] Prior to this revolt, it was rumoured that the Samnites, in the expectation of Palaepolis siding with them, were preparing to enter the territory of that community.[253] The very threat of such an army perhaps meant the community was forced to side with the Samnites. Palaepolis' choice lay between fighting either the Romans or the Samnites. Given the immediate threat of the Samnites, revolt against Rome perhaps seemed the safer option at the time. In the event that Palaepolis did side with the Romans and the Samnites had besieged the city, the Romans were not in a position to provide immediate help to the inhabitants. Only after the revolt did they send an army.[254] Consequently, the inhabitants of Palaepolis solved their security dilemma by surrendering to the Samnites. Thus, due to the dilution of perceivable military strength across geographical distances, the military strength of the Samnites and Tarentum greatly affected the cohesion of Rome's alliances.[255]

[250] See Eckstein (2006: 14, 21-2) for the nature of the security dilemma and associated Realist paradigms. This sort of thinking can even be found in Roman era writers. Cicero (*Rep*. 3.34), for instance, in constructing his own ideal city-state, acknowledges the fundamental importance of survival.
[251] These exceptions include Fregellae in 125 and Venusia during the Social War.
[252] Livy 8.23.10. Oakley (1997-2005: 2.643) seems correct in suggesting Palaepolis was perhaps simply a section of Naples (Neapolis).
[253] Livy 8.23.10.
[254] Ibid.
[255] In the above case, the Samnites' military strength was presumably deemed greater than the Romans on account of its proximity. Agnew (1999: 501) notes that political power 'strengthens and weakens geographically' since it relies on transmission or retransmission to penetrate distant localities. Military power too is subject to this same restraint. See Livy 41.24.8-9 for the relationship between power and geography in the context of the Achaean League and Macedonia.

Roman policy makers did seemingly recognise these geopolitical problems and devise tactics to extend the reach of Rome's military strength and power. In this way, they took measures to mitigate the possibility that another formidable military power could have intimidated communities into revolt. An obvious example of such a tactic is the placement of colonies in strategic positions in order to consolidate and protect allied territories.[256] For instance, the Romans established Suessa Aurunca in 313 on the passage leading from Campania into Latium Adjectum between the Apennines and the volcanic group of Rocca Monfina near the *Via Latina*.[257] Rome was plainly interested in securing this passage from the Samnites with whom they had shared hostilities for over a decade at the time. Naturally, these fortified communities would have protected communities from external threats, thereby satisfying any nearby community's security interests.[258] As an imposing demonstration of Rome's power in themselves, these military outposts would have deterred most communities from even contemplating raids on Roman allies. The establishment of these colonies in fact projected Rome's power throughout the Italian Peninsula by creating a symbolic image of territorial control.[259] A community capable on establishing outposts in distant territories would not doubt have formidable military strength. Moreover, these outposts distributed military forces, which as a result limited any response time needed to address any threat and mitigated the dilution of power across geographical space. Allies and enemies alike could no doubt have also concluded that the inhabitants of the colonies might be ordered against them if the Romans felt the need. Colonies, therefore, functioned both as a benefit that provided for the defence of nearby communities, and as well as a deterrence against revolt.

Since military strength formed a key element in the Romans' ability to maintain their empire, it was necessary to display this strength continually. The elements of the Roman military ethos, such as the triumphal procession at which the allies were present, were certainly one way to highlight the Romans' prowess at warfare to those from the Italic communities, but cultural

[256] Salmon (1969: 15) stresses the militaristic nature of the early Latin and Roman colonies that seem to have guarded the extremities of Rome's fledgling empire. See also Campbell (2002) 171. Bispham (2006: 91) is right to note that this explanation does not explain the establishment of every colony. For instances, as Bradley (2014: 62) argues, the island colony of Pontiae is unlikely to have served this function. See also Bradley (2006) 91 for further criticism of this hypothesis. Cassius Dio (9.13) and Zonaras (8.3) provide evidence that garrisons were sent out to various communities prior to the Pyrrhic War, but this practice seems to have not been commonplace. This was done to prevent them from revolting.
[257] Livy 9.28.7.
[258] For instance, Asconius (*Pis.* 3) notes that the placement of a colony at Placentia sought specifically to defend the region against the Gauls.
[259] Lawrence (1999: 19-20) notes the relationship between controlling landscapes and hegemony.

practices were no substitute for regular success on the battlefield.[260] Often these campaigns offered strategic value to Rome's alliances. For instance, Livy records that the Romans assisted the Lucerini against the Samnites in 321 because their involvement would have prevented a general uprising in Apulia had the region come under any threat from the nearby Samnites.[261] However, this act went further than simply removing a military threat from the region. Providing help to an ally, in this case the Lucerini, reminded other allies that the Romans were capable of protecting the members of its alliance. The act itself justifies Rome's position as the senior member of the alliances. The inability to defend allies from threats would have been seen as a form of weakness.[262] This would in turn have undermined Rome's goal of outwardly exhibiting an image of military strength and success. Other communities might have viewed this image of weakness to justify and promote their independence from Rome or even their own hegemonic aspirations. The stronger the Romans appeared to others, the more likely its alliances would remain cohesive.

That being said, as we have seen in the case of the *Mytilenian Debate*, the goodwill of a hegemon could be as effective at securing the loyalty of allies, particularly over time. Given the importance of securing a community's interest to this process, it does seem that the Romans were capable of providing enough incentive to the communities to ensure their compliance. Rome's approach to this tactic seems to have had a particular focus on helping the local elites secure their interests. This is perhaps unsurprising since the Romans relied heavily on the local elites to control their own communities in the absence of the administrative structures essential to modern nation-states.[263]

2.2 – Local Assistance

We might readily imagine that an informal *quid pro quo* agreement existed between Roman and local elites. [264] The Roman elites might have supported the interests of the local elites. In

[260] For military strength to translate into political power and influence, it is necessary for its holder to continually demonstrate its capabilities. See Tritle (2006) 491.
[261] Livy 9.2.3-5.
[262] A community that achieves hegemony must also bear the responsibility of protecting those over whom they rule. See Rosenstein (2007) 237. Strauss (1997: 136) contrasts the success of the Romans, who clearly prided themselves on being able to protect their allies, to the failures of the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War. The latter seemed either incapable or disinterested in defending their allies, in particular Melos (Thuc. 5.104-5).
[263] The lack of quick means of communication between distant communities meant that the Romans were particularly reliant on the pre-existing structures. See further, Patterson (2016) 485.
[264] Woolf (2012: 42) describes this arrangement as establishing a 'community of interest'.

return, as the script of *amicitia* demands, Roman elites would expect the goodwill and compliance of the local elites. By extension, in the elites' role as the magistrates and influential members of their communities, these individuals could promote compliance within their local communities. Through this mechanism, then, the Romans would have been able to influence the Italic communities themselves. The ongoing cooperation of these local elites was, therefore, vital to the exercise of Rome's power.[265]

The interests that the Romans could have secured for the local elites likely varied quite widely depending on the community. When ancient empires undertook such tactics, the hegemonic elites, in this case Roman elites, regularly allowed the local elites to share in some of the material spoils of military expansion.[266] This certainly seems to be true in this case. The Mopsii from Compsa, whom Livy describes as 'a powerful family on account of Roman favour', are perhaps most prominent example of such elites during the Middle Republic.[267] Particularly in the second century, building programmes sponsored by elites were testament to their increasing wealth.[268] Indeed, the sharing of spoils gained through successful warfare is a general indication of Rome's willingness to share the successes of empire with both the elites and lower classes of the Italic communities.[269] As long as these material interests were forthcoming, the Romans could probably expect local elites to toe the line.

Modern scholars, including Lomas and Pobjoy, have previously covered the topic of the enrichment of elites during the mid to late Republic.[270] For this reason it will not be necessary to devote too much time to this topic. Instead, I will focus on other interests of the local elites that often escape consideration.

The Romans occasionally assisted local elites displaced from influential positions within their own communities. Evidence from this period is, of course, scarce, but there are a few recorded instances of the Romans supplying military assistance to local elites in order to re-establish

[265] This cooperation could be vital given the cultural differences that might exist between Rome and an Italic community. See Lavan, Payne and Weisweiler (2016) 2-5.
[266] Ibid. 5.
[267] Livy 23.1.2. The community only seceded to Hannibal during the Second Punic War after the family had vacated the town.
[268] For example, a number of aristocratic families named in an inscription monumentalised at Pietrabbondante. See Scopacasa (2014) 73-5.
[269] This is one condition in the *Foedus Cassianum* (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.95) and appears to have remained constant until the second century (e.g. Livy 41.13.8) as far as we can tell. Strauss (1997: 138) lists the sharing of profits as essential to the long-term success of alliances.
[270] The enrichment of local elites is best presented by monumental dedications. See Lomas (1997) 21-41 and Pobjoy (2000b) 77-92. It should be noted that evidence for wealth of elites for the fourth and third centuries is meagre.

these individuals to their positions. It is attractive to think that only these few occasions seemed worthy of mention to ancient writers.

Livy records the first of these instances of Roman assistance involving the elites of Arretium for the year 302. He suggests that the Romans specifically intervened in this insurrection to assist the Cilnii, a powerful family within the community.[271] This may have involved a military campaign, or simply the 'peaceful' reconciliation of the Cilnii with the people of Arretium.[272] Whatever the approach used, this intervention, specifically undertaken to assist the local elite, does seem to have had positive long term effects for Rome's leadership. The community appears to have been more willing to accept the Roman hegemony and was even prepared to acknowledge its position in relation to Rome's hegemony.[273] We might suppose, therefore, that local elites were indebted to the Romans for their assistance. Returned to their former position, these elites could once again benefit from the prominence they enjoyed as community leaders. So as not to risk losing the benefits associated with their position, they would seek to maintain the status quo. This would have included a close relationship with Rome. Subsequently, the positive outcomes for these elites boosted the compliance of their community to Rome's leadership.

While Livy describes the above insurrection as a conflict between the elites and the lower classes of the community, it might be supposed the situation was more complex than the account indicates. Indeed, Fronda's work has rightly emphasised the probability that hostile elites existed alongside those friendly to Rome in each Italic community.[274] It is precisely this internal division within the communities that the Romans likely sought out and exploited.[275] Some local elites perhaps traded their influence within their communities for Roman assistance to further their own political careers.[276] Elites friendly towards the Romans benefitted from their relationship, while other elites found themselves in a weakened position since they

[271] Livy 10.3.2, 5.13.
[272] Livy's main narrative relates the military campaign against the Etruscans (10.3.6-5.12), but he also states that a more diplomatic approach to assisting the Cilnii can be found in some of his sources (10.5.13).
[273] Although eight years after this episode we are told that Arretium sued for peace with Rome, it might be possible to attribute the later revolt to external pressure since it took place during a general revolt of the Etruscans. Besides, Oakley (1997-2005: 3.415) seems right to suggest that they were not held to the same level of responsibility as the Volsinii or Perusia. See Livy 10.37.4. The need to compensate the Romans implies that the community played some role in the revolt (Livy 10.37.5). Yet the call for assistance against the Gauls later in 284 would seem to imply that the community was on favourable terms with Rome and, further still, were under their protection (Polyb. 2.19.7).
[274] Fronda (2010) 30-2. Attitudes towards Rome were likely affected by the self-interest of the elites themselves.
[275] Patterson (2016) 485.
[276] Again, the Cilnii seem the best example.

received no external assistance. In the ebb and flow of local politics, hostile elites might have gained prominence preceding the outbreak of this and other revolts.[277] Rome's aim would have been to restore the prominence of the friendly elites. This appears to be precisely what occurred at Arretium on these occasions. A similar pattern may have occurred in other Italic communities as well.

Perhaps as a result of Rome's fragile leadership in the period, the tactic of supporting local elites did not always ensure the continual compliance of the Italic communities. This seems most obvious in the case of the Lucani. Livy tells us that the elites of the community were under threat from the common people in 296.[278] But again, a more complicated picture is likely.[279] The possibility that a rival group of elites incited this insurrection seems quite plausible. The infidelity of the Lucani over a thirty-year period is probably best read with this in mind. We might speculate that a group of elites hostile towards Rome held sway in 326 when the Lucani re-allied with the Samnites.[280] A pro-Roman group may have gained prominence when they once again allied with Rome in 298, only for the pro-Samnite group to reassert itself two years later.[281] The changing of allegiances appears to be influenced by geopolitical experiences. For instance, in 298 Livy claims that the Samnites raided the territory of the Lucani.[282] Circumstances such as these would naturally be capable of influencing the policies adopted by the Lucani. The Samnites' activities prompted certain elites of the Lucani to seek the assistance of the Romans, who possessed more military strength than themselves, against the Samnite raids. The proximity of the Lucani to Samnium, though, likely meant that these people could regularly influence local policy through their own networks of the elites and military strength. Indeed, the *Fasti Triumphales* indicates that the Lucani regularly sided with the Samnites against Rome in the first half of the third century despite also regularly being allies.[283] The tactic, therefore, was not always an immediate success. Clearly other factors were

[277] Each of Arretium's two revolts appears as part of a wider Etruscan disloyalty. More ethnocentric elites and policies may have gained prominence at this time.
[278] Livy 10.18.8.
[279] Even in the event of a popular uprising, we might expect that individuals of some social standings would be needed to instigate the insurrection (Isaac [1993] 384). For this reason, the opposition of the *optimates* and plebeians in particular might reflect the conservative and popular political approaches found at Rome in the Late Republic that has been retrojected into the third century.
[280] Livy 8.27.10.
[281] Livy 10.12.2. The political factors associated with these changes in allegiance should also not be underestimated.
[282] Livy 10.11.11.
[283] Degrassi (1954) 97-9.

also in play. Yet the persistence to support local elites clearly demonstrates the importance of such a tactic to Rome's overall alliance management.

In the case of Thurii in 282, the Romans again gave assistance to those local elites whom they had backed. According to Appian, the Tarentines captured Thurii and expelled the most distinguished citizens of the city (ἐπιφανεῖς αὐτῶν).[284] It seems, then, that the Tarentines specifically targeted the elites of the city. This episode reveals their importance of local support not only to the Romans, but also to other hegemonic aspirants. Following their removal, the Romans sent an embassy to Tarentum seeking to restore these citizens and their property.[285] As Appian specifies that only the noblest citizens were removed from the city, it would seem reasonable to assume that these were the elites most amicable with the Rome and, consequently, most hostile to the Tarentines. We may conclude that Tarentum wished to interrupt Rome's influence on the city by removing the elites who were most closely aligned with the Romans. Furthermore, Appian identifies the Thurini's preference for Roman leadership over that of the Tarentines as a key reason for the assault on Thurii.[286] The removal of these individuals would have been highly advantageous to the Tarentines and their own political aspirations in the region. This would have especially been the case if Tarentum had promised rival elites positions of prominence in return for their assistance. While our source makes no direct identification of such a group of elites, the nature of the city's capture would presumably have required internal assistance.[287]

The episode, as Appian records it, implies that Tarentum was consciously aware of Rome's reliance on local elites. The assault on Thurii seems to be designed precisely to undermine Rome's influence on the community by severing its ties with the local elites. Hannibal, of course, famously undertook a similar strategy during the Second Punic War.[288] This again highlights the importance these relationships had to Rome's leadership of the Italic communities. It is understandable that the Romans did everything in their power to reinstate these individuals.[289] By restoring the elites to their position, the Romans would in turn have

[284] App. *Sam*. 3.7.1. Both Valerius Maximus (1.8.6) and Livy (*Per*. 11) give evidence for Rome's earlier assistance to the Thurini against the Lucani and Bruttii (c. 285).
[285] App. *Sam*. 3.7.2.
[286] App. *Sam*. 3.7.1.
[287] App. *Sam*. 3.7.1-2. We typically hear of an individual or individuals simply opening the gates for an awaiting army. This is also certainly the case of the recapture of Croton. Zonar. 8.6; Frontin. *Str*. 3.6.4.
[288] Fronda (2010) 34-7. See below, Chapter 3.1.
[289] The episode is portrayed by Appian (*Sam*. 7.2-3) as a direct precursor to the Pyrrhic War. The state of the sources for this era does not allow us to determine if the Romans successfully restored the expelled citizens after the completion of this war.

maintained their own influence within that community through their relationship with the leading elites.

To highlight just how important this tactic was to Rome's approach to alliance management, the Romans continued to assist the local elites even after they had secured the hegemony of the Italian Peninsula. The case of the Volsinii in 264 is evidence of this.[290] While the Romans would have dominated the Italian Peninsula at this time, even small uprisings might have cascaded into larger revolts that threatened Rome's hegemony. Besides, the Romans reliance on the support of the local elites was ongoing. For this reason, the Romans needed to engage positively with the local elites. Through this process, Rome's relationship with the Italic communities would be strengthened and the cohesion of their alliance maintained.

2.3 – Intermarriage of Roman and Local Elites

While satisfying the political and material interests of the local elites secured a degree of compliance for the Romans, the use of marriages reinforced the connections within the network of elites. Marriage with local elites further tied these individuals to the Romans through direct familial relations.[291] This action also placed a Roman, usually a woman, within the Italic communities, who may have been in a position to influence the political process, or at the very least relate the happenings of a community back to Rome.[292] Such relationships could influence the policies the community adopted. For instance, Livy states that the marriages between Roman and Capuan families had initially prevented the community from defecting to Hannibal.[293] In this case, the leader of the pro-Roman faction at the time, Pacuvius Calavius, was married to Julia, the daughter of the consular ranked Appius Claudius.[294] Further still,

[290] Every account of this particular insurrection retells the story of how the local elites had succumbed to luxury and had ultimately been overthrown by their ambitious former slaves (Zonar. 8.7; Flor. 1.16; Oros. 4.5.3; Val. Max. 9.1. *ext.* 2). However, Capozza (1997: 28-41) has suggested that the laziness of the elites is likely more connected to concerns of the first century CE rather than any true reflection of the situation in the third century BCE. I agree with Fronda (2010: 26) in placing the responsibility for the revolt in the hands of hostile elites who sought to break away from the Roman alliance. Again, then, the restoration of the 'ancient citizens', albeit to a new community, was a tactic aimed at maintaining influence with the community though local elites (Zonar. 8.7).
[291] Connections between elites of different Italic communities had existed from archaic times. See Terrenato (2007) 18-20.
[292] Harders (2008: 51-9) argues that the horizontal relationships between elite families were established and maintained by women. See also Carney (2011) 208 for a similar conclusion concerning the role of marriages in Hellenistic world. For the case of Capua in 340, Livy (8.3.3) states that individuals with personal ties of hospitality and kinship leaked information concerning a war that the Capuans had conspired against Rome.
[293] Livy 23.4.7.
[294] Livy 23.2.5-7.

Calavius had a daughter married to Marcus Livius, who had also served as consul.[295] Although similar examples of these connections are not widely recorded,[296] we might take Beck's point of view that elite marriage had more influence on Romano-Italic relations than is indicated by the evidence.[297] For this reason, the topic deserves more consideration than it usually receives.[298]

Immediately, though, the use of elite marriages within Rome's approach to alliance management faces one significant issue. For a marriage to be legally binding between a Roman and a foreigner (*peregrinus*) according to Roman law, the foreigner must have possessed *conubium*.[299] Whether the bestowal of *conubium* was widespread has been a matter of debate from some time.[300] However, Roselaar's analysis of the evidence found in Livy seems to confirm the selectivity of Roman grants awarding *conubium*.[301] She rightly points out that the Anagini and other Hernican communities were restricted from the right of *conubium* despite being Roman citizens without the vote.[302] At the time of the Herican communities' incorporation, only the inhabitants of Aletrium, Verulae and Ferentinum received this right.[303] It is, therefore, evident that not all communities were granted *conubium* upon incorporation. As previously mentioned, Roselaar is convinced that the Latins allies in particular did not receive *conubium*, only the Latin colonists were granted this privilege.[304] If the legal right to marry was as restricted as Roselaar suggests, then the selectivity of grants of *conubium* limits the impact that intermarriage could have on Rome's alliance management.

I would suspect, however, that grants of *conubium* were at least the norm for communities possessing *civitas sine suffragio*.[305] The example of the Hernican communities may just infer that certain privileges were granted separately to legal status. Restrictions of this right could take place, but Livy's account would suggest that these were abnormal for communities

[295] Ibid.
[296] Accounts of marriages between Romans and local elites for which there is some evidence can be found in Wiseman (1971) 53-64, Hölkeskamp (1987) 177-8 with references and, of course, Münzer (1991).
[297] Beck (2015) 68.
[298] The unwillingness to cover this topic seems to stem from the many critiques of Münzer's larger notion of familial factions (1999, e.g. 97-105). The occurrence of intermarriage between Roman and Italian elites though has never been questioned. See Beck (2015) 59-60.
[299] Gai. *Inst*. 1.55-6. Treggiari (1991: 43-9) is the seminal work for the legalities of marriages between Romans and non-Romans.
[300] For instance, Galsterer (1976: 103) argues that most *socii* possessed *conubium* by the time of the Social War.
[301] Roselaar (2013) 109-10.
[302] Ibid; Livy 9.43.24.
[303] Livy 9.43.23.
[304] Roselaar (2013) 111-3.
[305] Roselaar (2013: 120) too shares this view.

possessing *civitas sine suffragio*. Cicero certainly seems adamant that the right was customarily given to allied communities in earlier times.[306] For this reason, I cannot identify grants of *conubium* as a 'hegemonic tool' in the way Roselaar does.[307] Besides, even in the event that *conubium* was heavily restricted, it seems reasonable to suppose that individuals received the grant and not the communities.[308] This could have taken place quite regularly among the *socii* and the Latins allies. Such grants would have replicated the basic patterns of marriage in archaic Italy among elites of different communities who received *hospitium*.[309] If this were the case, the restriction of this privilege from some communities does not undermine the argument that marriages were used to safeguard pre-existing alliances.

The few references to marriages between elites of different Italic communities do in fact highlight the role these marital connections were meant to play in the cohesion of the Roman alliances. Patterson identifies two key references to the intermarriage between Romans and the elites of other Italic communities.[310] The first has already been mentioned above: the revolt of Capua.[311] The second occasion belongs to the instance of the Social War. Diodorus Siculus mentions that the two armies recognised soldiers from the opposing side with whom they shared personal friendship and relations.[312] These two episodes illustrates the tendency of ancient writers to only acknowledge such marriages in relation to the revolts of communities. This would seem to suggest that these writers thought that marriages between members of different communities should have been capable of preventing revolts. It is the fact that they do not which makes them worthy of mention. A further example will demonstrate this point.

---

[306] Cicero (*Rep.* 2.63) in discussing the prohibition of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians in the fifth century notes that intermarriage was usually permitted between individuals of different communities (*diiunctis populis tribui*).

[307] Roselaar (2013: 116) argues that grants of *conubium* privileged some communities over others. However, there seems little reason for the average Latin, for example, to desire such a right at this time. It is difficult to see how the Romans could have restricted the marriages of commoners, assuming of course they had the desire to do so. In regard to *conubium* being utilised as a 'hegemonic tool', the exclusion of local elites from different communities intermarrying among themselves (*inter ipsos*) certainly could be viewed in this way. This tactic would effectively prohibit familial alliances being formed between Italic communities. The applicability beyond this though seems limited.

[308] Roselaar (2013: 116) acknowledges that grants could be made to both individuals and entire communities. Contra De Visscher (1952) 403.

[309] Capogrossi Colognesi (2014: 90) offers a useful discussion the nature and relatively widespread grants of this right in the early to middle Republic. I see no reason why *conubium*, when required, could not also be distributed in a similar way.

[310] Patterson (2006) 148-9.

[311] Additionally, following Capua's recapture, Livy (26.33.3) suggests that the Capuans were required to appear before the Senate as they were Roman citizens (in most cases they possessed *civitas sine suffragio*) and many were related to Romans through marriage.

[312] Diod. Sic. 37.15.2. The reference also would seem to indicate that marriages existed Romans and *peregrini* at the lower levels of society. In the past, e.g. Galsterer (1976) 102-3, this episode was used as evidence that the *socii* widely possessed *conubium.* However, see now Roselaar (2013) 117-8.

Valerius Maximus records that Aulus Atilius Calatinus was guilty of betraying Sora to the Samnites in 306, but he was ultimately cleared of this crime on the merit of his father-in-law, Q. Fabius Maximus, the Roman consul of 322.[313] In this case, again, we see the clear association between ancient authors highlighting marital ties and an instance of revolt.

It seems then that the marriage of Roman and local elites was likely thought to promote congenial allegiance between the communities involved. While this is largely an argument *ex silentio*, Wiseman seems right to think that the casual references in the sources strongly suggest that alliances reinforced through this means were not unusual and perhaps taken for granted in Roman society.[314] We might assume that the Romans saw the importance of the role marriages could play in reinforcing the alliance's foundation as well as promoting shared interests between the communities involved.

Beck has rightly noted that only by placing importance on marital unions is it possible to justify the connection between marriage and alliances that is present in the traditions of the Romans themselves.[315] According to Livy, the early Latins and Trojans established a *foedus* through the marriage of Lavinia and Aeneas.[316] Here Livy explicitly associates the connection between the private link of marriage and the public *foedus*.[317] The Rape of the Sabines is another significant episode linking alliances with marriage from the mythology of Rome's foundation. The Livian tradition records that, after Sabine women who had been taken by the Romulus and his followers pleaded for a friendly resolution, the two leaders established a *foedus* and ultimately decided to form a single community.[318] To offer one final example, Florus claims that the relationship between Cn. Pompeius and Julius Caesar deteriorated only after the death of Julia in 54.[319]

In short, there seems to be an intrinsic connection between alliance and marriage. This connection would explain why marriage relations of prominent individuals were occasionally

[313] Val. Max. 8.1.9.
[314] Wiseman (1971) 54.
[315] Beck (2015) 61-2.
[316] Livy 1.1.9.
[317] Livy 1.1.9 (trans. De Sélincourt, 1971): 'A [*foedus*] was made; the two armies exchanged signs of mutual respect; Aeneas accepted the hospitality of Latinus, who gave his daughter in marriage, thus further confirming the [*foedus*] by a private and domestic bond'.
[318] Livy 1.14.4-5.
[319] Flor. 2.13.13 (trans. Foster, 1966): 'But when Crassus had fallen fighting against the Parthians, and Julia, who, as Caesar's daughter and the wife of Pompeius, by the bond of marriage maintained friendly relation between father-in-law and son-in-law, had died, rivalry immediately broke out'. See also the more sceptical account in Plutarch (*Pomp*. 53).

cited by the ancient writers in the event of a community rebelling against Rome. There would only presumably be a need to mention these marriages if the connection was meant to establish a stronger bond between families and between the communities to which they belonged.

2.4 – The Fate of Hostile Entities: Exemplary Deterrents

The Romans' approach to alliance management required them to offer incentives for loyalty via 'the carrot of generosity', but the deterrence applied with 'the stick of savagery' was equally as important. The key to the two-pronged approach would be to make any rebellious intent seem both futile and unprofitable. The Romans sought to convince the Italic communities that remaining loyal and compliant would be the more prudent option, and preferably the only option. Indeed, Rosenstein states that the Romans wished to present themselves as a people not to be crossed, which required that they demonstrate a degree of harshness.[320] This behaviour would have dissuaded individuals and communities from undertaking rebellious actions. The deterrence against revolt would, therefore, largely have been based on the treatment of previously rebellious actors. For this reason, the Romans handed out punishments that were in part exemplary in nature.

Deterrence established by this means, however, does rely on the spread of information through channels of communication. It is not immediately self-evident that had, for instance, the Romans supressed a revolt of an Etruscan community, how information concerning its punishment would have reached Apulia in an era lacking modern forms of communication. Some attention must be given to the channels of communication that existed at the time. It is likely that in most cases inhabitants, both elite and non-elite, of many Italic communities were present for the meting out of punishments as part of their military service.[321] The elite networks could then have acted as a medium through which such information might be slowly shared.[322] Alternatively, markets might have offered a place for discussion and rumour among the lower

[320] Rosenstein (2007) 237.
[321] This may be as part of the force that subdued the revolting community or as a witness to the visible punishments seen, for instance, in the triumphal procession (e.g. Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.66-7).
[322] Austin and Rankov (1995: 9-10) offer a summary of means through which political and military information might be transmitted. They conclude (1995: 35) that most information in this period would likely have taken oral form. Lawrence (1999: 82) estimates that more official forms of communication could have reached all communities of the Italian Peninsula within five days.

classes.[323] These were sufficient communication channels both to transmit information concerning the punishment of communities and, subsequently, to establish the deterrence.

Our sources regularly single out members of the local elites for punishment in the event of a revolt. For instance, Livy states explicitly that most of the Tusculani were not affected by the Latin Settlement as most of the blame fell on a few ringleaders.[324] Given that the Romans relied on the influence of local elites within the communities, these punishments were no doubt designed to deter other elites, whether friendly or hostile to Rome, from pursuing similar actions. Since these individuals were the most likely candidates to organise revolts, the Romans seem to have focused some attention on this group.[325]

The punishments that the Romans meted out on these elites could differ in severity. One possible outcome that such individuals faced in the event of an unsuccessful uprising was expulsion. Livy informs us that the senators of Velitrae were forced to relocate across the Tiber.[326] The Romans perhaps dealt out a similar punishment to the elites of Tusculum in the case mentioned above. Theoretically, this process would only leave elites who were friendly towards the Romans in charge of each community, or at least those that would think better of undertaking rebellious actions.

The practice of removing local elites hostile to Rome was not restricted to expulsion from the community but in many cases resulted in execution. According to Livy, the leading citizens of Privernum were put to death in 329.[327] The same treatment was reserved for the ringleaders of Sora's revolt fifteen years later as well as those Frusinates responsible for interfering with the Hernici.[328] This tactic was seemingly so effective that it remained in use for most of the period in question. A later and more famous example would be the case of Capua in 211, where a large number of the senators are said to have been executed, while others were imprisoned or distributed among other communities, but who too seemed to have been killed.[329]

---

[323] Austin and Rankov (1995) 27.
[324] Livy 8.14.4.
[325] Salmon (1962: 108-9) suggests that the Italic communities did not undertake any anti-Roman campaign in the second century because their '*principes*' had no interest in organising any action because they were reasonably content with the Roman hegemony. While his wider argument perhaps misses the mark, he does recognise the importance of leadership in a revolt.
[326] Livy 8.14.5-6. Although the Veliterni were perhaps not strictly under Rome's leadership until after the Latin Settlement, this episode does demonstrate Rome's policy of removing hostile elites.
[327] Livy 8.20.10-11.
[328] Livy 9.24.14-5 (Sora); 10.1.3 (Frusinates).
[329] Livy 26.16.5-6.

The policy for placing most of the responsibility for community's disloyalty upon the local elites is perhaps best demonstrated by the case of the Aurunci. Livy records that when these people were defeated in 313, the Romans did not capture any community leaders because they were absent, claiming further that their absence had been the reason for the destruction of the community.[330] The episode's details imply that the eradication of the Aurunci had not been Rome's initial aim. They rather reveal a specific particularity in Rome's style of leadership that required an alternative solution. The Romans' approach to alliance management relied on the cooperation of at least a small number of elites who could influence the wider community. The style of leadership required, however, that some elites had to be willing to align themselves with the Romans. The absence of any elites with whom the Romans could control the community likely pushed them towards eradicating a population.

The destruction of an entire community itself acted as a message to other Italic communities that rebellious actions would not be tolerated. During the Middle Republic, this was the fate of not only the Aurunci, but also the Aequi in 304, the Volsinii in 265 and the Falerii in 241.[331] Livy's account of the destruction of the Aequi in particular openly acknowledges that the Romans implemented this tactic for exemplary purposes. According to the historian, the destruction of the Aequi warned the Marsi, Marruncini, Paeligni and the Frentani against undertaking hostile actions towards the Romans.[332] As a result of this, these peoples were quick to make peace and an alliance with Rome.[333] Not only then did this tactic dissuade communities from hostile actions, but it also assisted the Romans in spreading their influence and expanding its empire.

There was also the possibility that a community could be reduced on a smaller and more strategic scale. For instance, Livy tell us in his account of the Latin Settlement that the walls of Velitrae were torn down and the fleet belonging to the original inhabitants of Antium was burnt.[334] Furthermore, the Romans did not always mete out this tactic in the form of physical destruction to a community's infrastructure. Several Hernican communities had been severely

[330] Livy 9.25.8-9.
[331] Livy 9.25.9 (Aurunci), 45.17 (Aequi); Zonar. 8.7 (Volsinii), 8.18 (Falerii). The cases of the Voilsinii and the Falerii differ from that of the Aurunci as the communities were initial destroyed, but later rebuilt in a different location. Zonaras' evidence suggests that the relocation of Falerii was perhaps a condition of its survival. We may note that a similar condition was famously directed against Carthage (App. *Pun*. 12.81).
[332] Livy 9.45.18.
[333] Ibid.
[334] Livy 8.14.5, 12.

weakened with the removal of their political bodies as a result of its involvement in a revolt.[335] Any community that wished to act in a hostile manner against the Romans would have been aware of the serious repercussions that they could face in the event of failure. It should be emphasised that the Romans were very successful in supressing such revolts, so severe repercussions would have seemed all the more likely.

Any community contemplating a potential revolt would probably also have to take into account the prospect of land confiscation. While the Romans typical confiscated land from defeated communities who had for the first time been incorporated under their leadership,[336] it should be noted that Campani had already submitted to the Romans before its lands were confiscated after the Latin War.[337] On another occasion, Capua forfeited virtually all of its land holdings as a result of siding with Hannibal.[338] These two episodes demonstrate that further land confiscations were a possible repercussion of disloyalty to Rome's leadership and was, therefore, a likely deterrent.

2.5 – The Benefits of Roman Leadership: The View from the Wider Community

The previous section introduced the deterrents established against entire communities. To balance against these, the communities themselves must also have received incentives to remain compliant to the Romans. It follows, then, that the Italic communities enjoyed certain benefits from their alliances with the Romans. However, these benefits seem to have occurred more as by-products of allegiance with the Romans rather than a specific policy targeted at the common people. Adding to this, we may even ask how much life changed for the average individual whose community came to be under Rome's leadership.[339] These individuals would have largely followed the direction of the local elites within their own communities. After the conquest of their communities, these elites worked under Roman leadership instead of being concerned entirely for their own interests or those of another local power. As long as a

[335] Livy (9.43.24) records that these Hernican communities were only permitted magistrates with exclusively religious functions.
[336] For example, Livy 8.1.3, 11.13, 14.9. See Bispham (2007) 71.
[337] Livy 8.11.13.
[338] Livy 26.16.8.
[339] While initially some inhabitants on confiscated land were removed from their homes, they are usually relocated elsewhere on the *ager publicus*. See Roselaar (2008) 70. For instance, when the Falerii rebelled in 241, the population was moved to Falerii Novi, a new settlement (Polyb. 1.65.2; Zonar. 8.18; Val. Max. 6.5.1).

community's basic needs were accounted for and certain interests were attended to, it is doubtful that much objection would have been made concerning the circumstances in the period after the Roman conquest. Nevertheless, the benefits associated with Roman allegiance would have further incentivised loyalty among the communities as a whole.

The first and most easily identifiable of the benefits of Rome's newly established predominance was the mutual self-defence strategy adopted by the collective communities. If an external threat attacked a community, the conditions of the *foedera* bound the Romans and their allied communities to defend it. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a clause establishing this policy is present within *foedus Cassianum*.[340] Such a policy was, however, probably common to all alliances established in the Italian Peninsula, including those prior to the Roman conquest in which the Romans were not involved.[341] Roman military strength, though, presumably made this alliance particularly desirable. It is little wonder that the likes of the Campani chose to approach the Romans for assistance. Indeed, the episode surrounding the *deditio* of the Campani specifically established the clause of a mutual self-defence in their relationship.[342] There are numerous examples of the Romans assisting local communities, but only a few are needed to demonstrate this point further. The Romans defended Sutrium against the Etruscans in 310.[343] We are also told that the Romans sent a consular army to defend Campania against the Samnites in 296 despite having just served in Etruria.[344]

Indeed, the Romans were so proud of defending their allies that the inability to do so, according to their traditions, brought with it a burden of shame. Livy relates that Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 215) had been too ashamed to desert their ally Cumae during the Second Punic War.[345] On the other hand, the same writer rebukes those former allies who had sided with Hannibal because the Carthaginian general was unable to defend them.[346] These two episodes reminds us of the importance of protecting allies. The act justifies the basis of the alliance in that it both fulfils the interest of the allied community and demonstrates military strength. The assistance of allies against threats, then, should feature regularly in a successful hegemony's

[340] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.95.2.
[341] Kent (2012: 77-8) is particularly critical of modern scholars who assume the conditions of Rome's alliances were unique.
[342] Livy 7.29.7-31.10.
[343] Livy 9.32.1-33.2, 35.1-37.12.
[344] Livy 10.20.2.
[345] Livy 23.37.8.
[346] Livy 26.16.13.

military culture. This was true of the Romans. For what it is worth, Romans could proclaim defence of the allies as a reason to undertake a 'just war'.[347]

A benefit related to the policy of mutual self-defence is the internal peace between communities that came about due to predominance of the Romans. The Romans and their allied communities formed an outward facing bulkhead that would have exercised its military strength against external threats, perhaps namely the Gauls and the Samnites.[348] In this way, the Roman alliances mimicked the function and purpose of the Latin League which was probably created to mitigate the threat of the Sabines, Etruscans, Aequi and the Volsci in the fifth and possibly sixth centuries.[349] Under Rome's leadership, conflicts were not meant to arise between neighbouring communities.

While the frequency of conflicts in the seventy-year period after the Latin Settlement would not suggest that the era was a particularly peaceful one,[350] the policy of mutual self-defence and the limitation of belligerency between neighbours had considerable advantages.[351] Frequent wars would have disrupted the economic and social stability of communities which depended upon agriculture for their survival. Although war was theoretically reserved for the warmer months which coincided with the offseason for farmers,[352] Rosenstein has rightfully questioned whether such a clear cut distinction is unlikely to have occurred in reality.[353] Based on similar research on warfare in the Greek Peninsula during the Classical period, he reasons that farmers were unlikely to have been given time off to tend to their own crops.[354] Consequently, Rome's internal peace and policy of mutual self-defence was beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, since internal peace under Rome's leadership ensured a decrease in the number of raids, the crops and livestock would not be as frequently stolen or destroyed by hostile forces.[355] Not only would this have reduced crop loss, but no retaliatory raid would have been

[347] Cic. *Off.* 1.11.35. The degree to which the Romans considered a threat to be worthy of military action is subjective and loosely defined. See Eckstein (2006) 221. Furthermore, writers could overplay, or indeed invent, just causes for war after they had occurred.
[348] The Gauls in particular appear to have been a constant threat to Rome in the four and early third centuries and did raid the Latins on occasion. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 14.8.1; Livy 6.42.4-5; 7.1.3, 12.7, 23.2; 8.17.6, 20.2; 10.10.12.
[349] Heurgon (1973) 176.
[350] See Eckstein (2006) 215-6.
[351] A good but brief overview of advantages is set out in Salmon (1982) 71.
[352] For example, in Oakley (1993) 17.
[353] Rosenstein (2004) 26-30.
[354] Ibid. 26.
[355] Rosenstein (2004: 28) suggests that concern for their livelihood in fact dictated the nature of the wars that communities fought. They preferred short campaigns and quick battles, which suited the interest the farmer-soldiers held for their own crops and did not rely on large amounts of time in training for battle.

sent out in response. Secondly, since any military response would have been a collective effort, the number of men needed from individual communities for military service likely dropped. Accordingly, the agricultural outpoint likely rose as a result.[356] In short, then, Rome's policy of mutual self-defence and the internal peace of Rome's dominion would have been beneficial because the number of farmers taken away from their lands and communities would have been reduced.

A quick demographic calculation can best verify this claim. Although it is difficult to estimate the demographics of early populations, there is a good likelihood that the number of farmers enlisted into Rome's armies would not have surpassed the number required for the defence of communities prior to the Latin Settlement. Taking Rawlings' calculations on the size of Rome's legions and allied contributions, a high estimate of allied men needed for Rome's armies after 311 would be twenty thousand infantry and three thousand six hundred cavalry.[357] Prior to 311 the amount of men contributed would have been half that number.[358] Afzelius estimates that the combined population of Rome's Italic communities at the onset of Latin Settlement was approximately two hundred and six thousand and only increased thereafter.[359] For these new circumstances to have increased the contribution, we would be forced to accept that less than a quarter of the men of fighting age were contributed to any one community's military effort prior to the Latin Settlement.[360] This seems extraordinarily unlikely. In the past the recruitment of fighters would have likely encompassed a majority of the male population of fighting age.[361] It seems rather that the number of troops drawn from the eligible male population of each community would be a small proportion of the population in comparison with the number needed to defend their own community, or indeed make an attack, without help from the Romans or a small number of allies. Due to the change in circumstances, those individuals whom the Romans did not enlist could continue to work within their own communities. Furthermore, the internal peace produced a stability that enabled the opening of

[356] This output would, of course, also depend on environmental factors.
[357] Rawlings (2007) 51.
[358] In this year the number of legions was doubled (Livy 9.30.3). The number of allies recruited is also likely to have doubled. Of course, in times of emergency the number and size of armies could be increased as needed. See De Ligt (2007) 116.
[359] Afzelius (1942) 153. I have altered the numbers given by Afzelius so that communities possessing *civitas sine suffragio*, who should not be counted among the Roman legions, are included in the allied contingent.
[360] If the male population of these communities was roughly 103,000, only approximately a quarter of them, would be required to reach the post 311 number of 23,600. This fraction would decrease as more communities allied with the Romans.
[361] Rawlings (1999: 97) suggests that in certain circumstances the entire resources of a community would be needed to carry out or fend off attacks.

further economic opportunities through new trade links, particularly via Rome's road building programme.[362] Therefore, the policy of mutual self-defence likely improved the social and economic stability of each community.

The limitation of conflicts brought benefits not only within communities but also between them. The economic advantages of war could be hugely beneficial,[363] but an unsuccessful campaign could be disastrous, particularly if a community were defending its own territory. Death, property destruction and loss of crops would have had a devastating effect on the livelihood of a family and the wider community. The introduction of a general peace limits the chances of communities suffering in the event of frequent wars. If, hypothetically, two sets of two communities, who were incorporated by the Romans after the Latin Settlement, warred against each other over a two-year period then at least four communities would likely suffer some sort of damage in those two years. This is not unrealistic given the prevalence of war and the reactive nature of conflicts in the period.[364] But the damage sustained by communities would be limited under the Romans. Theoretically, only an external force could damage incorporated communities. In the event that this occurred, typically only one community suffered.[365] It is fairly clear that the Roman peace limited the risk of damage to communities that might have otherwise produced social and economic instability due to death, property destruction and loss of crops.

2.6 – Rome and the Italic Communities to 264 BCE

In the above sections I have attempted to highlight the complex character of Rome's management of the Italic communities. In the current section, I wish to consider the overall nature of Rome's relationship to the Italic communities. In particular, I seek to examine the military and political power of the Romans in comparison to that of the other Italic communities. As the Italic communities' primary contribution to the alliance was the supply of troops, the circumstances of enlistment and attitude in which it was undertaken may be the best indication for the style of Rome's leadership in this period.

[362] Morel (2007) 499.
[363] Harris (1979: 46-50) highlights the considerable economic advantages of Rome's imperialistic expansion.
[364] Kent (2012) 78.
[365] The largest number of communities recorded to have come under attack in a single campaign prior to the second century, excluding the unique circumstances of the Second Punic War, is three (Livy 8.19.5).

While it is usually argued that the Romans were entitled even in the third and fourth centuries to recruit troops from the *socii* for its wars, Kent argues that they are unlikely to have made demands of this sort prior to the Punic Wars.[366] There are in fact only two occasions in Livy's work prior to the Punic Wars in which the Romans are said to have received troops *ex foederibus*, though each occasion is highly suspect.[367] These two occasions both also involve the Latins with extant *foedera*. The *foedus* clearly indicates that *both* the Latins and the Romans will assist each other when the need arises.[368] There is no indication that allied communities would have supplied a consignment of troops to the Romans annually or otherwise. Such a direct demand would have required 'a level of domination' that the Romans simply did not possess in the fourth century.[369] Furthermore, the combined effort of the Latin League and the Romans in establishing pre-338 Latin colonies itself clearly suggests a joint responsibility and an equal role in their military contributions.[370] It is difficult to see how this cooperative effort could have translated into demands for troop contributions, particularly prior to the Latin Settlement. Even after 338 when the Romans acquired greater control of military operations, there is little evidence in our sources to suggest the Romans adopted a more heavy-handed approach to troop recruitment. As such, Livy has likely made an anachronistic assumption about the recruitment process in these two instances based on the circumstances of later periods. There was a time during and after the Punic Wars, in which the demand for troops from the Italic communities is plausible.[371] This may be especially true of the period covered by the *formula togatorum*, a means for calculating troop contributions, which I will cover in the following chapter.[372]

Rather than recording any demand of the Italian allies, Kent instead notes that the sources when discussing troop recruitment in the fourth and early third centuries emphasise the voluntary nature of this assistance. This occurs on several occasions and perhaps hints at a more realistic representation of Roman power in the period. Livy records that the Lucani and the Apuli

[366] Kent (2012) 71-83. For military obligations of allies dating even to the fourth century, see recently Lomas (2018) 268, 271.
[367] Livy 3.22.4; 7.12.7. On these occasions, the *Foedus Cassianum* applied to the Latin communities. There is nothing in the surviving tablet to suggest the Romans were entitled to demand troops, but the agreement rather suggests that the participating communities would give military assistance when necessary. See Alföldi (1965) 404. There is no other surviving evidence that points to the Romans demanding troops until the time of the Second Punic War.
[368] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.95.2.
[369] Kent (2012) 75.
[370] Salmon (1969) 40-1.
[371] Kent (2012) 79.
[372] The *formula togatorum* appears to be a list kept by the Romans to determine the contribution of soldiers from the *socii*. See Baronowski (1984) 248-52.

promised to aid the Romans with men and arms for the war against the Samnites in 326.[373] The same author writes that the inhabitants of Camertium willingly supplied troops to Rome in 310.[374] Even in the period of the Pyrrhic War, when the Romans controlled a good majority of the Italian Peninsula, the Apuli seem to have provided soldiers on their own volition.[375] We may also note that communities often willingly supplied men for armies which fought against the Romans. Communities contributing troops against Roman forces include the Apuli, Hernici, Marsi and the Paeligni.[376] Once again, it is useful to remember that the Romans often utilised the pre-existing military traditions of the Italian Peninsula. The voluntary commitment of troops was likely already embedded into the military ethos of the Italic communities since the prevalence of annual warfare in the peninsula conditioned individuals to expect regular fighting.[377] The practice likely continued into fourth and third centuries. Nor should it also be forgotten that a thriving mercenary culture existed in certain communities, particularly in the southern regions.[378] This too may have prompted individuals to volunteer in the hope of attaining riches.

If the Italic communities were not obliged to supply troops for Roman wars, then an alternate means must have existed for the recruitment of allied contingents. Kent has suggested that Roman elites played a vital role in this process.[379] Due to the importance of Roman and local elites to Rome's approach to alliance management, this makes some sense. Three separate episodes support Kent's argument: the enlistment of the entire army, presumably also including allies, by L. Aemilius Mamercinus, the recruitment of Umbrians by Marcus Fabius and an allied force by Maximus Rullus.[380] The third of these examples is the most applicable for current purposes. Cassius Dio suggests that allies were willing to assist Rullus because they remembered the past deeds he had performed.[381] This episode recalls the conditions of *amicitia*.

[373] Livy 8.25.3: *Lucani atque Apuli, quibus gentibus nihil ad eam diem cum Romano populo fuerat, in fidem venerunt, arma virosque ad bellum pollicentes; foedera ergo in amicitiam accepti*.
[374] Livy 9.36.8.
[375] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.3.2 (trans. Cary, 1963): 'Some of the Daunians, it seems, from the city of Argyrippa, which they now call Arpi, four thousand foot and some four hundred horse who had been sent to the assistance of the consuls, arrived near the royal camp'.
[376] Livy 8.37.5-6; 9.41.4, 42.8. See also Plut. *Pyrrh.* 13.
[377] Oakley (1993: 16-7) notes that Roman culture was geared for the expectation of annual warfare, but that this would have also been the case for many other Italic communities.
[378] Livy (8.38.1) records that the Samnites had recruited mercenaries from their neighbours.
[379] Kent (2012) 79-82.
[380] Livy 8.20.3-4 (Mamercinus); Livy 9.36 (Fabius) and Cass. Dio 8.36.31 (Rullus).
[381] Cass. Dio 8.36.31.

Since these individuals were all high-ranking Romans, the reputation of an elite seemingly played some role in their ability to recruit allies. A further example from a later period appears to confirm the importance of this attribute. A rumour about the death of P. Cornelius Scipio, the future Africanus, quickly incited an attack on Roman allies in Spain during the Second Punic War.[382] This is despite the fact they had only recently formed friendly relations with the young general. The episode suggests a need for personal relationships between elites in order to solidify alliances. As Kent suggests, the sudden removal of this element seemingly eliminates the basis for cooperation prompting the revolt.[383] The need for such elite networks is further demonstrated by the effort that went into forming these alliances in the first place. The Romans and the Carthaginians both openly attempted to establish relations with the local elites in order to form a base to recruit more soldiers.[384] Collectively, these examples would point towards the relations between elites forming the basis of military cooperation in this period.

We should, however, apply caution in identifying specific individuals responsible for the recruitment of allies. Livy himself claims that families were prone to appropriate such honours for their members.[385] The opportunity to boast of achievements may have also overemphasised the role of the individual played in the recruitment of allies in this early period. For these reasons, Kent perhaps overstates the importance of individual elites, but this does not mean that elites did not collectively have considerable influence over the enlistment of allies.

The process of troop recruitment is also rendered more in line with Rome's approach to alliance management when considered a cooperative undertaking. The key to Rome's success as a regional force lay in its ability to produce large quantities of men for its armies, a significant proportion of which came from their allies. Being reliant on this factor, the cooperative nature of military assistance has significant advantages over any system that may have required the forced enlistment of fighters. Soldiers who have been compelled to fight either out of fear or compulsion tend not to be effective on the battlefield.[386] Moreover, had this been the case, the addition of these troops to the Roman army may have made the army collectively less

[382] Livy 28.24.3-4.
[383] Kent (2012) 82.
[384] Rome: Livy 21.60.4; 22.22; 27.171-3; Polyb. 3.98; 10.34.3-35.8. Carthage: Livy 25.34.6.
[385] Livy 8.40.4-5.
[386] See Vazquez (2005) 858 with bibliography for the effectiveness of conscripted versus voluntary soldiers. In short, conscripted soldiers, i.e. those forced to fight, tend to lack the morale, discipline and cohesion required for military success.

effective.[387] Forced enlistment could bring with itself the unwanted side effects of low morale and the lack of fighting will.[388] This in turn could lead to desertion. While the direct conscription of allies could prove useful in the short-term, typically this method would not bring about long-term success.[389] In light of the Romans' successes, they were probably aware of these problems or never contended with the issue. We return then to the idea that these troops volunteered, or at least mutually agreed to their involvement, for the early period.

2.7 – Conclusion

The recruitment of soldiers does not suggest the simple enforcement of unilateral policies. The evidence rather indicates that local elites played a role in supplying troops for Rome's wars. The troops themselves likely either volunteered or at least understood their service contributed to the survival of their own community. This is a vastly different picture to the idea that Italic communities were obligated to send soldiers at the Romans' demand. Neither the evidence nor the events of the period support this claim. The Romans did not possess the geopolitical position to influence the Italic communities by intimidation and deterrence alone.

The number of revolts and realignments in the fourth and early third centuries draw a similar conclusion. The potential fragility of Rome's leadership meant that a more tactful approach was required. Thus, a combination of benefits and deterrents were used to promote compliance. The most prevalent tactic involved satisfying the interests of the communities' local elites. Equally, however, in the event of rebellious behaviour, the Romans used the punishment of any disloyal aristocracy to deter other local elites from taking similar actions. The expulsion or execution of such individuals from non-compliant communities appears to have been common practice. On the other hand, larger scale deterrents, such as the destruction of entire communities, seems to have been used selectively. On one occasion, if the sources can be believed, this occurred specifically on account of the absence of local elites.[390] The particular

[387] Kent (2012) 75.
[388] Peled (1994) 63. Here we should distinguish between those forced to fight and those entering military service via the census. While both may be considered in modern terms to be types of conscription, the ancients are unlikely to have viewed the latter in such a way due to regularity of service and the military ethos found in the ancient Italic communities.
[389] Ibid. Peled offers mostly modern examples, but the use of conscription in Xerxes' armies (Hdt. 7.19-20, 110) and their defeat to the combined Greek forces in 480-79 may offer a useful ancient parallel.
[390] Livy 9.25.8-9.

focus on these individuals within the tactic would seem to correlate with their importance to Rome's approach to alliance management.

The benefits of Rome's leadership did extend into the wider community. The installation of internal peace and a solid basis for mutual self-defence brought a degree of social and economic stability to the incorporated communities. For this reason, the commoner may have viewed Rome's leadership in a reasonably positive light. Besides, particularly with the local elites maintaining control of the communities, the rise of the Romans to a position of power in the period before the Second Punic War may not have seriously altered the day to day life of the average individual.

Certainly, the loyalty of many allies in the Second Punic War is difficult to understand if the Romans managed their allies through coercion and fear alone. One suspects, however, that this war became the turning-point for the Romans and their relationship to the Italic communities. The geopolitical position afforded to Rome as a result of the conflict enabled the Romans to adopt alternative means of influencing the incorporated communities than those implemented in the timeframe covered in the current chapter.

THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL HEGEMONY

3.0 – Introduction

From the conclusion of the Second Punic War to the middle of the second century BCE the Romans gradually extended their empire to encompass a large proportion of the Mediterranean Basin. Rome's success over the other regional powers, notably Carthage in the late third century, but also Macedonia in early second, had created a power vacuum which the Romans subsequently filled. This period was, therefore, defined by the Romans' dominance not only of the Italian Peninsula but also of the wider Mediterranean.

I will argue that in this period, the Romans predominantly relied on their political and military superiority to maintain the loyalty and compliance of the allies.[391] The lack of a viable competitor to Rome in this period was the key factor in the cohesion of their alliances. To demonstrate this, I will use the case of Hannibal's presence in the Italian Peninsula to outline the important effects that a competitor could have on alliance networks. In doing this, we may further understand the reasons why allies may have chosen to break away from their alliances. The defection of several of Rome's allies to Hannibal will prove useful in this regard. After undertaking this analysis, I will then be able to discuss the effects that the absence of a competitor would have had on Rome's alliances and how this in turn affected the Romans approach to alliance management. The basis of such a discussion will be formed predominately from the insights of the fifth century BCE Greek historian Thucydides, but several Roman writers of the Republican era also provide useful contributions on this topic.

Although some of the tactics of alliance management outlined in the previous chapter did continue in this period, I intend to demonstrate that the Romans did not provide the same level of benefits to the Italic communities and their local elites in the period after the Second Punic War. Political and military superiority was in itself seemingly enough of a deterrent against potential rebellious behaviour. The granting of benefits and the use of exemplary punishments became less frequent in this period because, as I hope to show, this strategy was largely

[391] Gabba (1989: 208) recognised that these two factors had been responsible for the loyalty of the allies up until and including the Second Punic War. I believe that their importance continued well after this time.

unnecessary, at least from the perspective of incentivising compliance. Military superiority had come to fill this role.

In the final section of this chapter I will discuss the new benefits that the Italian elites could acquire in the last quarter of the second century, namely special grants of Roman citizenship. These, I suggest, were designed to convert the interests of the men rewarded with such grants to a Roman point of view. This differs from the previous tactics that had been focused on aligning the interests of the Roman and local elites. While this may seem like only a small change, this in fact reveals an increasing disparity between Roman interests and those of the wider Italic alliances. The disparity between interests, as I will discuss in the subsequent chapters, has important implications for Romano-Italic alliances and the outbreak of the Social War.

3.1 – The Effects of a Competitor: The Case of Hannibal

The great Carthaginian general Hannibal was perhaps the Romans' most significant competitor during the Republic. By bringing a large army into the Italian Peninsula, Hannibal immediately altered the geopolitical landscape of the region when he led his army over the Italian Alps. While the Romans had held the peninsula securely for the previous fifty years,[392] the significant defeats at Trebia, Transimene and Cannae severely dented the military reputation and superiority of the Romans. As a result of these losses, a number of Rome's allies defected to Hannibal, or were forced to join his war effort.[393] Within the Italian Peninsula two powerful military alliances were present in the penultimate decade of the third century. These were, of course, Rome's allies and those of the Carthaginians.

The sudden introduction of the Carthaginian competitor provided an opportunity for the other communities of the Italian Peninsula to revolt against the Romans. The reasons behind such actions might have been quite varied, but in one way or another this response to the new geopolitical situation can ultimately be attributed to the pursuit of self-interest and greater self-determination.[394] Capua, for instance, demanded from Hannibal that no Carthaginian

[392] The revolt of the Falerii in 241 (Livy *Per*. 20) is an obvious exception to Rome's usual dominance. The general lack of information on a large period of the third century, though, should be acknowledged.
[393] A succinct account of the communities joining the Carthaginian side can be viewed in Hoyos (2003) 122-3.
[394] Realists would refer to this as communities pursuing strategies of self-help. To this end, they must accept that these communities were constantly concerned with their own survival. The best means to achieve this goal is to

magistrate or general have power over any Campanian; that no Campanian soldier serve against his will; that Capua should have its own laws and magistrates.[395] While subjected to Rome's hegemony for half a century, or in many case much longer, these communities had no other option but to remain loyal to the Romans due to the tangible gulf in military strength. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, communities wishing to revolt would have had to consider any harsh repercussions for a failed rebellion, which historically was a very probable outcome. The chance of any revolt being successful would have been extremely slim. It seems unlikely that a community would revolt with little or no chance of the revolt being successful and permanent.[396] The presence of a competitor, who was capable of challenging Rome's military superiority and defending a prospective ally from any repercussions that the Romans might have intended for the community, increased the probability of a revolt's success. A competitor, if it thought such an action was in its interest, could have sided with the revolting community and protected that community from not only any repercussions, but also from any influence or control the Romans might otherwise have had on that community. By this means, revolts had more chance of being successful and permanent. What the competitor supplied to any potential ally, then, was the realistic hope of an alternative set of conditions to the one offered by the Romans.[397] In these alternative circumstances, a community, or indeed its elites, may have been in a better position to pursue its interests. This may have been very attractive and, therefore, may have enticed communities to consider revolting against Roman leadership.

On the other hand, the existence of a competitor also raised the possibility that communities might be forced to revolt.[398] In this period, only a competitor would have been capable, firstly, of opposing the Romans themselves in the face of any military conflict that may have occurred as a result of its actions and, secondly, of imparting enough pressure on another community to

possess as much military power as possible. Being subject to another community's leadership made this pursuit difficult. For the application of this theory to ancient Mediterranean including Rome, see Eckstein (2006) 14-8.

[395] Livy 23.7.1-2.

[396] Thucydides (3.45.2) also observed this in his time.

[397] Rosenstein (2007: 236) rightly recognises that for the majority of the third and second centuries, except for the Second Punic War, there was no realistic alternative for the Italic communities other than to endure Roman domination. For this reason, the allies remained loyal. Livy (31.7.10-2) does record, however, that the Romans were concerned that the presence of Philip V in the peninsula may have incited many of the Italic communities to revolt just as they had done in the time of Pyrrhus (Gell. *NA* 3.8.1). This, as Livy suggests, may have prompted the Romans to undertake offensive wars in the wider regions of the Mediterranean rather than risk potential revolts within the Italian Peninsula.

[398] This is the second reason for revolt outlined by Thucydides (3.39.2). The first being the oppression of a community by a hegemon, and, therefore, the need to improve circumstances.

force it to revolt. Both these actions require a certain amount of military power that only a competitor would have possessed.

In the case of Hannibal's campaign in the Italian Peninsula, the surviving sources record both categories of revolts. Aside from the famous defection of Capua, those communities that revolted soon after the Battle of Cannae of 216 may have also revolted to improve their individual circumstances. The Hirpini, the Apulii and the Bruttii seem to be identified most with this action.[399] These peoples would be later joined by the Tarentines in 212.[400] The communities that defected to Hannibal as a result of forced surrender or intimidation appear to be limited. The Locri seem to be in this category and so too the Heraclea.[401] It is quite possible after Cannae that the threat of Hannibal may have prompted swift revolts aimed at achieving more favourable treatment than might otherwise have occurred in the case of forced surrender. There are far more examples, though, of the Carthaginian general reducing other Italic communities, including Acerrae and Nuceria, for refusing to submit.[402] In sum, the defection of communities during the Second Punic War seems to be driven more by self-interest. It would be useful for me to outline precisely what these communities would have gained from their alliance with Hannibal had he managed to subdue the Romans.

While neither Livy, nor any other source, records the terms of all Italic-Carthaginian alliances in any great detail, several conditions discussed between Hannibal and a small number of Italic communities may hint at the types of advantages that Carthage's new allies might have gained from their new circumstances. Of the occasions in which our sources outline the specific terms of Hannibal's alliances, all of these agreements refer to the condition that the community involved would maintain its own laws.[403] It should be stated, however, that this condition was not in any way new to such alliances, and had previously applied to many, if not all, of Rome's alliances.[404] The real difference between these new agreements and those previously shared

[399] The Hirpini immediately invited and accepted Hannibal's leadership (Livy 23.1.1-3), while Mago named the Apulii and the Bruttii along with the Lucani among rebellious communities when addressing the Carthaginian Senate soon after Cannae (Livy 23.11.11). The Lucani, though, appear not to have joined Hannibal's side at this time, but did align with him at a later date (Livy 25.16.7).
[400] Polyb. 8.29-30.
[401] Livy 24.1.5-8 (Locri); App. *Hann.* 6.35 (Heraclea). Consentia possibly also belongs to this category, but it is not known whether its inhabitants supported Hannibal after surrendering (Livy 23.30.5).
[402] Livy 23.17.4-8 (Acerrae); 23.15.2, 15 (Nuceria).
[403] The occasions include Capua (Livy 23.7.1-7), Locri (Livy 24.1.13), Lucani (Livy 25.16.7) and Tarentum (Livy 25.8.8). In the case of Tarentum, Polybius (8.25.2) only mentions that the city would be free from tribute or burdens.
[404] Harris (1972) 639-45. It is possible to make the argument that because Roman law served as the medium between even non-Roman people, the allies were at a disadvantage in this regard. See Capogrossi Colognesi

with the Roman centred around the limitation of any direct or indirect interference. In their respective arrangements, Capua and Tarentum agreed to the condition that the communities would not be subject to obligations or tribute of any sort.[405] I believe such a stipulation can be linked directly to elevating the prominent issues of fighting Rome's wars. Under whatever arrangement that would have existed in the event that Carthage subdued the Romans, these Italic communities wished to ensure that they would not be subjected to the same level of subordination as what they experienced previously.[406] According to Livy, Capua even had its eyes on the hegemony of the Italian Peninsula itself.[407] Though, we might expect Tarentum would have also challenged for this title. Both would have ultimately attempted to improve their own conditions in light of the newly arisen geopolitical situation in which they found themselves. The alliance with Hannibal was a means to this end. With the predominance of the Romans removed, and assuming Carthage itself had little interest in maintaining a large military presence in the Italian Peninsula, the way was open for these communities to rise to greater prominence and better secure their own interests.

It should be noted though that not all rebels received these assurances of non-interference in regard to military service. Hannibal was evidently not completely benevolent towards his Italian allies.[408] Nevertheless, in his isolation from Africa, Hannibal still needed to rely on Italian manpower to a certain degree.[409] While the promise of material rewards likely enticed some soldiers, others would have been fulfilling the terms of their communities' agreements with Carthage.[410] Even among the limited number of occasions in which the conditions of the alliance survive, Locri's agreement specifies that they were to assist the Carthaginians in the war, which seems to have included both land and naval resources.[411] This condition may have been related to the fact that the Locrians agreed to these terms while in immediate danger from

(2014) 102. The new alliances with Hannibal may have sought to remove a similar arrangement occurring under Carthage's leadership.

[405] Livy 23.7.1-7; 25.8.8; Polyb. 8.25.2. Capua and Tarentum represent half of the occasions in which the agreements are found in the sources.

[406] Certain communities may have wished for what Hoyos (2003: 127) calls a 'cheerful anarchy' offering them a return to the pre-Roman warfare, in which they might have shaped their own fortunes.

[407] Livy 23.6.1. Fronda (2010: 119-26) agrees with Livy in that Capua was attempting to secure the hegemony of the Italian Peninsula for itself.

[408] The most obvious case against Hannibal's goodwill towards all Italic peoples was the massacre of some twenty thousand allies who refused to cross over to Libya (Diod. Sic. 27.9.1).

[409] Hoyos (2003: 128) seems right to suggest that Hannibal regularly replenished his army with Italian recruits.

[410] While some Italic communities, such as the Bruttii contributed troops to Hannibal, it is fair more likely that a many of the communities were merely passive allies, whose greatest contribution to the Carthaginians was not assisting the Roman war effort. See Hoyos (2003) 132.

[411] Livy 24.1.13.

a Carthaginian force.[412] The Carthaginians, therefore, were in a position to exact more from the Locrians than might have otherwise been the case. Rejection of these terms may have led to the destruction of the city, which the Locrians obviously wished to avoid. Furthermore, this particular community did not possess the same level of political and military significance as Capua or Tarentum.[413] Placing too harsh terms on these communities might have limited the Carthaginian success in their respective regions. The combination of these factors likely meant that Locri was not in a position to seek more amicable terms. Accordingly, we should consider the pursuit of self-interests, and the terms that communities received from Hannibal, on a case by case basis.

The last category of communities to cover in the case of the Second Punic War is that of the communities who remained loyal to the Romans. This process requires a degree of speculation as the sources, particularly Livy, wish to view the contrast between those communities that remained loyal and the defectors predominantly as the action of good or unfaithful people, respectively.[414] While this perfectly suits the moralistic function of such works, the case of forced surrender demonstrates that the process was more complicated than the idealised Roman view. For instance, a community under siege risked its own survival if it chose to remain loyal to the Romans. The community faced the question of whether it valued its honour as an ally or its own survival. A Roman and an inhabitant of the besieged community would no doubt have offered differing answers to this question. In light of this issue, I will instead consider any possible deterrent that may have persuaded communities to remain loyal.

The first of these considerations concerns geography and geopolitics. To offer a neat, if perhaps oversimplified summary of the solidity of Rome's alliance network during the Second Punic War, the northern and central communities of the Italian Peninsula predominantly remained loyal to the Romans, while revolt was more typical of communities in the southern regions.[415] It is also in this southern region that Hannibal spent most of his time after the victory at Cannae in 216.[416] These southern communities, therefore, were in more of a position to receive

[412] Livy (24.1.4-6) makes it clear that the negotiations took place in sight of Hamilcar's troops.
[413] The revolts of these two cities was quickly followed by the cities' own satellite allies joining Hannibal. See Fronda (2010) 126-29, 217-30.
[414] See, for example, Livy 23.5.1.
[415] Cornell (1996: 103) is right to note that those a large proportion of Italic communities who defected were situated from Campania and Apulia down to Lucania and Bruttium, but he never achieved the defection of the entire southern region.
[416] A concise summary of Hannibal's campaigns in the Italian Peninsula can be found in Toynbee (1965) 2. 10-3 and Cornell (1996) 101.

protection and support from Hannibal or, alternately, to be forced into revolt. Other communities may have desired to join the Carthaginian side but were deterred by either their proximity to Rome and its legions, or the very distance between themselves and Hannibal.

A second possibility is that the internal politics within these communities resolved the question of possible revolt in favour of supporting the Romans. I have outlined previously that the Roman elites supported certain local elites within the Italic communities in return for influencing the compliance of their own communities. Having been promoted to their position through the support of the Roman elite, it is probably safe to assume that these individuals would have sided with the Romans in order to preserve their own position. Using the influence at their disposal, certain local elites would have attempted to sway their communities to remain loyal. Had Hannibal subjugated the Romans, they might have readily foreseen the uncertainty surrounding their position within their own community. Remaining loyal would have been their safest option.[417]

The ability of the pro-Roman local elites to secure the action or, perhaps rather, inaction of their communities depended on political weight of any oppositional faction.[418] Any anti-Roman elite would seek to gain a political advantage either through reciprocal services to the Carthaginian side or at least the removal of any Roman connections to the community resulting in a more level playing field within the community.[419] While we are not in a position to make a judgement on the political landscape of many communities at the time of the Second Punic War, in those cases known to us, most cite the existence of either a pro-Roman or a pro-Carthaginian faction, if not both. The most notable case of this comes from Capua, but opposing factions also appear in the portrayal of the Lucani, the Tarentines, Croton and Locri.[420] This leaves open the possibility that similar opposition to Roman leadership existed in many communities of the Italian Peninsula. However, the size and strength of this opposition can only be judged on a case by case basis. In some communities, it seems quite possible that either opposition to Rome's leadership did not exist, or more likely that any pro-Carthaginian

[417] This is assuming of course that a Carthaginian force was not in the immediate vicinity waiting to force through a decision in their favour. In such a case, revolting would prove the safest action for the community involved. Obviously, there are examples in the war in which this action did not take place and communities were destroyed (see above). In practice, communities may not always take the 'best' course of action.
[418] Fronda (2010: 30-4) has contributed most to this subject in recent times.
[419] Fronda (2010) 52.
[420] Livy 23.6.4-5 (Capua); Livy 25.16.5 (Lucani); Livy 25.8.3, Polyb. 8.24.4 (Tarentines); 24.2.8 (Croton); 24.1.7-8 (Locri). A fuller account of these factions can be found throughout Fronda (2010).

movement did not gain widespread support. The community would then have remained loyal to the Romans throughout the war.

The presence of a competitor affected the decision-making process of the Italic communities by presenting different courses of action. One of these possible actions that a community might have taken was to revolt in order to improve its circumstances. Not all communities would necessarily have benefited from changing allegiance and this is reflected in the fact that they did not revolt. The Latins certainly come to mind in this category. Nor would all communities have been in a position to affect this change. Conversely, the absence of a competitor limited the different courses of action that a community might have taken. These circumstances would have pressured the Italic communities to remain loyal to the Romans. It is this absence of competition during periods of Rome's dominance, notably prior to the Second Punic War and immediately following this same conflict, which determined the stability of the Italic alliance network.[421]

The prevalence of revolts from Rome's alliances, therefore, largely depended on the presence of a viable competitor. When considering the periods of Rome's dominance beginning in 340 at the outbreak of the Latin War until the outbreak of the Social War in 91, it becomes immediately obvious that far more revolts occurred during periods when a competitor was present in Italy.[422]

[421] In a discussion of modern International Relations, Wohlforth (1999: 23-8) argues that a geopolitical situation dominated by a single great power is more stable than one in which two or more great powers are present because hegemonic rivalry and competition are limited. The safest option for non-hegemonic communities in such periods is to side with the hegemon or at least do nothing to suggest enmity.

[422] In collecting data to produce this chart, it was difficult determining the precise number of revolts due to the nature of the sources. In some cases, a single community was said to be in revolt, yet in other cases entire regions are named. For the latter, I was not in a position to determine whether an entire region did in fact revolt at the same time, whether parts of the region followed as a result of an initial revolt, or whether multiple communities rebelling simultaneously were necessarily related or, indeed, were part of a separate revolt. Furthermore, while the *Fasti Triumphales* clearly includes triumphs over rebellious communities, it does not reveal whether three triumphs over the same people, for example the Etruscans, constitutes three separate revolts or the suppression of a single revolt in three different phases. With these problems in mind, I have presented a low estimate of the number of revolts fully acknowledging the number is likely to be higher. However, the periods 263-219 and 203-91 are most likely correct and it is only the number of revolts in the earlier periods that may need adjusting. As I am demonstrating the disparity between certain periods, the chart is useful for current purposes.



Chart 2: Revolts against Rome by Italic Communities

Firstly, when the Romans were establishing themselves within Central Italy during the fourth and third centuries, the number of revolts were at their greatest frequency. Given the hostilities and competition between the Romans, the Samnites, the Tarentines and the Etruscans in these periods (340-290 and 289-264), the large number of revolts is hardly unsurprising. Following the Roman conquest of the peninsula and the subjugation of the aforementioned enemies, the number of revolts dropped away significantly (263-219). Then the Second Punic War produced a series of revolts as communities aligned themselves with Rome's competitor Hannibal (218-202). With the Second Punic War concluded, the Romans had no competitor for over a century (201-92). Again, there was a lack of revolts and general loyalty among Italic communities.[423] I will return to the case of the Social War in future chapters, but at this point I believe it is safe to conclude that there is a strong correlation between the existence of a competitor in the Italian Peninsula and the frequency of revolts. While Gabba seems correct in suggesting political and military superiority played a large role in cohesion of the Italic alliances, the same factor must apply to the compliance of allies as well.[424]

[423] There are further instances of the Boii and Ligures revolting in the fifteen years that follow the Second Punic War, but I have not included these in the graph as these tribes are generally not considered to be part of Rome's Italic alliances.
[424] Gabba (1989) 208.

3.2 – Superiority: 'The Strong Do What They Want…'

Thucydides' maxim in the *Melian Debate* that 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept' when it came to the interactions between Greek *poleis* could also apply to the Romans' leadership of the Italian Peninsula during the second century BCE.[425] The key difference, though, is that Thucydides as a fifth century Athenian never experienced a military superiority similar to that possessed by the Romans.[426] Throughout his life, Athens had been in conflict with Sparta who had allies of reasonable military strength in Corinth and Thebes, while the influence of the Achaemenid Empire also loomed over both competitors. During the second century, no Mediterranean community, let alone any Italic one, possessed the political and military superiority to challenge the Romans' dominance. Consequently, the Romans of the second century had the strength to do far more than fifth century Athenians.

Although Thucydides' dialogue concerned Athens with regard to an independent and neutral Melos, the situation can equally be applied to the case of their allies as well.[427] The Melians themselves raise the question of neutrality and independence in the dialogue, but are plainly discouraged by the Athenian response.[428] In answering, the Athenians highlight the importance of their strength as perceived by others: 'so far as right or wrong is concerned they (the allies) think that there is no difference between the two (unincorporated communities and incorporated communities), that those who still preserve their independence do so because they are strong, and if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid'.[429] Again, then, the importance of military strength, or at least perceived strength, comes to the forefront.[430] Athens' concern for its own security revolves not around maximising the number of allies, but

[425] Thuc. 5.89.1 (trans. Warner, 1972): δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. See also Thuc. 1.77.4. Thucydides' attitude towards hegemonic power is more complicated than this single quote. Yet while he likely believed the communities who acquired such strength should govern with justice and goodwill in mind (1.76.3, 3.46.5-6), he also appears to believe that there was a natural tendency for hegemonic powers over time to neglect this approach and instead rely on fear established through military strength (contrast 1.77 with 3.37). To Thucydides, this transition seemed difficult to avoid (2.65, 3.39.4: 'The fact is that when great prosperity comes suddenly and unexpectedly to a state, it usually breeds arrogance'). See De Romilly (1963) 317-38. The language of the Melian Dialogue demonstrates that Thucydides believed that the Athenians had made this transition. It is probable that the Romans had also transitioned to this approach to alliance management after the Second Punic War.

[426] Isocrates (8. 134) noted that Athens as a result of the Peloponnesian War had learnt that they were not stronger than the combined Greek *poleis*.

[427] Indeed, Thucydides does elsewhere include allies and subjects in this equation at 1.77.2-4.

[428] Thuc. 5.94-6.

[429] Thuc 5.97.1 (trans. Warner, 1972): δικαιώματι γὰρ οὐδετέρους ἐλλείπειν ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ τοὺς μὲν περιγίγνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ φόβῳ οὐκ ἐπιέναι.

[430] Perceived military strength could be just as valuable to the compliance of allies as actual strength. See Kallet (2001) 21-3.

rather maximising its own strength. While the two are often related, it should be noted, and it is mentioned elsewhere in Thucydides' work, that empires rule over communities who would prefer to be independent and would most likely attempt revolt if the circumstances permitted it.[431] In terms of security, Athens would be better served treating allies and independent communities with the same suspicion, because the hegemon could not fully guarantee that allies would not be hostile towards it in the future.[432] This is not to say that allies ought to be subjected to harsh treatment like the one Melos eventually received, only that both allied and independent communities would have to consider the strength of Athens when deciding on their actions. The difference being that allies have already acknowledged the superiority of Athens, while *poleis* outside of Athens' empire would either come to acknowledge it or possess the means and strength to oppose Athens. Thus, political and military strength was the basis on which relations between *poleis* were formed.

Thucydides was not the only ancient writer to observe the significance of military strength in regard to the behaviour of communities. Plato's Callicles in the dialogue *Gorgias* goes even as far as calling it a law of nature that stronger communities hold sway over those weaker than them.[433] In the same Platonic dialogue, Socrates does not challenge this statement. He rather seems to agree with the principle as long as it was applied within the sphere of interpolis relations.[434] Demosthenes too recognised in his oration *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* that international rights, which is to say those existing between *poleis*, were granted by the stronger to the weaker.[435]

While there were, of course, a number of cultural differences that affected how Greek *poleis* interacted with each other,[436] the prerogative of the strong to determine the rights of the weak does also seem to apply to the Romans and the other communities of the Italian Peninsula. By Thucydides' own admission to the universality of considerations about strength and security, Rome's relationship within its network of alliance must also have been built with this same

[431] Thucydides (3.37.2) believed that allies were naturally inclined to prefer independence. This also recalls the notion of self-help mentioned in the preceding section.
[432] This sentiment is also expressed by Eckstein (2006: 8-14).
[433] Pl. *Grg.* 483c-e. Goldsworthy (2016: 57) posits that the domination of powerful states over those weaker than them probably did not require any explanation and was likely thought of as the natural order.
[434] Pl. *Grg.* 488c. Socrates does, however, point out that physically stronger *individuals* do not determine laws and justice *within* a *polis*.
[435] Dem. 15.29.
[436] The differences between the Greek πολίτης and Latin *civitas* appear to be crucial in regard to the establishment of 'foreign' laws.

foundation.[437] Although this topic does not receive the same level of attention from Roman era writers as it did from the Athenian writers, the concept is hinted at in the work of Polybius. He states simply that 'in general the Romans rely on force (βία) in all their undertakings, and consider that having set themselves a task they are bound to carry it through, and similarly that nothing is impossible once they have decided to attempt it'.[438] Presumably, according to Polybius' observation, if the Romans wished to enforce any conditions on their Italic allies, then the threat of force and violence could be utilised as a tool of diplomacy.[439] Of course, the actual use of force never had to be employed against the allies on any regular basis; the allies themselves could readily have anticipated and even been anxious about the use of force as a result of non-compliance.

It is the new-found level of even greater superiority that enabled the Romans to place increasingly burdensome demands on its allies. In this period, the notion that the Romans could obligate their allies to supply troops through the *formula togatorum* is more than plausible.[440] According to Polybius, this formula was the means through which the Romans calculated the number of the troops that individual communities contributed to a war effort.[441] The work of Brunt and Baronowski has further defined the *formula togatorum* as the means for calculating the troops that each ally would supply based on the proportion of their *iuniores*.[442] This would take place after the consuls had determined the full number of troops needed from the allies.[443] This formula was seemingly adjusted only occasionally for any population changes.[444] Although the extant sources do not allow a complete reconstruction of this process, it would appear that the allies themselves supplied the Romans with the relevant information for

[437] Thuc 5.105 (trans. Warner, 1972) has the Athenians declare, 'Our opinions of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.'
[438] Ployb. 1.37.7 (trans. Scott-Kilvert, 1979): καθόλου δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἅπαξ δοξάντων.
[439] Rosenstein (2007) 235.
[440] The introduction of the formula probably occurred sometime between the conquest of Italy and the Second Punic War (Erdkamp [2011] 117-8). The traditional date for its introduction is 225 BCE, as in Brunt (1971) 545-8, but this is by no means certain. Salmon (1982: 171) suggests that the formula was introduced after 338. I consider this unlikely as the procedure of calculating the available strength and resources of the allies presupposes a certain stability that simply does not exist until after the conquest of the Italian Peninsula.
[441] Polyb. 6.21.4-5; See also Livy 29.15.12; 41.8.8.
[442] Brunt (1971) 545-8; Baronowski (1984) 248-52.
[443] Ibid.
[444] Baronowski (1984) 251-2. More recently, Erdkamp (2011: 133) argues that the formula was adjusted quite regularly.

determining the amount of troops each community would provide to Rome.[445] How the Romans determined the final number of troops required from each community, however, remains unknown.

For my purpose, I would like to highlight that this formula, as Brunt and Salmon have previously noted, was not part of any obligation established in the *foedera* or any other formal agreement.[446] It is worth repeating that such agreements only promised the use of a community's manpower when needed. No surviving *foedus* records the obligation for annual military contributions. The use of the *formula togatorum* to calculate a specific contribution was likely, then, a product of Rome's superiority and ability to make more demands of its allies.

Coinciding with the relatively new demand for quantified military contributions were the punishments for not meeting this requirement. The first group of communities punished for failing to supply the specified troop numbers were the famous twelve Latin colonies of the Second Punic War.[447] These colonies gave the seemingly reasonable excuse that they simply did not have the men or the finances to fulfil their quota, the Romans nevertheless appear to have regarded this form of non-compliance on a similar level to a revolt.[448] While the consequences for this action were not comparable to the standard punishments for rebellion in terms of harshness, there was something equally intrusive about the Romans' treatment of these colonies. Beginning in 204, the colonies were required to bring their own census list to Rome presumably so that the Romans themselves could have both determined and known the precise number of troops and resources of these twelve communities.[449] It is difficult to see this as anything other than the Romans assuming greater control of these communities.[450] Again, this approach was seemingly afforded to them by their position. To make matter worse for the colonists, the Romans doubled the contribution of these colonies including an additional 120

[445] Polyb. 2.23.9.
[446] Brunt (1971) 545; Salmon (1982) 170.
[447] Livy 27.9.7.
[448] Livy 27.9.7-9.
[449] Livy 29.37.7.
[450] Broadhead (2008: 465) stresses that the Romans seem to have taken a more hands on approach to the manpower issue in the case of the Latins colonists, but this was not necessarily the case as my discussion will show. There is, however, perhaps some difference in the fact that the Latins colonists did not receive Roman citizenship as part of this punishment, unlike the Campani (see below).

horsemen and introduced a new tax, which, in light of the new census procedure that now matched the Roman one, could easily be enforced.[451]

Indeed, in the period under investigation the Romans appear to have handed out more constraining checks than had been practised in the past as punishments against non-compliant allies. The first case of such punishments came in the immediate aftermath of the Second Punic War with the punishment of the communities who defected to Hannibal. While the Romans subjected these defector communities to a number of fairly traditional punishments, particularly the confiscation of land and removal of local elites,[452] new forms of punishments designed to bring these communities under greater control appeared during this period.

The treatment of Capua is the most prominent example of such punishments. Leaving aside the more traditional punishment of wholesale confiscation and the removal not only of the community's local elites, but also Capua's entire administrative apparatus,[453] I would like to focus on the integration of the Capuans into the Roman citizenship itself. According to Livy, in 188 the Capuans were for the first time counted in the Roman census.[454] Just like the twelve Latin colonies mentioned above, this means that the Romans would be fully aware of Capua's potential for suppling troops. Presumably at this time also they were required to pay *tributum* until the practice was discontinued some twenty years after their enrolment.[455] This would suggest that the Romans were more actively seeking to control the manpower from those communities that had rebelled. The more information the Romans attained about a particular community, especially if the census of that community was reported in the Roman fashion or, indeed, in Rome itself, the greater chance the Romans had of exacting the maximum amount of the community's manpower. Only a community that possessed the superiority that Rome enjoyed could have intruded so far into the internal workings of another community without also suffering retaliatory actions. We might then view this action, as well as the introduction of the *formula togatorum*, as increasingly typical of Rome's political and military power.

[451] Livy 29.15.4-13. Livy alleges that this was an income tax that collected one *as* for every thousand.
[452] Capua again seems the best example (Livy 26.16.5-10).
[453] The punishment of Capua is predominantly outlined in Livy 26.16.5-10. While the removal of the local government is only recorded once prior to this occasion (Livy 9.45.24), Roselaar (2010: 73) is probably right that many communities, such as the Aurunci, who seemingly disappeared, in fact only lost their independence as a political and administrative unit. Roman conquest or subsequent punishment may or may not have been responsible.
[454] Livy 38.28.4.
[455] The Campani were included in the Roman census for the first time in the year 167 (Cic. *Off*. 2.22; Plin. *HN* 33.17). Given that they were now Roman citizens, these Campani must have also payed the taxes associated with the status.

The treatment of the Bruttii may seem to go against the trend of the Romans securing a stronger hold of Italian manpower, if we believe the account of Appian, but I suspect that the Bruttii too would have been required to take their census under the watchful eyes of the Romans just as the twelve colonies had done. As their punishment for ceding to Hannibal, Appian claims that the Romans had punished the Bruttii by forbidding their citizens from serving in the armies and instead requiring them to personally serve as assistants to the magistrates.[456] This seems counterintuitive considering their treatment of the twelve colonies for their failure to supply troops and, furthermore, out of character for the Romans who had up to this point always sought to utilise the manpower of conquered Italic communities. I think it more probably that the manpower of these communities too was managed directly from Rome, or perhaps temporarily by the praetor of Brutti.[457] As a result of this process, the inhabitants of these communities no longer served in their own identifiable units.[458] This may have given the impression to imperial writers, such as Appian, that the Bruttii no longer supplied troops.

I believe this analysis becomes more plausible with consideration of Strabo's evidence on the matter. He names the Picentes as those who did not serve in the armies but rather acted as messengers and couriers for the Romans on account of their defection to Hannibal.[459] He in fact only mentions in passing that the Bruttii and the Lucani also served in this same fashion.[460] This would seem to suggest there was nothing especially unique about the Bruttii in this regard. Strabo's account, however, does not in itself rule out the possibility that these three peoples only served as the magistrates' attendants.

I see very little reason why the Romans would have limited their available manpower so drastically in order to carry out this humiliation. Had this been the case, the Romans may well have alienated many communities who were required to field soldiers, while other communities were relieved of this burden as some form of punishment. Although the Bruttii would have technically still served under the Romans, the fact that they did so in non-combative roles was likely to have appeared favourable to those who undertook more dangerous duties. Even if non-

[456] App. *Hann.* 61. A similar story also survives in Aulus Gellius (*NA* 10.3.17-9), who quotes Cato the Elder.
[457] Livy 35.20.11-2. This seems to be the first usage of such a praetor tasked with overseeing a region within the limits of the Italian Peninsula.
[458] Cappelletti (2018: 332-3), following Strabo 6.1.2, notes that after their role in the Second Punic War, the Romans ended the political association of the Bruttii such that their communities were of little importance by the end of the first century BCE. This does perhaps raise the possibility that their disassociation extended to their military contributions. Cappelletti does not question Strabo's claim that the Bruttii served only in non-combative roles.
[459] Strab. 5.4.13.
[460] Ibid.

combative roles were meant to entail punishment, the risk that other communities would view these roles as a reward was probably too great.[461] Certainly, Livy depicts exemption from active military service as a benefit.[462] Furthermore, if it were intended as a punishment, this seems to be the only usage of such a tactic during the Republic.[463] To summarise, we might safely say that there were individuals serving in non-combative roles, and even that they took the name Bruttiani from the Bruttii, this does not necessarily mean that all Bruttii, or Lucani and Picentes for that matter, served exclusively in the role. It would be better to assume that all of these communities continued to serve in both combative and non-combative roles.

The increase in military contributions of punished communities and the attitude with which these were acquired following the Second Punic War reflected Rome's heightened position of power. Although nothing in many of the Italic communities' agreements with the Romans would have necessarily changed, with the obvious exception of those communities who defected to Hannibal, the superiority that the Romans now enjoyed enabled them to be more domineering in character. This stems largely from the greater superiority that the Romans now held as not just hegemon of the Italian Peninsula, but also of the Mediterranean. The growing disparity between Rome and every other Italic communities increased that likelihood that if a community did indeed revolt that the movement would be supressed with even greater ease than it had been in earlier times. The communities themselves would have calculated the chances of succeeding in their decision-making process. The suppression of revolts and consequent repercussions in these circumstances likely seemed a 'mathematical certainty' to any would-be rebel.[464] So again, the safest course of action for these communities was to comply with any demands that the Romans may have made of them. Of course, in this period those demands, as we have seen in the case of the *formula togatorum* and the treatment of those communities who defected to Hannibal, were more domineering and intrusive than in the earlier periods.

[461] It seems possible that having the Bruttii serve in this fashion may have been a short-term approach, perhaps because of how the other communities viewed the 'punishment'. Strabo's account suggests this practice ended at some unspecified time.
[462] Livy 29.14.2.
[463] In the *Lex Repetundarum* exemption from military service appears as a reward. See Crawford (1996) 94.
[464] De Romilly (1963: 294), in discussing the Melian Dialogue, makes this same point concerning the outcomes of any Athenian and Melian conflict prior to the military action taking place.

3.3 – Alliance Management in the Second Century

In the previous sections I have outlined how the lack of regional competition as well as the increasing political and military superiority of the Romans were largely responsible for the cohesion of Rome's network of alliances in the period following the Second Punic War. This did not mean, however, that the more traditional tactics of alliance management ceased altogether. It does seem, though, that in theory, and in practice, the Romans no longer needed to focus as much on establishing deterrence through exemplarity nor loyalty by granting benefits since military superiority largely secured the compliance of the allies.[465] The granting of benefits in particular would be more typical of a powerful community incentivising a weaker community either to join its alliance, just as Hannibal had done during the Second Punic War, or to remain loyal and reject any advance that a rival alliance might make. For reasons outlined above, this action may have seemed largely unnecessary for a community with no competitor such as Rome. It makes sense that providing benefits in return for loyalty would not necessarily be a key focus of the Romans' foreign policy in this period.

The departure from a strategy of providing benefits to allied communities is visible in the extant sources. The only community recorded as having received assistance from the Romans to alleviate internal difficulties was Patavium in 174.[466] This particular community, though, is not regularly considered part of the traditional Italic allies since this Venetic community inhabited an area beyond the symbolic boundary established by the Po River. I too do not consider this community as an Italic *socius* despite the fact that it held a relationship with the Romans since approximately 238.[467] It must be concluded, as far as we can tell, that no Italic community received assistance of this variety during the second century.

It is worth considering though whether the military strength of the Romans actually limited the need for them to assist these communities in the first place. The Romans' treatment, and in some cases removal, of a community's elites after the Second Punic War quite possibly meant that competing factions may well have temporarily disappeared from view. The execution of

[465] I make this observation based on the evidence that has survived from the period. It is quite possible that much of Rome's relations with the Italic allies was overlooked by later sources in preference to affairs in Rome's overseas involvement, particularly in the first half of the century. If we take Livy as an example, although he returns to issues concerning the Italian Peninsula in certain key places during his narrative, his focus remains fixed predominantly on events in Illyria, Greece and the Aegean throughout Books 31 to 45. I do, however, think it unlikely that Livy would have overlooked any significant event that may have occurred in Italy in order to maintain his focus.
[466] According to Livy (41.27.3), this upheaval was a consequence of factional rivalry within the city.
[467] Polyb. 2.23.3; Strab. 5.1.9.

disloyal elites, such as in the case of Capua, was undoubtedly a means of deterrence among the upper classes of the Italic communities. This leaves the possibility that although the frequency of assistance dropped in this period, the need for assistance likely fell as well.[468]

The compliance of the upper classes did not always translate into a peaceful coexistence with the lower echelons, but a lack of Roman intervention in this period does seem to suggest that this was the case. But there was one group connected to these communities which was understandably not always satisfied with their given situation and made this known through disruptive actions. The slaves the Romans acquired in huge numbers during its wars occasionally rebelled or were otherwise disloyal.[469] Livy tell us of revolts at both Setia and Praeneste in 198 as well as another in Etruria two years later.[470] In the 180s there were further slave rebellions in Southern Italy particularly among shepherds.[471] The fact that in the case of Etruria, for example, the Romans were prepared to allocate a praetor as well as an entire legion demonstrates the seriousness with which the Roman Senate viewed this problem.[472] Two years earlier L. Cornelius Lentulus was supposedly even given the power to compel any man he met between Rome and Setia to join his emergency force.[473]

The suppression of these revolts can be counted as a benefit provided to the Italic communities. Naturally, these revolts disrupted and even threatened the adjacent communities. In the case of Setia, Livy reports that the slaves had attacked those who were attending the games,[474] while those instances of revolts in Southern Italy appear to be dominated by reports of banditry.[475] The case of a slave uprising in Apulia apparently involved as many as seven thousand slaves.[476] Eliminating these threats was obviously beneficial to these communities and to Rome itself. Had these slave rebellions gone unchecked, they could have destabilised Rome's dominion and undermined the strength with which it coerced allies. Suppressing these revolts was a way of

[468] It is worth bearing in mind that although Rome's assistance of Italic communities diminished, it now also had to assist communities outside of the Italian Peninsula (e.g. Livy 41.27.4). Throughout the second century concern for extra-Italian issues seems to take precedence as I will later discuss in Chapter Four.
[469] Scheidel (2005: 64-79) provides a useful discussion and calculation of the number of slaves acquired by the Romans during the Republic.
[470] Livy 32.26.4-18 (Setia and Praeneste); 33.36.1-3 (Etruria).
[471] The campaigns against slaves in Southern Italy seems to have occurred between 185 and 182 (Livy 39.29.8-9, 41.6-7; 40.19.9.10). Shaw (2001: 72) also believes that praetors sent to Southern Italy in the first half of this decade were targeting slave insurrections. While this is perhaps possible, I doubt very much that this action was related to the suppression of the Bacchanalia as he claims because no attempt to supress the cult was made until 186.
[472] Livy 33.36.2.
[473] Livy 32.26.10-11.
[474] Livy 32.26.7.
[475] Livy 39.29.8-9.
[476] Ibid.

demonstrating military strength. Of course, it was this strength that had enabled the Romans to act, and continue acting, as hegemon.

In all, Rome did not need to supply its allies with as much assistance after the Second Punic War because the Italian Peninsula was enjoying a period of relative stability. There are some instances in which Livy may have downplayed the seriousness of a given situation, if, indeed, he was even fully aware of them in the first place. One such occasion may have been in 188 when the Romans redeployed armies from Cisalpine Gaul into Apulia.[477] Given the hostilities typically experienced from the Gauls at the time, it would be somewhat surprising for this decision to be made unless there was a great need for troops in the South. Livy, however, gives no indication as to what this reason might be.

The predominant form of assistance that Rome offered to its allies in this period was against external threats. This correlates to the assistance against external threats the Romans provided in the period of Italian conquest, but differed in that these threats predominantly came from outside of the peninsula rather than within it. For the first half of the second century, external threats did on occasion loom over the Italic communities. In the aftermath of the Second Punic War, the northern regions of the peninsula were under pressure for a number of Hannibal's former allies in the form of various Gallic tribes as well as the Ligures. Gallic insurgents had in fact managed to raze the Latin colony of Placentia in 200 and besiege Cremona before being suppressed.[478] Later, in 193-2, the Ligures alone had managed to penetrate as far as Pisa.[479] The southern regions, on the other hand, had to contend with a more persistent threat in Macedonia and other Greek *poleis*. In 192, Livy suggests the Romans had made provisions in the event that the Spartan tyrant Nabis or the Antiochus III made any attempt to enter the Italian Peninsula.[480] Indeed, the regular dispatch of an annual praetor to Bruttium and Apulia as well as the founding of new colonies demonstrates the Romans' concern for the threat that their eastern enemies possessed across the sea, and perhaps even the loyalty of the southern Italic communities.[481] Of course, the Romans did eventually remove these threats towards the middle

[477] Livy 38.36.1.
[478] Livy 31.10.1-3, 21.10-8.
[479] Livy 34.56.1-2; 35.21.7-11.
[480] Livy (35.20.11-4) records that two large forces were raised in case the Macedonians invaded, while the Romans planned similar measures for Antiochus (23.3-8).
[481] Initially following the Second Punic War, a praetor was regularly sent out to Bruttium (e.g. Livy 31.8.7; 35.20.10, 41.6), but later Apulia was added to this same office (Livy 37.2.2, 50.13). Two Latin colonies were also established at Vibo and Castrum Frentinum (Livy 34.53.1-2), but perhaps more importantly a major programme involving the founding of several Roman colonies was introduced to protect South-eastern portion of the Italian

of the century. Rome's overseas conquest did also remove potential threats further and further away from the Italian Peninsula. We might rightly question whether there were even any external threats to seriously concern the Italic communities at the turn of the first century BCE. Paradoxically, the total removal of external threats may have undermined the Roman alliance rather than strengthening it. This is, however, a discussion for a later chapter.

The importance the Romans still placed on the defence of Italic communities can be linked back to the role of the hegemon and the importance of its military superiority. Had the Romans not supplied this benefit, the communities themselves may have come to two conclusions, both of which might led to untoward behaviour. Firstly, without providing its allies with protection, Rome could not have justified its leadership of the Italic communities, nor could the communities justify themselves being under Rome's leadership because they may well have been better off alone.[482] Moreover, protection against threats was a keen interest for any community which submitted to the will or leadership of another.[483] So to not have undertaken measures to ensure the protection of communities under their leadership would have damaged the relationship between the Romans and their allies. In this situation, a community might have attempted to revolt against, or at least distance itself from, the leadership of the hegemon in pursuit of their own interests. As security was a key interest of communities, hegemons, such as Rome, would have been well served by providing this benefit to members of its alliance to avoid such action from taking place.

If the Romans had ceased to protect them against external threats, communities might have also concluded not that Rome was disinterested in providing protection, as in the first conclusion, but that they were incapable of doing so. Communities may have questioned Rome's military capabilities. Rome, of course, wished to give at least the perception, if not the actual reality, of its military superiority, otherwise it would have left itself open to competition for other communities - even if this challenge took the form of small scale revolts.[484] It was in the Romans' interest to protect these communities, as this action demonstrated their military

Peninsula. from naval threats (Livy 32.29.3-4; 34.45.1-2). Such was there importance that when the colonies at Buxentum and Sipontum initially failed they were quickly re-established (Livy 39.23.3-4).

[482] This is to say that they may have been in a better position to fulfil their interests.

[483] Terrenato (2007: 14-5) dates the benefit of protection back to the archaic period and counts it among the obligations and expectations of clan membership. These obligations and expectations can be extrapolated to account for the membership of a hegemonic alliance.

[484] When used as a deterrence, military strength only needs to suggest to a community that a revolt, or, indeed, a war would fail. The actual military capacity need not be known. If we return to the case of the Melian Dialogue, we can see that the Athenians were more concerned about how their military capacity appeared to their allies rather than their actual military capacity (Thuc. 5.95-7).

strength in comparison to hostile entities. Moreover, when speaking of their empire, the Romans seemed to have prided their alliance on this attribute of military strength.[485] For these reasons, protection against external threats remained a vital benefit of allegiance to the Romans in the period following the Second Punic War.

The suppression of the Bacchanalia may offer an example of one additional benefit in this period. During 186, the Roman Senate ordered that no Roman citizen, Latin or *foederati* could undertake any rites or practices associated with the Bacchic cult without first consulting the *praetor urbanus*.[486] Gruen has previously argued that the suppression of this cult represented Rome's ability to interfere with the usually autonomous internal affairs of its allies, but his stance has been rightfully questioned with differing levels of success.[487] For instance, Mouritsen suggests that the suppression itself only applied within Roman territories.[488] However, there is no positive evidence for or against such a reading. It is perhaps safer to assume the decree applied to all communities and territories within the Italian Peninsula.[489] Since Rome was predominantly a noninterventionist hegemon when it came to the religious practices of the Italic communities, it is unsurprising that scholars have sought to offer a more positive account of Rome's suppression of the Bacchic cult.[490] The task then is to frame what appears to be an action forced on Rome's allies into a more typical approach from this hegemon.

The analysis of David may provide the best solution. He speculates that the Romans in fact only intervened on this occasion because the cult threatened the power of the local elites.[491] This leaves open the possibility that these elites themselves had requested assistance from the Romans. These requests would have mirrored those made in instances of civil unrest.[492] Burkert in particular has stressed the possibility that had the Romans not intervened in this worship, a

[485] Livy's Rhodians express this sentiment by declaring the Roman alliance the only secure alliance at the time (42.45.4).
[486] The most complete account of the event can be found in Livy's work (39.14.5-9, 18.7-10), but the inscription outlining the *senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus* is also of great significance (*CIL* I^2 581).
[487] Gruen (1990) 61-78.
[488] Mouritsen (1998) 55.
[489] I am following Stek (2009) 21. It is somewhat strange that foreigners would have need to consult the *praetor urbanus* when they would not usually deal with this particular magistrate. Nevertheless, Bispham (2007: 116-24) outlines problems in keeping the alternative reconstructions of Mouritsen and others, who follow this approach. Primarily, such a reconstruction relies on the assumption that only Romans were targeted since the inscription appears in Latin.
[490] For instance, recently Gladhill (2016: 28-9) argues that the Romans were asking nothing more of the allies than would apply to themselves.
[491] David (1995) 141.
[492] See Chapter 2.2.

'second people' may have been created capable of undermining or overthrowing the existing order.[493] The focus of this analysis, though, has usually been the risk the movement posed to the Roman Senate, but it seems equally likely that the cult threatened the local elites of the Italic communities for precisely the same reasons.[494] The Bacchic cult threatened the pre-existing hierarchies within the Italic communities as well as those at Rome. This would have been disconcerting for Roman elites because they relied heavily on the local elites for control of the incorporated communities. If the local elites lost control or influence within their communities, Rome's leadership too would have suffered as a result. It would make sense for the Romans to have intervened in these circumstances. While intervention within the religious workings of an incorporated community is indeed atypical of the Romans, intervening to support local elites was not. Conflicting policies likely created the unique situation of the Bacchanalia affair. In this situation, the Romans clearly favoured the preservation of the elite networks over the religious freedoms of a large, though select, group.

While the suppression of the Bacchanalia appears to be an additional benefit, one of the important traditional incentives offered in return for loyalty seems to have decreased drastically in this period. The spoils the allies enjoyed for assisting the Romans in their wars seem to have been partially reduced. For the year 173, Livy records that when Roman citizens received ten *iugera* for their service in Cisalpine Gaul, the Latins, or possibly the Latins and allies, only received three.[495] I believe this particular passage is best read with the assumption that allies had previously received the same size land allotments as Roman citizens.[496] In this case, there would be no need for the author to name the allies as their inclusion would be implied. As such this restriction appears to set a new precedent.

Indeed, the case of the despondent allies in the triumph of C. Claudius in 177 would seem to suggest the normality of an equal share of spoils. According to Livy, these men received only half the donations presented to the Roman infantry.[497] As a result of this treatment, the allies

[493] Burkert (1987) 52. Livy (39.13.14) details the testimony of the prostitute Hispala who suggests the followers were almost the size of a second state and importantly included men and woman of high rank. Takács (2000: 306-7) builds on this point by focusing on the challenges the cult brought to the social hierarchy of the Romans. Especially relevant were the prominent roles for women in the cult.
[494] A typical account of the threat to the Senate can be found in Takács (2000) 303.
[495] Livy 42.4.4. The question here remains whether Livy meant solely the Latins by the use of the term *sociis nominis Latini*, or indeed, whether any non-Latins were involved in this distribution. Livy is known for using the term even when identifying non-Latins. See Coşkun (2016) 556.
[496] The footnote for this particular passage in Sage and Schlesinger's *Loeb* translation of Livy (1967) suggests that this was the first instance that allies were included in the distribution of land.
[497] Livy 41.13.7-8.

supposedly followed the procession in a silent yet angry manner.[498] Here Livy clearly emphasises that the source of the allies' anger was the belittling nature of their reward. Prior to this episode, there is a small number of instances in Livy's account of the same quantity of spoils being shared among Roman citizens and allies.[499] The anger of the allied soldiers in 177 is best understood if we assume that they were previously accustomed to receiving the same amount of spoils as Roman citizens.[500] We might conclude that the notion of sharing spoils between members of an alliance outlined, for instance, in the *foedus Cassianum* had continued until at least the first quarter of the second century.[501] After this date, though, the clause seems to have fallen into disuse.[502]

In terms of the punishment of communities outside of those previously mentioned in relation to the Second Punic War, the only community recorded to have been severely punished is Fregellae in 125.[503] This Latin colony seemingly revolted as a response to the failed campaign to grant Roman citizenship to Latin colonists.[504] It should be remembered, though, that due to Rome's military superiority and the lack of a competitor, a significant drop in the number of revolts, as well as the need to make an example of their instigators, is unsurprising. Again, we may turn to the importance of military superiority as the major form of deterrence in this period.

3.4 – A New 'Benefit': Special Grants of Roman Citizenship

The bestowal of special grants of Roman citizenship to relatively elite individuals from the Italic communities perhaps best reveals the changing nature of Rome's relationship with its

[498] Ibid.
[499] Livy at 40.43.7 records that the Latins (plus the allies?) received the same fifty *denarii* as their Roman counterparts, while at 41.7.3 the allies received twenty-five *denarii* just as the Roman citizens had done.
[500] Göhler (1939: 51-2) unconvincingly tried to argue that this was all that the allies were legally entitled to. Had this been the case, their anger would be difficult to explain.
[501] Dion. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 6.95.
[502] This would seem to be another indication that the Romans' leadership of the Italic communities was not entirely governed by the *foedera* since it would seem likely that these agreements still required the equal share of spoils. The decision to alter the amount given to allied soldiers must have occurred independent of these.
[503] Livy *Per*. 60.
[504] Mouritsen (2008: 477-8) seems right to suppose that Flaccus' original proposal only included a small minority of the allies, and in particular Latins from colonies, many of who were descendants of Romans. Appian's account of Fulvius Flaccus' campaign (*B Civ*. 1. 21) suggests that he proposed to give Roman citizenship to all Italian allies. Valerius Maximus (9.5.1) shares this view, but also includes the option of *provocatio* for those not wishing to become Roman citizens. However, in discussing C. Gracchus' campaign (*B Civ*. 1.23), Appian names only Latins as those who would receive citizenship, while only promising to enfranchise the allies at a later date. Plutarch (*C. Gracch.* 8.3) too only mentions Latins. Alternatively, Velleius Paterculus (2.6.4) claims all Italian allies would be enfranchised.

allies in this period. According to the *Lex Repetundarum*, individuals who had successfully prosecuted a Roman citizen in the law courts or had held a magisterial office within their local community could be granted Roman citizenship.[505] Given the importance of local elites to Rome's system of governance as well as the cohesion of alliances, I am more interested in the second group of these individuals, though this happens to be the more problematic group. It should be immediately pointed out that the surviving text of the *lex* is rather fragmentary and its reconstruction is a matter of some speculation.[506] For this reason, whether or not an individual from an allied community enjoyed this right, or indeed just those from Latin communities, is still the subject of some debate. So too is the date of the introduction of these special grants.

I find it entirely reasonable to assume like Ando and Coşkun that the law granting citizenship to those serving as local magistrates dates from the late 120s.[507] While it is tempting to date the introduction of so-called *ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae* to the period after the Social War as Crawford has done,[508] thereby coinciding its introduction with other major citizenship laws, Asconius' evidence suggests that the law most likely predates the Social War.[509] He claims that Cn. Pompeius Strabo gave Latin rights to the pre-existing inhabitants of the new colonies founded after 89 in Cisapline Gaul rather than enrolling new settlers, and so brought them into line with the rest of the Latin colonies.[510] It would seem that although the magistrates of these new colonies could gain Roman citizenship from 89, office bearers from older Latin colonies received this right some time before this date. Accordingly, I find little reason to disregard the traditional date of the right's introduction. Those who date the introduction of this right to the dates towards the end of the Republic too easily ignore Asconius' evidence.[511]

---

[505] Lines 76-9. See Crawford (1996) 94.
[506] Crawford (1996: 111) highlights the issues with the text.
[507] Ando (2016) 179-80; Coşkun (2009b) 226-7. 123 BCE seems the most likely date. See also Dart (2014) 215-6.
[508] Crawford (1996: 111) suggests a date sometime after the Social War. The law may well have been introduced in 89, but at the very least the *Lex Repetundarum* highlights the fact that the special rights of *provocatio* and *uacatio* could at least be granted to local magistrates from 123. The granting of Roman citizenship to a limited number of individuals then at this time may not have seemed entirely radical. Livy (23.22.5-6) in fact records an instance in 215 in which a senator purportedly put forth a rejected notion of granting citizenship to two members of each Latin community and enrolling them in the Senate. If genuine, this at least proves that some Romans considered offering special grants of citizenship well before the 120s.
[509] Asc. *Pis.* 3.
[510] Ibid: *Pompeius enim non novis colonis eas constituit sed veteribus incolis manentibus ius dedit Latii, ut possent habere ius quod ceterae Latinae coloniae, id est ut petendo magistratus civitatem Romanam adipiscerentur.*
[511] The major scholars preferring a later date are Bradeen (1959: 221-8) and Mouritsen (1998: 99-108).

The next issue to consider in the granting of this right is who possessed it. The predominant view holds that this right was only extended to the Latins.[512] As such, Mouritsen has argued that this right is only dated to the 120s because of the need to explain the changing stance of the Latins who at first campaigned for citizenship at this time, but later were loyal to the Romans in the Social War.[513] Of course, even if this notion is arguably true for a number of scholars, it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the Latins possessed this right from the earlier date. The possession of this right and the actions of the Latin communities during those two periods are not mutually exclusive. It is quite possible that the Latins did indeed have this right during the 120s, but remained loyal to Roman during the Social War for entirely different reasons. However, this issue might be better viewed from the recently established standpoint that scholars have too often assumed the Latins occupied a special legal position between Roman citizens and *peregrini* during the Republic.[514] It seem possible then to argue that the higher magistrates of all Italic communities were given the option to become Roman citizens in the late second century if they so desired.

To begin with, only the reconstruction of the very fragmentary section 78-9 of the *Lex Repetundarum* presupposes that the Latin communities were the sole beneficiaries of this right. Within this passage, both the restriction of the right *in cuititate Latina* and the longer list of Latin magistrate titles, with the exception of praetor, aedile and probably dictator, are both very tentative reconstructions as Crawford is careful to acknowledge.[515] He also admits that this section could refer to all of Rome's allies and not just the Latins, but, in his opinion, it is more likely to apply only to this select group.[516] Nonetheless, it is quite possible, as Sherwin-White suggests, that the author of this law had chosen to use only Latin office titles rather than to list the magistracies of all Greek, Oscan, Etruscan and Umbrian communities.[517] In practice,

[512] E.g. Sherwin-White (1973) 111-2; Piper (1988) 59-68.
[513] Mouritsen (1998) 99. Keaveney (2005: 84-6) demonstrates the argument that Mouritsen so heavily criticises.
[514] The most influential works on this subject include Roselaar (2012) 381-413 and (2013) 102-22. A useful summary of recent challenges to the traditional view of the Latin rights can be found in Coşkun (2016) 526-69.
[515] Crawford's reconstruction of 78 runs: *ᵛᵛᵛᵛᵛᵛ de prouocation[e uocantion]eque danda. ᵛᵃᶜ sei quis eorum, quei [???c(eiuis) Romanei ex h(ace) l(ege) fieri nolet, quei eorum in ceiuitate Latina IIuir consul??? Dicta]tor ᵛᵛ praetor aedilisue non fuerint, ad praetorem, quoius ex hace lege eri[t, ex h(ace) l(ege) alteri nomen detolerit et is eo iudicio h(ace) l(ege) condemnatus erit, tum, quei eius nomen detolerit, quoius eorum opera maxume is condomnatus erit, ei prouocatio uocatioque esto uocatioque]*. See Crawford (1996) 111 for his commentary on the section and his admittance of difficulty.
[516] Crawford (1996) 111.
[517] Sherwin-White (1972) 94-6. Galsterer (1976: 94-7) too adopts Sherwin-White's argument. Lintott (1992b: 159) questions whether the use of *in ceiuitate Latina*, as in reconstructions like that above, is an acceptable alternative shorthand to *nominis Latini* in a legal text. His reconstruction suggests instead *in ceiuitate sua* meaning that all Italic magistrates, not just those of the Latin communities, received the offer of citizenship. Lintott (1992b) 106.

though, due to their proximity to Rome and their closer similarity of customs, it was likely that mainly former Latin magistrates chose to adopt Roman citizenship and quit their own communities. Given the problems that individuals would have faced in making the transition to live in Rome, or indeed Roman territory, many would have likely preferred to remain in their own community, hence the former magistrates were provided with the option for doing so.

Turning briefly to Asconius' evidence, while he specified only Latins possessed the right to Roman citizenship after holding office, in 89 there would have been no need to mention this right in relation to other Italic peoples because they all possessed Roman citizenship at this time.[518] This right ceased to apply to the allies after this date. Thus, there would have been little or no need for Asconius to specify the *socii* among those who possessed this right. He was only concerned with those who held the right in the 50s when it was extended to the new Latin colonists in Cisalpine Gaul.

While the possibility of gaining citizenship might have seemed a concession to the inhabitants of the Italic communities, I find it more likely that the introduction of this right brought about a certain degree of friction between the Romans and some of the Italian elites. Those scholars, notably Mouritsen, who argue for the later date of grants of citizenship *per magistratum* use the problems associated with its introduction as evidence for the non-existence of the right in the earlier periods.[519] We may immediately note issues over the depletion of the elite classes because former magistrates were barred from office as they were now Roman citizens, the notion of double citizenship, and the subsequent loss of manpower to communities.[520] However, this analysis relies on the misconception that those who introduced this law perfectly foresaw all of its consequences and side effects. To be sure, the aforementioned issues are legitimate, but this does not mean that Roman policy makers were necessarily in a position to foresee these problems. It seems quite possible that these issues only became evident after the introduction of this right. Many elites likely chose the option of remaining in their own citizenship precisely because of the issues associated with becoming a Roman citizen from a foreign community. In this way, the extension of this right may have been rather hollow for many elites of the Italic communities. For their own part, I am sure that many of the elites would have preferred to stay in their own communities where they possessed a privileged

[518] Asc. *Pis.* 3.
[519] Mouritsen (1998) 100-2.
[520] Ibid.

position and influence rather than trying to establish themselves in Rome's political world, even if there were potentially greater benefits associated with the latter.[521]

Prior to the introduction of this right, the Romans sought to strengthen their position in the communities of the Italian Peninsula by supporting the interests of local elites, who would in turn comply with Rome's leadership in order to cement their own advantage.[522] Its introduction represents a significant change to Rome's approach. Ando briefly alludes to this fact by suggesting this policy was designed to conduce alignment between the personal interests of the local elites and those of Roman elites.[523] Instead of supporting the interests of the elites of the Italic communities, the Romans seem to have been attempting to convert these interests to a more Romano-centric outlook.[524] In theory, the interests of the local elites that did choose to change citizenship would have mirrored Roman interests.

This change may only seem small, but it does hint at larger issues in the relationship between Rome and its Italic allies. The need to convert the interests of the local elites to a more Roman outlook presupposes that the interests between the two groups had become too diverse for the previous policy to have worked effectively. The reasons for this separation of interests, a development we might call 'relationship drift',[525] are too many to address briefly here, but their importance does warrant the dedication of an entire chapter.

3.5 – Conclusion

In the century and a half that followed Rome's conquest of the Italian Peninsula, particularly after the conclusion of the Second Punic War, the Romans seem to have relied predominantly on their military superiority to ensure the compliance of their allies, rather than the balanced strategy of establishing benefits for loyalty and deterrents against insurrection that was hugely successful in the preceding period. The reduction of benefits that the Romans offered in this period does, however, coincide with the lack of a viable competitor. Without this competitor,

[521] Lomas (2012: 205) estimates that the prestige of local elites would probably be similar to a junior senator even at Rome. Consequently, they would not enjoy the same level of position or influence as they had in their own communities.
[522] See Chapter 2.2.
[523] Ando (2016) 180.
[524] I stress here that this was only an attempt. The actual procedure of electing those who would be offered the opportunity to choose Roman citizenship, regardless of whether this offer would be accepted, was entirely in the hands of the communities themselves. See Ando (2016) 179-83.
[525] I borrow this term from Burton (2011) 53.

who might protect rebellious communities from any repercussions the Romans might otherwise inflict on them, Rome's allies were forced not only to be loyal by default, but also to accept whatever conditions were forced on them. In this way, military strength, or at least its perception, was the main contributing factor to the cohesion of Rome's network of alliances in the Italian Peninsula.

The reliance on military strength, however, was perhaps slightly misguided because a significant proportion of Rome's military strength came from the contribution of its allies. In fact, on average Rome's allies provided near or over half of the total fighting force. For instance, according to Rich's calculations, Rome's allies contributed seventeen soldiers for every eleven soldiers Rome itself provided in 103 to deal with the Sicilian slave revolts.[526] At different times this number would have been considerably higher. It is possible that during the decades of the late third century and early second century the allied contributions comprised two-thirds as Velleius suggests.[527] This being the case, Rome's military superiority in this period is slightly misleading to the outside observer and perhaps artificially inflated. As a result, their superiority, and by extension the cohesion of their alliances, was less secure than the Romans might have anticipated. After all, if most of the allies rebelled against the Romans, the former allies would be an equal match at least in terms of manpower. Hence, the reliance on military superiority alone was a risky approach, though perhaps an element of complacency on the part of the Romans, as well as their own projection of a strong military ethos, concealed this reality. We may ask ourselves whether they had even contemplated the possibility of a large-scale revolt of their Italic allies towards the end of the second century.

[526] Rich (1983) 323. This calculation is based on the numbers provided by Diodorus Siculus (36.8.1).
[527] Vell. Pat. 2.15.2. Though, Velleius suggests that this proportion was always constant. This seems improbable. Polybius (2.24), in his discussion on available troop numbers in 225 for the war against the Gauls does attest a similar proportion and, indeed, that the number was constant from the Second Punic War to his own day (approximately 150 BCE), but later claims that allies contributed an equal number of infantry as the Romans and three times the cavalry (3.107.12). A good discussion on the proportion of allied contribution can be found in Rich (1983) 321-3.

ITALY WITHIN THE EMPIRE

4.0 – Introduction

In the late stages of the third century and throughout the second century, the Romans expanded their influence into the wider Mediterranean basin by means of various military campaigns. Both the expansion of the Rome's Republican empire itself and the organisation of mechanisms used to control the newly incorporated populations affected the pre-existing empire bound within the limits of peninsular Italy. Modern historians have not fully examined this connection. It is my aim to demonstrate in this chapter how the changes associated with this era are instrumental in understanding the weakening of Rome's relationship with its Italian allies and, indeed, the outbreak of the Social War.

Throughout this process, I will avoid anachronistic assessments of the management of the wider Mediterranean. Much like many of Rome's institutions, the mechanisms of controlling the outlying regions of the empire was subject to change. How the Romans approached the management of an empire that encompassed the wider Mediterranean in the early second century was different to the method adopted in Cicero's day. In the latter half of the second century, the Romans reconsidered how they controlled the territories outside of the Italian Peninsula due to their earlier experiences in overseeing these outlying regions.[528] This reassessment, though, would be a slow process that was not fully complete until after the Social War.[529]

The greatest change in this period that affected the Romano-Italic alliance was the introduction of new interests, particularly economic interests, as a result of overseas expansion. We might quickly note war indemnities, taxation and profits gained from the mining of precious metals. Not all of these new interests were shared directly with the Italic communities themselves. This change had ramifications for the relationship between Rome and the Italic communities since their alliances were partially founded on interests shared between the elites. It will be my task in this chapter then to outline the introduction of these new interests and how changes

[528] Richardson (2008: 48-9) claims that their experience in the Iberian Peninsula in particular affected how they approached this issue.
[529] Serrati (2013: 167) suggests this change was complete at some point during Cicero's lifetime.

associated with these likely produced a degree of uncertainty between a number of the allies and the Romans.

The incorporation of the *provinciae* themselves also likely caused an element of uncertainty. Each of these new non-Italic communities had interests of their own which they hoped Rome would secure in accordance with its role as a regional hegemon. The level of assistance that the Romans could supply, though, was of course finite. Even as hegemon, the city did not have the means nor the resources to satisfy each and every demand that its allies might have. As such, the Romans could only have acted upon a certain percentage of each of their allies' interests. These we might call the 'fulfilled interests'. The fulfilled interests of a community would have been those that the Romans could secure and protect. The Romans would have naturally been unwilling to give up a proportion of their own fulfilled interests, so the Italic allies would have to endure this loss. The more the Romans had sought to fulfil the interests of the non-Italic populations, the less effort they could spare on fulfilling the interests of the Italic allies. While this change was unlikely to have been detected by the average inhabitant of an Italic community, the Italic elites and the Italian *negotiatores*, when they later came to prominence, may have become aware of this through their dealings with the Roman elites or the inhabitants of the *provinciae* themselves.

It seems perhaps that the Romans were initially aware of such a problem occurring since the control of Spain and Greece in first half of the second century was characterised by a lack of clear policy and even an element of disinterest after the initial conquest itself.[530] But this may equally have been caused by the Romans' own perception of what was at least territorially 'theirs'. Several sources do hint that the Romans felt they only could claim possession of the Italian Peninsula.[531] As I will demonstrate below, it was only after a series of revolts in both *provinciae* that the Romans embraced a more active approach. A more active approach in the *provinciae*, though, translated into a less active consideration of the Italic communities. For this reason, the uncertainty within the Romano-Italic alliance can perhaps be better dated to the latter half of the second century.

[530] For the situation in Spain see Richardson (1986) 105 and Curchin (2004) 52. The style of Rome's early involvement in Greece and Asia Minor is well documented by Eckstein (2013) 81-8.
[531] For instance, Gaius (*Inst.* 2.27) preserves that Italian land was viewed differently in a legal context to land from other regions. See more below.

4.1 – Additions to the Empire: The Romans in Spain and Greece

Empire Beyond the Italian Peninsula

In the final quarter of the third century the Romans began to expand their influence beyond the borders of the Italian Peninsula. There is some indication, however, that the Romans viewed this expansion, and even the act of conquest itself, in a different light to that of the territories occupied by the Italic communities.

Conventionally, modern scholars believed that a territory conquered by the Romans was at once annexed and formed into a province of the empire.[532] At the beginning of the second century, however, a *provincia* was, as far as we can tell, a 'task' rather than an assertion of sovereignty, even if a *locus* was attached to it.[533] It was only later during the Late Republic and Empire that the word took on a meaning similar to the modern understanding of the term 'province'.[534] This definition is consistent with the word's usage in the works of several ancient writers. For instance, Livy calls Africa a *provincia* in 205.[535] There would be few scholars, though, who would attempt to argue that in this period Rome was claiming sovereignty over the territory which included an as yet undefeated Carthage. We may even note that Livy often used this word to denote hostile areas or Italic peoples that were assigned to the consuls of the early Republic.[536] None of these areas, though, would be later thought of as any sort of province. Furthermore, although Polybius states that the Romans had become masters of Asia, Africa and Spain by the first decade of the second century, Kallet-Marx rightfully points out that during these years only the Iberian Peninsula possessed a provincial assignment.[537] This leaves the question then of how the Romans themselves envisaged their empire during the second century.

---

[532] See for instance, the discussion in Harris (1979) 131-53.
[533] Here I follow Richardson (2008) 16-7, 24.
[534] Richardson (2008: 25) singles out instances in Appian and Livy in which the author has more likely applied the usage of the turn in their own time. The topic is subject to considerable debate. Drogula (2015: 242-3) suggests that from the regularly stationing of praetors in Sicily in 227, against Brennan's (2000: 85-9) claim of 241, that *provinciae* could be permanent 'defensive assignments'. Other than Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, though, *provinciae* initially had little permanency, which perhaps implies these were experiments. See also Rafferty (2017) 148-50 for a brief, but useful discussion.
[535] Livy 28.40.1. Further examples of the term *provincia* being used in this way can be found in Richardson (2008) 24.
[536] For instance, Quintus Fabius was given the *provincia* against the Aequi in 466-5. See Livy 3.2.2.
[537] Polyb. 23.14.10; Kallet-Marx (1995) 27.

The answer to this question seems to be found within the work of Polybius. His use of the word ἀρχή clearly indicates that he considered the Romans' establishment of empire over the whole world (i.e. the Mediterranean) relates specifically to their ability to command obedience.[538] While it may be possible to make the argument that Polybius has misunderstood how the Romans viewed their world, it would likely be an error to pursue this line of thinking in this case. After all, magistrates sent to their *provinciae* relied on grants of *imperium* to affect orders,[539] and even in the Augustan era those in the provinces were said to be *sub imperio populi Romani*.[540] If the Romans wished for those outside of the Italian Peninsula to obey their commands, neither the acquisition of territory nor the permanent administration of the populations themselves was necessary. Indeed, we see this in the early phases of Rome's involvement in Spain and Greece.

'Roman' Spain (216-133 BCE)

The Romans' involvement on the Iberian Peninsula began in the latter half of the third century when the region formed a major theatre for the Second Punic War. During this time and for the next half century, Rome's relationship with the Spanish tribes was determined not by the Senate, nor by the privileged group of elites, but by individuals, who seem to have organised the region independent of the Senate. Chief among these individuals were Scipio Africans himself, who lay the foundation of the Spanish alliances,[541] Cato the Elder, who seems to have exploited the locals during his time,[542] and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, the father of the famous tribune, who introduced a series of new arrangements in 179.[543] Outside of the magistrate's own initiative itself, there seems to have been little guidelines to specify how he should operate or what military aim, if any, he should achieve during his tenure.[544] Furthermore, there is little

[538] This point was first raised by Derow (1979: 4-6), though it is equally well attested in Kallet-Marx (1995) 22. The key passage of Polybius demonstrating this point is 3.4.3.
[539] Drogula (2015: 132) argues that a *provincia* limited the sphere in which a commander could use his *imperium* to full effect.
[540] The *Res Gestae* (26.1), for example, speaks of subduing those *non parerent imperio nostro*. In the late Republic, Cicero (*Prov. cons.* 33.3) too uses a similar formula. We might also note that Livy's translation at 37.53.4 of Polyb. 21.19.10 equates Polybius' understanding of Rome's empire with Livy's own of *imperium*, albeit from an Augustan era understanding.
[541] Polyb. 10.38.5.
[542] Livy 34.9.11-13, 21.9. Curchin (1991) 29-33.
[543] The major account of Gracchus' campaigns in Spain can be found at Livy 40.47.1-49.6, but Appian (*Hisp*. 43) also offers a brief outline of his agreements in Spain.
[544] See especially Richardson (1986: 108), who notes that there appears to be little military planning or instructions to these senatorial appointments. This coincides well with Eckstein's argument (1987: 319-24) that the Senate relied heavily on the commanders in the field.

to suggest that agreements reached between these individuals and the Spanish communities were ever ratified by the Senate itself, especially those made by Gracchus.[545] Indeed, at a later time both the Spanish communities and the Senate could distinguish between agreements previously reached with Gracchus and those with the Senate, or at least this is how Appian has preserved the encounter.[546] While it is possible that the Appian has downplayed the Senate's involvement in these agreements, there is some logic in assuming that the geographical distances between the parties meant that authority to make such arrangements was given the Roman commander, in this case Gracchus, on practical grounds.[547] There is some precedent even within the limits of the Italian Peninsula.[548] It is perhaps only after the turbulent praetorship of C. Cassius Longinus in 171, who left his designated *provincia* in order to conduct a war in Macedonia, that the Senate chose to restrain more closely the activities of those holding *imperium* in outlying regions of the empire.[549]

The situation in the first half of the second century is perhaps best demonstrated by the application of taxes in the region. In short, this was kept to a bare minimum. However, we should avoid the trap of assuming that the Romans had from the beginning planned to tax the inhabitants of the *provinciae* at a certain level or, indeed, at all. The level of taxation in the first century BCE and at later times should not be used as a basis from which to judge Roman taxation practices. To describe the level of taxation in Iberian Peninsula during the period under question as lenient does rely on a great deal of hindsight. Nevertheless, the lack of regular contribution of any sort, either manpower or monetary, would suggest that the Romans did not hold the Spanish communities in the same regard as the Italic communities. It is worthwhile, then, considering the development of the taxation practices so as to assess the impact of Roman dominance on the lives of the non-Italic communities in comparison to Italic communities.

The earliest form of taxation seems to belong to the campaigns of Cato the Elder in 195, but these were seemingly temporary and lacked meaningful coordination. Cato, of course, famously believed that the cost of war ought to have paid for itself rather than relying on

[545] Richardson (1986) 108. We might contrast this experience with that of Cn. Pompeius' eastern settlement in 65 (App. *B Civ.* 2.9).
[546] See, for instance, App. *Hisp.* 43 contrasting App. *Hisp.* 44.
[547] Again, this is consistent with Eckstein (1987) xi-xxii, 319-24.
[548] In 310, Livy (9.36.7) records that Roman legates established friendship and alliance with the Camertes *in senatum consulis verbis*.
[549] Longinus left Gaul in an attempt to reach Macedonia where a war was already being conducted by another commander (Livy 43.1.4-12). Brennan (2004: 45) believes this to have been the first instance that the Senate encroached upon the *imperium* of a magistrate. By 100 BCE, the Senate had legislated the precise responsibilities of the magistrates within their *provinciae*. See the *lex De Provinciis Praetoriis* in Crawford (1996) 250.

supplies purchased from contractors.[550] To achieve this goal Cato forcefully collected grain from the locals,[551] but there is no specific indication of how far the collection of grain extend nor how it was organised. The Romans may have seized grain merely as a tactic of war rather than a transaction between allies. A more obvious choice for the first policies of taxation within the Iberian Peninsula may be Cato's introduction of a levy on iron and silver mining.[552] Again, though, there are some questions concerning its application. Richardson, who believes this was not as wide spread as Livy himself suggests, argues that these taxes may only have applied to the northern regions of Cato's *provincia*.[553]

The first period of widespread fixed taxation likely belongs to Gracchus' praetorship in 179. While the precise nature of this tribute is unknown, Appian claims that Gracchus made pacts with all the tribes of Spain under the sway of the Romans.[554] This seems to be confirmed when, in 171, envoys from these same communities asked that the Romans themselves should not determine the quota of grain taxation nor be stationed in their communities in order to do so.[555] Once again though, the interest of the Romans in actively 'governing' the region can be called into question given that the collection of this tribute appears to have ended shortly after this time. The Romans had tried to collect tribute in 153 only for the Spanish communities to argue that they had been released from this obligation previously.[556] Fixed taxation once again began to be collected, probably in a permanent manner, from 152.[557] This can be tied in with other changes that were taking place in the region at the time.

The Romans' involvement in the Spanish *provinciae* did become more prominent and permanent after a series of revolts beginning in 154, which lasted for the next two decades. These revolts prompted the large campaigns of the Second Celtiberian War, the Lusitanian War and the Numantine War, the most comprehensive accounts of which can be found in Appian's *Hispania*. During this time, the Senate took an active role both in how the commanders conducted themselves and in the final agreements the Spanish communities made with the Romans. For instance, the Senate rejected the pacts of L. Licinius Lucullus in 152 and Q.

[550] Livy 34.9.11-3.
[551] Ibid.
[552] Livy 34.21.7.
[553] Richardson (1996) 73 and n. 112. The northern regions were not as materially rich as other regions.
[554] App. *Hisp.* 43.
[555] Livy. 43.2.12.
[556] App. *Hisp.* 44. The date of this release might be 169 since Livy does not record any tribute from Spain from this time until the end of his extant work. See Curchin (1991) 60-1.
[557] Curchin (1991) 60.

Pompeius in 139 for being attained in a manner not worthy of the Roman people.[558] Later, C. Hostilius Mancinus was stripped of his command in 137 for coming to an infamous pact with the Numantines.[559] This added level of senatorial involvement culminated in either the need for ambassadors from conquered communities to be sent to Rome,[560] and, when the wars were finally concluded, for the Senate to send out a commission of ten men to finalise the agreements of the conquered communities in 133.[561] Curchin attributes this increase to a certain degree of embarrassment on the part of the Senate.[562] I would add, though, that while these revolts may have been embarrassing, the reaction of the Senate also likely reflects a change in attitude towards the issue of controlling the Iberian Peninsula at this time, which in turn brought about a new, more centralised approach to management.

'Roman' Greece and Macedonia (197-146 BCE)

A similar attitude towards controlling overseas communities can be found in the case of Greece and Macedonia. Initially, T. Quinctius Flamininus brought the communities of the Greece under Roman leadership in 197 having famously declared all of Greece free at the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War, but in 194 he, along with all of the Roman forces, withdrew from region entirely.[563] Indeed, it is worthwhile pointing out, according to Brunt's analysis, that there were no permanent legions in Greece until 149.[564] In contrast to the colonial establishments throughout the Italian Peninsula, this approach does not suggest that the Romans sought on overly active supervisory role in the region. Consequently, Eckstein seems correct to surmise that the Romans were mainly relying on the goodwill of the region's populous to maintain whatever hold on Greece the Romans desired.[565] It is little wonder then that Errington can claim that 'most Greek states since 196 had enjoyed greater practical independence than in any time since the middle of the fourth century'.[566]

[558] App. *Hisp*. 49, 79.
[559] App. *Hisp.* 50. Hostilius, after being captured and threated with death, accepted terms favourable to the Numantines.
[560] App. *Hisp.* 49 (152 BCE), 79 (140 BCE), 83 (136 BCE).
[561] App. *Hisp.* 99.
[562] Curchin (2004) 52.
[563] The conditions Flamininus imposed after the war can be found at Polyb. 18.44.2-7, 46.5-15, while his withdrawal from Greece is outlined in Livy 34.43.8-9.
[564] Brunt (1971) 432-3. This is not to suggest that one or two legions were capable of holding the region in check, but this does demonstrate a change in attitude.
[565] Eckstein (2013) 84.
[566] Errington (1989) 283.

As was the case in the Iberian Peninsula, the Romans only adopted a more active role after a series of revolts. The greatest of these occurred half way through the second century. The case of the Third Macedonian War best demonstrates the Romans' avoidance of an active leadership role. Despite Perseus' expansionist programme being implemented seemingly from the beginning of his reign in 179, it was only in 172 that the Romans responded to this threat.[567] Of course, Rome may not have been entirely aware of all of Perseus' undertaking, but this in itself implies a lax approach to the control of the region. Even after the defeat of Perseus in 168 at the Battle of Pydna, the Romans, although removing the existing monarchical system and reorganising the defeated kingdom into four 'republics', once again withdrew from the region.[568] Rome's political presence too appears to be missing in this time. Between 168 and 149 only one Roman embassy is known to have visited these republics, despite their desire that the Romans do more to settle disputes arising between them.[569] Indeed, the request that Rome take a more active role in the whole region can be dated back to 180 when Callicrates of Leonitium suggested that the Romans were perhaps indifferent to whether Greek communities were compliant to Rome's instruction.[570]

Callicrates' statement seems to hold some truth since a number of communities and leagues did not always comply with Roman direction during this time.[571] Not only did Macedonia fail to carry out the instructions of the Romans, but the members of the Achaean League were also guilty of such behaviour. Certainly within the Italian Peninsula of the second century, Rome would not have permitted conflict to occur between two or more allied communities, though this did occur between the members of the Archaean league beginning in 150.[572] To be sure, the Romans did eventually address these issues, albeit almost four years later, but there seems to be little that might have deterred them from undertaking these actions in the first place, even though they were acting contrary their agreements with Rome.[573] This was perhaps reminiscent

[567] Rome was, though, aware of some aspects of Perseus' programme, particularly his military exploits since they were told of these. See Livy 41.19.3-6, 23.12-7; App. *Mac*. 11.1; Polyb. 25.6.
[568] Livy 45.29.3-14.
[569] Eckstein (2013) 92. This was the embassy that permitted the reopening of the gold and silver mines in 158. It should be acknowledged though that sources for this period are scarce. Polybius (35.4.10-11) records that Scipio Aemilianus was invited to settle the domestic quarrels of the republics.
[570] Polyb. 24.9.9.
[571] A short but good discussion of this topic can be found in Kallet-Marx (1995) 93.
[572] Polyb. 3.5.6; Paus. 7.13.1. One further example of the Archaean League not obeying Roman leadership was the failure to return Spartan exiles (Polyb. 25.8.2-5, 10.15)
[573] The sharing of allies and enemies was likely constant in all Roman *foedera*. For Greek examples of this period, see the *foedera* with Methynma (*IG* XII 2.510) and Kibyra (*OGIS* 762). The Romans had initially attempted to solve the conflicts within the Achaean League via mediation before they themselves were drawn in to the conflict (Paus.7.9.5). See Gruen (1976) 54-7.

of the type of control that the Romans sought in this region. It would be hard to describe this style of control even as hegemony. According to Donnelly, a hegemon must to be capable of controlling the external policies of a subordinate community.[574] The picture that I have just painted though suggests that during the first half of the second century in the Greek Peninsula the Romans did not wholly possess this ability. We may equally, however, question the Romans' desire to hold this position since, during 150, no Roman army or embassy seems to have been present in the Eastern Mediterranean.[575]

A change in Rome's approach to the control of these overseas communities can once again be detected at the midway point of the century. Pausanias informs us that at the end of the Achaean War L. Mummius removed the democratic leadership of the Greek communities and established governments based on property qualification in their place.[576] He also put an end to the various leagues and federations of the region.[577] Even if these conditions were perhaps short lived,[578] this recalls the situation in the Italian Peninsula in the fourth and third centuries when the Romans suspended all alliances other than their own and supported the oligarchies of the Italic communities over the governments who came to power by more popular means.[579] While Kallet-Marx is right to stress that new situation in the region, notably the creation of the Macedonian *provincia*, did not change the status of the communities found within, these new conditions do, however, highlight an increased level involvement on the part of the Romans.[580] It is this increased level of involvement in the Greek and Iberian peninsulas, as well as other regions which the Romans now controlled, that had repercussions for the Romano-Italic relationship.

Holding the Empire

Given the approach the Romans took to controlling communities outside of the Italian Peninsula, Eckstein seems right to suggest that they were more concerned about removing existing threats and preventing the rise of potential competitors than about overseeing these

[574] Donnelly (2006) 156.
[575] Eckstein (2013: 71) observes this from Brunt's (1971: 432) analysis.
[576] Paus. 7.16.9; Polyb. 39.5.2-3.
[577] Paus. 7.16.9.
[578] Paus. 7.16.10. See Kallet-Marx (1995) 95 for this argument.
[579] See above, Section 2.2.
[580] Kallet-Marx (1995) 92-3. I agree with Kallet-Marx that the year 146 is not a direct turning point as such, but the date perhaps marks a change in attitude that would influence developments in the coming decades.

regions.[581] The Romans' experience with Hannibal likely demonstrated the risks that competitors outside of the Italian Peninsula posed to Rome. By removing these potential threats from regions in the vicinity of the Italian Peninsula, the Romans would have limited the chance of a similar event occurring. This task, though, did not require a permanent military presence around the Mediterranean.

It is worthwhile, then, to consider briefly how the Romans approached controlling their empire as a whole. Richardson is quite right to point out that the Romans chose to employ a range of methods that included both formal and informal means of control.[582] Due to this co-existence, we should recognise whether a community has been made subordinate through 'power by possession' or though 'power by conquest'.[583] In other words, we ought to separate those communities who were directly administrated by Romans and those who were compliant in recognition of Rome's superiority. As the Romans of the second century thought about their empire in regard to the people whom they had compelled to obey their orders, Rome's capacity to make others compliant to their wishes relied mainly on the latter for communities outside of the Italian Peninsula.

Controlling empire through conquest and military superiority did not necessarily mean that the Romans could be complacent about the burdens of its hegemonic position. As I have noted above, revolts did occur in these regions. Failing to subdue these revolts risked further communities joining their causes since Rome's military strength, the means through which communities were compliant, would be undermined. For the same reason, the Romans could not entirely have ignored the raids of people from outside of regions under their control. This is why the Romans took such an interest in protecting the Spanish *provinciae* from the Celtiberians.[584] However, the sheer logistical difficulties resulting from the geography of their empire was evidently a massive challenge for the Romans.[585] Judging from the ensuing revolts in the first half of the century, the Romans' approach to this issue did not achieve the desired level of control that they had envisaged. It seems likely that at some point during the 140s, or

[581] Eckstein (2013) 87.
[582] Richardson (2008) 3.
[583] Ibid for discussion.
[584] See, for instance, their raids in 186 (Livy 39.7.7).
[585] The problems faced by the Romans in establishing an empire beyond the Italian Peninsula is usually explained in terms of cultural differences, but geopolitical issues must also have had some effect.

slightly earlier, the Romans decided to shoulder the burden of protecting inhabitants outside of Italy and ultimately to claim responsibility of these people by the end of the century.[586]

The construction of major roadways to service the movement of troops outside of the Italian Peninsula is perhaps the best evidence for the change in attitude. The most relevant of these for this investigation are the *Via Egnatia*, possibly constructed as early as the mid-140s but certainly before 120,[587] and the *Via Domita* built in 118. Taking the former as an example, the *Via Egnatia* allowed for Rome's legions of the second century to move from Apollonia via Dyrrachium to Cypsela.[588] Its construction seems to coincide with tumultuous period following the Fourth Macedonian War and the Thracian attacks of the following two decades.[589] The construction of such infrastructure would imply that at this time these roadways would be regularly used for the foreseeable future. This in turn would suggest that the Romans had made the conscious decision to become more actively involved in the defence of their wider Mediterranean empire and by extension its management.

The decision to alter their existing approach to controlling the *provinciae*, though, was a new dynamic that might have been disconcerting to the inhabitants of the Italic communities. The relationship with Rome from 264 until this point had mostly been formulated against external threats. The elimination of Hannibal's armies or suppression of the somewhat frequent Gallic raids were in the interest of many Italic communities. Therefore, supplying troops for these causes was probably not too difficult to justify. In such circumstances, the Italic communities profited from the Roman alliance. From the middle of the second century, however, the Italian allies were not being solely used to safeguard the Italian Peninsula, but rather found themselves also protecting communities from outlying regions on a more permanent basis. To the average allied soldier, there often must have seemed little benefit in undertaking operations of this sort. I suspect it would be particularly difficult to justify why defending against Thracian raids, for instance, would ultimately have been beneficial to those at home in the Italian Peninsula.[590]

[586] Richardson (2008: 61) suggests that these were a series of *ad hoc* responses to the troubles that the Romans were experiencing in these regions. The need for further defence of those in outlying regions prompted the regular assignment of legions and annual commanders to these areas. Richardson (48-9) must also surely be correct in arguing that the continuous designation of these regions as *provinciae* led to them becoming institutions of Roman provincial governance in the following decades, though this is beyond the scope of the current investigation.
[587] See discussion in Lolos (2007) 274.
[588] Polyb. 34.12.2[a] -3.
[589] Walbank (1985) 194.
[590] See Harris (1984) 99.

We might suspect then that during this time the interests of Rome and those of the Italic communities may not have been as homogenous as they once were.

4.2 – The Troubled Position of the Italian Allies

These new circumstances probably raised questions regarding the position of the Italic communities within the wider empire. On one hand, Italic communities evidently had a long, close relationship with Rome, but on the other they were, for the most part, legally foreigners on the same level as the inhabitants of the *provinciae* who were subject to Rome's hegemony, and those who were not for that matter.[591] Thus, when the Romans did take a more active role in the outlying regions, the question of where the Italic communities were positioned may have arisen. The uncertainty of their position was no doubt further exacerbated by the fact that there was little to distinguish Italian allies from Romans in the wider regions of the Mediterranean.[592] This occurs, for example, in the list of businessmen found on the inscriptions at Delos where Ῥωμαῖοι was used to describe Romans and Italian allies alike.[593]

While there was a certain degree of similarity between the Italic communities and communities within the *provinciae*, there were also a number of key differences. The most prominent of these involved the recruitment of troops for Rome's war. The Italic communities were of course expected to undertake this obligation, but the communities of the *provinciae* were generally not burdened by this responsibility. There were instances where communities other than those of the Italian Peninsula did make contributions to Rome's war effort, as was the case with the Greek communities during the Third Punic War,[594] but they were not subjected to the annual levy nor the use of these troops in territories other than those in their immediate vicinity. There can be little doubt then that at least in this regard, the populations of the outlying regions were viewed in a different light to those of the Italian Peninsula.

The distinction between those within and outside of the Italian Peninsula seems also to apply to the physical territories themselves. While I have established that the territories defined by the *provinciae* were by no means annexed as Roman property, there is some sense that the

[591] Richardson (2008: 188) makes this point regarding the legal status of those within or outside of the *provinciae*, but his point is also relevant to the case of the Italic communities since their inhabitants were technically also *peregrini*.
[592] Most recently discussed by Kendall (2013: 120), but Gabba (1992: 106-8) is still useful.
[593] Kay (2014: 200-1) offers a recent interpretation of the inscriptions.
[594] See, for instance, Livy 42.50.7-10.

Romans considered the Italian Peninsula as their possession. This is evident in the strict location of *ager romanus* within the confines of the Italian Peninsula.[595] The regions of the wider Mediterranean were not subject to similar territorial confiscation. The truest form of Roman annexation, therefore, only applied to Italian land. If Roselaar is correct in proposing that the Romans allowed Italic communities whom they defeated to continue to use *ager publicus* until such time as they had need of it, it seems possible that the Romans could lay claim to much of the peninsula itself.[596] The total land held by the Romans within the peninsula would have been more considerable than previously expected given that there is no way of telling how much 'allied' land was simply *ager publicus* not utilised by the Romans.

Something of this distinction between Italian land and other regions of the Mediterranean is perhaps also present in the surviving *lex Aciliae repetundarum* of 123. The rather fragmentary section thirty one of this *lex* refers to the action undertaken by a praetor in order to give proper notice for the commencement of a trial.[597] According to this inscription, a search was to take place *within* the Italian Peninsula (*in terra Italia*) for witnesses.[598] While Crawford notes in his commentary on the passage that he has 'no objection to supposing that witnesses to affairs outside of Roman territory could be found within it', he is silent on what constitutes 'Roman territory'.[599] From this inscription alone, it can only be assumed that this territory was confined within the limits of the Italian Peninsula. This would seem to confirm there being some sort of legal distinction, albeit a rudimentary one, between the Italian Peninsula and the other regions of Rome's empire.

Polybius too seems to observe a similar distinction within his narrative. In discussing the functions and duties of the Senate within his version of the 'Roman constitution', he suggests that crimes committed *within* the Italian Peninsula (κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν) serious enough to require a public investigation were the responsibility of the Senate.[600] The Senate also had jurisdiction over the arbitration of disputes between private individuals or communities, again, *within* the Italian Peninsula.[601] By stressing that the Senate was responsible for sending and receiving

[595] Richardson (2008) 190; Roselaar (2010).
[596] Roselaar (2010) 83. The Romans reserved this land primarily for the establishment of colonies. If none were established, the local communities seem to have continued to use the land freely. She also suggests that this may have been a provision of the *foedera*.
[597] *lex Aciliae repetundarum* 29-31. Crawford (1996) 68.
[598] Ibid.
[599] Crawford (1996) 103.
[600] Polyb. 6.13.4.
[601] Polyb. 6.13.5.

embassies to communities *outside* of Italy (ἐκτὸς Ἰταλίας) in the following clause, Polybius clearly indicates that, at least to his mind, there was a vital distinction to between the Italian Peninsula and the other regions. Cassius Dio too establishes a similar geographical limitation concerning the position of dictator. The second century CE writer notes only two restrictions: 'he shall not hold office for longer than the appointed time (six months) nor outside of Italy'.[602]

While on one hand the Romans wished to distinguish the Italian Peninsula from the rest of the empire, they also sought to unite all the Italic communities as a single entity together under Roman leadership. This is best revealed in Cato's *Origines*, in which the author attempts to unite the communities of the peninsula through the supposedly common origin of the inhabitants.[603] Throughout the work, the origins and successes of the Oscan, Etruscan and Greek communities are claimed under the umbrella of Roman deeds.[604] By organising the work in this way, Cato wished to establish a more unified 'Romano-Italic Empire', even going as far as to brush over the Roman conquest of the Italian Peninsula.[605] If we adopted Jefferson's argument that the work was aimed at a wider audience than simply the Roman elite, then its purpose, as she suggests, was to persuade the Italian allies to continue to act for the good of the whole.[606] Indeed, this whole was bound together by shared interests.[607]

It is the diametrically opposed positioning of the Italic communities, being in one instance considered closely related to the Romans but in another more closely connected to other foreigners, that may have created an element of tension. Chief among their concerns may have been that the distinction between the conqueror and conquered became increasingly complex. In the first half of the century, although these non-Italic communities were subdued, the Romans did not subject them to a similar level of close supervision that many of the Italic communities had received in the previous century. The addition of overseas *provinciae* also meant the Italic communities would likely have expected certain advantages befitting conquerors. As we shall see shortly, this did happen to a certain degree, but since the many of Italic communities were themselves conquered by the Romans, these advantages did not

[602] Cass. Dio 36.34.1-2 (Trans. Cary, 1969). Only Aulus Atilius Calatinus in 249 is an exception to this rule.
[603] While the work itself exists only in the fragments quoted in other authors, according to the testimony of Cornelius Nepos (*Cat.* 3), the origins of the Italic communities were given in books two and three.
[604] Jefferson (2012) 321. This also meant that Cato had appropriated others' achievements as Roman. Jefferson (2012: 323) goes on to claim that by not naming individuals, Cato offered the inhabitants of the Italic communities with exempla whom they could emulate.
[605] Gotter (2009: 115) supposes that had Cato included the conquest he would have undermined his wider thesis.
[606] Jefferson (2012) 313-20.
[607] Ibid. 324.

materialise. The Italic communities were in the awkward position of being both the conquered and the conqueror. This position became even more troublesome as the century progressed.

When the Romans took greater responsibility for those in the outlying regions in the second half of the century, the introduction of measures to curb the powers of the *imperium*-holders in regard to the inhabitants of their *provinciae* demonstrates a duty of care that benefitted the non-Italic communities more than those in the Italian Peninsula. For instance, the *lex Aciliae repetundarum* protected Latins, allies and foreigners from the unlawful seizure, procurement or extortion of personal funds or property.[608] Naturally this would have deterred *imperium*-holders from enforcing an overtly heavy taxation upon those within their *provinciae*, but since the Italic communities were not directly taxed by the Romans, the introduction of this legislation would have rarely applied to those from the Italic communities.[609] So, while the Italic allies were mentioned in the *lex*, the primary beneficiaries would have been those who would have suffered most from this sort of malpractice. In all likelihood, those living in the *provinciae* belonged to this category. The question remains, however, why did the Romans assist the non-Italic communities at this time, when the Italic communities held similar grievances from an earlier time.[610]

The question becomes increasingly intriguing when considering the introduction of the *lex Calpurnia* in 149. This legislation established a permanent extortion court.[611] It is usually argued that the actions of overbearing *imperium*-holders in the previous quarter of a century necessitated the introduction of such measures.[612] These *imperium*-holders, both proconsuls and propraetors, were most active in the outlying regions of the empire in this period. So, while the both the Italian allies and peoples of the *provinciae* may have benefitted from the introduction of these courts, their introduction seems to be prompted by concern for the inhabitants of non-Italic communities.[613]

What perhaps makes these two pieces of legislation most interesting of all though lies in Richardson's suggestion that these measures were introduced by individuals pursuing populist

[608] *lex Aciliae repetundarum* 2-3. Crawford (1996) 65.
[609] This law notably would have stopped Q. Fulvius Flaccus from stripping the Temple of Juno Lacinia of its marble roof titles in 173 had it been introduced earlier (Livy 42.3.1-3; Val. Max. 1.1.20).
[610] For example, the Romans may have protected the Italic communities from the excessive demands of visiting Roman officials as far back as the 170s. See Livy 42.1.7-12; Gell. *NA* 10.3.3, 17.
[611] Discussion of this law can be found in Cic. *Off.* 2.21.75; Cic. *Brut*. 106.
[612] See, for instance, Lintott (1992a) 16; Riggsby (1999) 127.
[613] Betts and Marshall (2013: 50-60) are of the view that neither of these groups benefitted greatly for the introduction of this legislation.

policies.[614] Given that the likely authors of the aforementioned laws, L. Calpurnius Piso and Manius Acilius Glabrio, were tribunes of the plebs when they introduced their respective legislation, this opinion is plausible. Since these individuals relied on popular support to pass legislation, it is possible that even the common voter at Rome during the second century came to hold some concern for those under Rome's wider Mediterranean empire. However, efforts of the same style of politician to secure specifically the interests of communities within the Italian Peninsula failed in the same period. The most prominent cases were the enfranchisement legislation introduced by Fulvius Flaccus, C. Gracchus and M. Livius Drusus in 125, 122 and 91 respectively.[615] Such circumstance in which the interests of the non-Italic communities could be fulfilled, but those of the Italic communities could not, despite their support of the Roman people, likely posed a difficult problem. After all, it is hardly ideal that an ally would support the interests of newly formed relationships, while disregarding those of much older and closely bound alliances.

The movement towards a more 'globally' focused Rome is not without reason. For much of the second century, diplomatic issues in the Italian Peninsula were to Roman eyes probably of secondary importance to issues elsewhere, a point Jehne highlights well. [616] He rightfully notes that book six of Polybius' work implies most of the Senate's diplomatic activity in his lifetime focused on embassies and commissions sent to the eastern Mediterranean.[617] Indeed, since so little of Livy's fourth decade, as well as the surviving books of the fifth, focus on events within Italy itself, it is worthwhile to consider whether the Romans themselves thought that the subjugation of the Italian Peninsula had been so securely achieved that they could focus their energy on the wider empire.[618] Even those embassies from Italic communities that did manage to gain a meeting with the Senate seem not to have had much prominence in their eyes. For instance, an embassy from the Latin colony at Narnia in 199 was seemingly received only after those from Carthage and Gades.[619] Livy lists the ambassadors from Narnia as the third of the embassies received by the Senate in the year. Given that Livy regularly infers that matters were dealt with in order of importance when it came to diplomacy, Narnia's position was an

[614] Richardson (2008) 40.
[615] App. *B Civ*. 21, 34-7; Plut. *C. Gracch*. 8.
[616] Jehne (2008) 158.
[617] Ibid. 143 n.3. Polyb. 6.13.6.
[618] Jehne (2008: 149) rightfully points out that this may not simply be because the Romans viewed these issues as unimportant, but either because the problems of the Italic communities were not great in number or because Rome could not solve them. The focus on events outside of the Italian Peninsula may also have been a result of Livy's writing process or could reflect the expectations of the average ancient reader.
[619] Livy 32.2.2-7. Similar cases can be found at Livy 33.24.8 and 39.3.4.

indication of where Rome's priorities lay at the start of the second century.[620] It is perhaps for this reason that two decades later ambassadors from various allied communities had to remain at Rome for some time, perhaps several months, before they were finally permitted to bring their case to the Senate.[621] According to the author of the *Scholia Bobiensia,* it was entirely the will of the consuls when or if an embassy was admitted to the Senate.[622] Therefore, to delay the case of these Italic communities for such a length of time would seem to indicate that the previous consuls had no desire to address their concerns.

The lack of desire to address this issue is probably reflected in the very small number of these embassies sent to Rome in the second century. In fact, there were so few embassies sent to Rome from Italic communities - only eight are recorded between 202 and 91.[623] Jehne rightfully asks whether the Italic allies thought this process worthwhile because they seemingly preferred to lobby prominent senators such as Scipio Aemilianus in order to secure their interests.[624] This, of course, mirrors the use of elite networks that had existed from a much earlier time. Through this means the local elites could ensure that their interests were looked after. However, Fronda notes that towards the end of the second century the elites of the Italic communities had less access to Rome's higher magistracies to form the necessary relationships, which had long been the basis of the alliances.[625] A major mechanism for elite interaction disappeared when the Romans replaced the combined Roman and Italian cavalry with foreign units sometime before the first century.[626] For this reason, the relationship between Rome and the Italic communities suffered. The attention of the higher and more influential senators had turned to the more distant affairs in the *provinicae*. Other interests had come to influence policies and outcomes as a result of the success of the empire's expansion.

[620] Jehne (2008) 149.
[621] Livy 41.8.6-9. Here Livy clearly states that the ambassadors had attempted to bring their case before previous consuls and censors.
[622] *Schol. Bob.* ad Cic. *Planc*. 33.
[623] The number of embassies from Italic communities is discussed in Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) 296-303.
[624] Jehne (2008) 164. See App. *B Civ*. 1.19 for the case of the Italic communities.
[625] Fronda (2011) 254-5.
[626] Cagniart (2007: 87) dates the replacement of the Roman and Italian cavalry to the final years of the second century. For the impact on elite interaction see McCall (2002) 5-10. The decline of regular annual campaigns during the second century may have also had some effect on formation of elite connections (Cornell [1993] 155). Marian reforms may have caused similar problems. Indeed, the common soldier's reliance on the army's commander for a prosperous post-service life (e.g. Serrati [2013] 161; Cagniart [2007] 82) would have undermined the role and position of the Italian elites. To say that the Italian elites foresaw the impact that this change would eventually have in the coming decades does probably rely too much on hindsight. Bispham (2008: 159) dates the common soldier's reliance on the commander to after the Social War.

4.3 – The Inflation of Interests: The Consequences of Success

It is during the second century that Rome's interests, particularly those of an economic nature, altered significantly from earlier times. As Cornell suggests, during the second century, the most important economic gains ceased to be in the acquisition of campaign spoils, but instead came from the exploitation of subdued territories.[627] In the following chapter I will outline how these changes came to empower other interest groups, but for the moment I will identify the different economic gains Romans could acquire in the second century and briefly introduce their relationship to the new pressure groups at Rome. This will prove useful in later discussions.

The first form of new income was the collection of regular indemnities. In the first half of the second century, many of Rome's defeated enemies were required to pay an annual fixed sum to the Romans.[628] Perhaps the most famous of those communities to be subject to this punishment were the Carthaginians after the Second Punic War, who paid 10,000 silver talents over a period of fifty years according to Polybius, though we should note the uncertainty that Livy places on the exact amount.[629] For the period between 200 and 157, Taylor calculates that indemnities paid by communities that the Romans conquered was 175,000,000 *denarii*.[630] In contrast, he calculates the value of the loot acquired during the same period at 110,000,000 *denarii*.[631] None of the income from indemnities went directly to the inhabitants of the Italic communities in the same way as *praeda*. Previously loot was given directly to either the elites or the soldiers themselves, whereas the sums of money from indemnities were deposited directly into the *aerarium*.[632]

Another form of income came directly from the mineral resources of the conquered territories themselves. For instance, Polybius claims that the mines at Cartagena were capable of producing 9,000,000 *denarii* annually.[633] This is comparable to the 26,300 Roman pounds of

[627] Cornell (1995b) 128.
[628] See M. J. Taylor (2017) 173 for full list of war indemnities between 200 and 157 BCE. This article is a critique of earlier work undertaken by Frank (1933: 138, 144), which reveals a similar observation.
[629] Polyb. 15.18.7; Livy 30.16.12.
[630] M. J. Taylor (2017) 177.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Livy (32.2.1) records that the Carthaginians brought the sum to Rome themselves; the envoys of Antiochus are said to have done the same (42.6.6). M. J. Taylor (2017: 149) raises the possibility that some of this income was spent on allied rations, however his argument is not entirely convincing.
[633] Polybius (34.9.8) suggests these mines were capable of producing 25,000 drachmae daily. For conversion see Jones (1974) 115. It is most likely this figure was only being produced in 150 when Polybius was writing his account. M. J. Taylor (2017: 166) seems right to question that if the mines were producing this quantity from the early second century, why the Romans would persist with collecting the *vectigal* or *tributum*.

silver plus other valuables, worth approximately 24,000,000 *denarii*, that L. Manlius brought back as spoils from his Spanish campaigns in 188 and 187.[634] Although we are not well informed about who ran and profited from these mines, they offered an alternative means of income to the profits of conquest.[635] This would increasingly become the case in the second half of the century when the Romans fought both unpopular and unprofitable wars against a number of Spanish tribes. It is worth bearing in mind that the amount of loot that the Romans and Italian allies could gain from a successful war was limited by the wealth of the conquered community. We might regularly expect the amount of loot that soldiers could have acquired from previously subdued communities revolting against the Romans to be meagre. For this reason, there must not have been much profit in conducting wars in which a tribe or small collection of tribes from the extremities of the outlying regions already subdued by the Romans. Thus, in periods when Rome did not engage in wars resulting in a great expansion of their empire that yielded large quantities of spoils, for instance the period between 140 and 67, it is little wonder that these alternative economic interests came into greater prominence.

It was also during this period that that the first tributes that were collected in monetary form. For instance, each of the four Macedonian republics was required from 167 to pay the Romans half of the tribute that they were accustomed to pay to their king.[636] Plutarch suggests that this came to a total of 100 talents.[637] A similar arrangement was also established in Illyricum.[638] The arrangement in the eastern Mediterranean was duplicated in Iberian Peninsula where, as mentioned above, the first permanent tributes were probably established in 150s.[639] These payments supplied the Romans with a fixed income that was not directly reliant on continual military success.[640] Consequently, the Romans' attitude likely altered to focus on the profits associated with maintaining an empire. The Italian allies, however, did not partake in the management process and so were also excluded from these profits.

In terms of economic value associated with conquest and management of empire, the situation became increasingly asymmetrical in the lead up to the outbreak of the Social War. For the

[634] Livy 39.29.6-7.
[635] These seem to be private ventures perhaps run by individuals including Romans, Italian allies and natives. See Curchin (2004) 147-8.
[636] Livy 45.18.7.
[637] Plut. *Aem.* 28.
[638] Livy 45.26.14.
[639] The tribute from Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica had paid their tribute in the form of grain since approximately 209. See Prag (2012) 60-1.
[640] Woolf (2012: 75) makes a similar observation. Hopkins (1978: 16) notes that this had the effect of creating a stable economic system based on taxation in the place of the less certain revenues provided by loot.

period between 150 and 90, Frank estimates that the collection of loot only accounted for a tenth of Rome's income.[641] This had fallen from approximately a fifth in the period between 200 and 157.[642] Even with the loot acquired from the sacking of several prominent cities, including Carthage and Corinth, adding a large boost to the significance of loot as a proportion of Rome's revenue, the vast majority of income now came from tribute and indemnities.[643]

While these alternative interests could benefit some inhabitants of the Italic communities, seen for instance in the spread of Italian *negotiatores* through the Mediterranean, the relationship between Roman elites and local elites likely suffered as a result. As Cornell points out, prior to the exploitation of overseas territories, only a small number of highly placed Italian elites benefited from the relationship with the Romans via the acquisition of loot.[644] This arrangement dramatically changed in the last few decades of the second century. These local elites lost a proportion of their status as an increasing number of the upper middle class took advantage of Rome's success. Confounded by the issue that wars after 146 were infrequent and largely unprofitable,[645] these elites probably competed with the Italian business class as well as their Roman counterparts, especially the *publicani*. Gabba, therefore, seems correct to suggest that the Italian *negotiatores* had gained enough prominence in this period to rival the traditional elites of their local communities.[646] As we have seen, in the past the Romans had ensured the position of the local elites in order to secure a working relationship to the benefit of both themselves and the elites of the Italic communities.[647] With the position of the local elites now less secure, it seems highly likely that their relationship with the Romans would have also suffered.

On the other side of the Romano-Italic network, the traditional Roman elites now faced political competition from new rivals, primarily in the form of *populares*, who largely garnered support from the common people, and from the *equites*. Rather than a one to one link between Roman and local elites, which is to say an agreement between oligarchs, the last decades of the second century saw the introduction a more complicated relationship. From the 130s, these competing

[641] Frank (1933) 230-31.
[642] I base this calculation on M. J. Taylor's estimates (2017: 169).
[643] Frank (1933) 230-1; Jones (1974) 114.
[644] Cornell (1995b) 129.
[645] It is worthwhile noting that the portion of the *Fasti Triumphales* for the years 155-30 are missing, see Degrassi (1955) 105, and few sources focusing on the wars of the period 155 to 90 are extant. As a result, we are not fully informed about the frequency or profitability of the era's wars.
[646] Gabba (1976) 75-6.
[647] See Chapter 2.2.

groups were capable of inhibiting each other's political endeavours. This is demonstrated when Ti. Gracchus, attempting to claim the bequest of Pergamum for the people, introduced legislation in a clear effort to undermine the strength of the Senate.[648] Keller is quite right then to link the increased role of the *populares* and the erosion of the traditional elite networks.[649] As a consequence of this development, Rome's foreign policy was not necessarily the product of discussion between elites, but rather could be a policy forced upon the Italic communities by another group entirely for which there was not an immediate remedy.[650] This is not to say that those groups competing against the Senate were necessarily anti-Italian or poor administrators compared to the senatorial elite, but rather these new circumstances required that the Italian allies adapt. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate that the nature of possible conflicts within Rome's domestic politics made this adaptation unlikely.

4.4 – Conclusion

The expansion of the Roman empire in the second century effected considerable changes on the alliances the Romans held with the Italian allies. While their effects on the Italic communities were perhaps largely unintentional, the additions of new Roman alliances with non-Italic communities forced the Romans to manage a wider set of relationships. In order to maintain these relationships, the Romans could not simply have chosen to focus on the Italian alliances. Resources had to be distributed among all alliances. In this light, the Italic communities might have believed that they had lost out. A more Mediterranean outlook was even more necessary for the Romans when their economic interests became increasingly bound to the management of the wider empire in the second half of the century. It makes some sense then that Rome's gaze moved away from the Italian Peninsula.

The fabric of the Romano-Italic alliance had not evolved to account for these changes. Traditionally, the local elites could have readily relied on the Roman elites to look after their interests. These elites, however, faced strong competition from the *populares* and *equites*. In such circumstances, as we shall see, the local elite's ability to pursue his interests could be, and

[648] Tiberius had claimed that the Senate had no authority to determine the outcome of this case (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 14-6), even though foreign policy usually fell under their sphere of influence.
[649] Keller (2007) 52-3.
[650] This is seen, for instance, in the case of Tiberius Gracchus and the land commission (App. *B Civ.* 1.13-4; Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 13).

in practice was, hindered by civil disputes at Rome.[651] Evidently, some Italian allies believed the issues related to the changes within the Romano-Italic relationship could be overcome if they were granted Roman citizenship in order to level the political playing field.[652] However, the policies of the Romans, both domestic and foreign, showed an increasingly Romano-centric attitude that prevented such a solution.

[651] For this reason, I propose that Appian was entirely right to link the outbreak of the Social War to the political activity at Rome.
[652] Appian (*B Civ*. 1.34) stresses the desire of the Italian allies to be partners instead of subjects.

THE GROWTH OF ROMANO-CENTRIC POLICY

5.0 – Introduction

In the previous chapter I outlined the considerable increase of material and political interests that came about due to Rome's expansion into the wider Mediterranean as well as the consequences these interests brought to the Italic communities. It remains for me, however, to explore how these changes affected political life at Rome and ultimately the relationship the Romans had with their Italian allies. During this process, I will argue that the new political situation of the late second century at Rome came to affect the relationship between the Romans and the inhabitants of the Italic communities because their alliances did not evolve in a sufficient manner to address the concerns of the Italian allies or fulfil their interests. Appian, I will assert, seems in part correct to attribute the eventually outbreak of the Social War to the conflicts found within Rome's domestic political sphere.[653]

In order to make this argument, I must trace the increasing importance of the *publicani*, who were predominantly members of the *equites*, and the common people, who secured their interests through the populist politicians known as the *populares*, in Rome's domestic politics. These two sets of individuals formed pressure groups capable of determining, or at least influencing, both domestic and, indeed, foreign policies. It was the conflicts and stalemates that could occur between the three main pressure groups – the senatorial elite, the *equites* and the *populares* – as they sought to fulfil their own interests that undermined the relationship between Rome and its Italian allies. Through the pursuit of these interests, Roman policy took on an increasingly Romano-centric character. This is to say that the Romans were more inclined to pass legislation designed to secure the interests of one or more of the major pressure groups at Rome.[654] The policies developed were increasingly a product of the internal divisions within

[653] App. *B Civ*. 1.34.

[654] It could be argued that the Romano-centric character of policy during this period is more the product of the sources than a true reflection of the reality. The Romans could theoretically have introduced legislation supporting the interests of the Italic communities, but due to the particular interests of ancient writers these have not been preserved. If this were the case, though, proponents of this point of view would have to supply an alternative explanation of why so many allies came to be at Rome and why they were often subsequently expelled. In effect they would have to argue against the prevailing view that this was because they sought to influence Roman politics (held, for instance, by Badian [1970-1: 388-9] and Dart [2010: 99]). Even Broadhead (2008: 466-7) who argues that the expulsion of 126 were not motived by the prospects of non-Romans imitating voters admits this was at least the case in 122. Non-Romans would presumably have taken this action if they felt that their interests were not being sufficiently met. This view, therefore, supports the notion of the increasing Romano-centric character of policy.

Roman domestic politics. Anyone outside of Rome's inward looking political body, including the Italic communities, would have found it hard to have their voices heard.

While there were, of course, conflicts between the senatorial elites over magistracies and general pre-eminence in the perpetual contest for *dignitas*, such hostilities did not seem to result in action that might have alienated the Italic communities. But the same cannot be said, for instance, about the Gracchan programme. As a result of this programme, whether intentional or not, land which the inhabitants of the Italic communities had previously occupied was taken from them and given to the poorest class of Roman citizen.[655] It is reasonable to suspect that conservative senatorial elites would not have introduced legislation of this sort because having done so would have undermined their own interest in the 'illegal' occupation of *ager publicus*.[656] Tiberius Gracchus, in an attempt to promote the interests of the common people, seemingly aimed his legislation at the senatorial elite, but this domestic dispute likely spilled over into the sphere of foreign policy when land was taken from the allies. This policy had perhaps failed to consider the implications it would have on the Italic communities because of its Romano-centric agenda.[657] Regardless of its cause, a conflict largely between the senatorial elite and the common people accordingly came to affect the inhabitants of the Italic communities.

In light of these potential conflicts, it is possible to speculate that Rome's inability to address the concerns of individuals wishing to gain greater influence in the running of Rome's empire was ultimately a key factor in the breakdown of the Republic. The outbreak of the Social War was just one consequence of this. Rome's overall success brought a vast amount of wealth into the hands of many Romans, not merely the senatorial elite. It was only natural that these individuals would have sought to maintain, or if possible increase, the material and political benefits that their involvement in the empire brought. As Tan has recently postulated, many Romans likely began to raise the question of "who gets what" around the time of the Gracchi.[658] Many Romans likely found the current circumstances unsatisfactory, but the conservative senatorial elites were unwilling to alter the current system largely due to their favourable position within it. Indeed, Ferrary suggests that the rise of the *popularis* ideology was a result

[655] A more recent discussion on this matter can be found in Mouritsen (2008).
[656] Appian (*B Civ*. 1.7) briefly outlines how the elites were able to purchase or occupy this land.
[657] Cicero (*Rep*. 3.41), while not specifically citing the use of *ager publicus*, suggests Tiberius neglected (*neglexit*) the rights and *foedera* of the allies. The wording could imply that he had not considered them fully or that he had disregarded them. In either case, Gracchus' legislation has a particularly Romano-centric character, whether concerning *ager publicus* or concerning the inheritance of Attalus III of Pergamum.
[658] Tan (2017) 169.

of the senatorial elites' failure to provide answers to the profound changes caused by Rome's conquests.[659] This same failure, though, could equally be used to explain the rise of the *publicani*.[660] I will demonstrate, then, that the rise of these often conflicting groups was entrenched in the pursuit of their own interests.

In the background of these political fluctuations, the rights and obligations of Roman citizenship also underwent a series of changes. These will be outlined in greater detail in the final section of this chapter, but for now we might note that certain public contracts, including the right to collect taxes within the *provinciae*, were restricted to Roman citizens.[661] Such exclusiveness was no doubt prized among the Romans. At the same time, many inhabitants of the Italic communities likely wished to enjoy similar privileges in order to pursue their own interests. They perhaps felt in some way entitled to such benefits in accordance to the role they had played in the formation of Rome's empire in the first place. However, the empire, while being jointly created by both Romans and their Italian allies, was 'a unilaterally controlled asset'.[662] In order to attain a greater say in the running of the empire, it became clear that acquiring Roman citizenship was perhaps the most obvious way to achieve some influence in how the empire should be run. Given the increased capacity of the common people to pursue their interests and the conservative nature of the senatorial elite, it is easy to see why the inhabitants of the Italic communities that did desire Roman citizenship faced an uphill struggle to be enfranchised.

5.1 – The Rise of the *Publicani* and the *Equites*

While it is difficult to trace the precise origin of this group, the *publicani* certainly existed from the time of the Second Punic War. Their first mention in the sources comes in 215 when the Roman treasury was empty and the Senate had no finances with which to fund the ongoing war in the Iberian Peninsula.[663] In this dire situation, the Senate commissioned contracts for the furnishing of necessary military expenses to be purchased with the private funds of private citizens.[664] According to Livy, three companies of nineteen individuals came forward to

[659] Ferrary (1997) 231.
[660] Hölkeskamp (2010: 21-2) similarly stresses that the regulation of Rome's empire did not evolve to deal with the socio-economic changes resulting from expansion.
[661] See section four of this chapter.
[662] Mouritsen (2013) 406.
[663] Livy 23.48.5-6.
[664] Livy 23.48.10-11.

purchase these contracts.[665] He describes these individuals as those made rich by the purchasing of public contracts, though at this stage does not refer to them directly as *publicani*.[666] At this time, the public contracts were probably restricted mainly to construction of buildings and amenities or their maintenance.[667] Later, these contacts would come to regularly include military contracts and, notably, contracts for the collection of taxes in a number of *provinciae*.[668] It was, as we shall see, the profitability of these contracts that greatly concerned this group and formed the basis of their interests.

Badian, in his monograph *Publicans and Sinners*, traced the rise of the *publicani* during the second century BCE and found that their relationship with the Senate fluctuated quite regularly.[669] He discovered that at times during the early part of the second century, the *publicani* were seemingly at odds with the Senate, or at least some of its more prominent members, while at other times these individuals appear to have had a peaceful co-existence, and were even favoured by them on one occasion.[670] We should note that during most of the second century, this group did not have the political influence to secure their own interests regularly, let alone possess the capacity to influence foreign policy. This is most evident in the great conflicts that occurred between the *publicani* and members of the Senate, usually one or more of the censors, between 184 and 167. During these conflicts, it is rather apparent that the senatorial elite could control the political activity of the equestrian class.

The quarrels between the *publicani* and elements of the Senate were usually over the profitability of the private contracts. The first recorded conflict of this sort occurred in 184. The Senate at the request of the *publicani* recalled the unprofitable contracts, only for the current censor Cato the Elder and his colleague Lucius Valerius to reissue the same contracts at a slightly lower price to new lessees.[671] Those that the Senate had deemed to have suffered from the first sale did not receive any benefit they might have hoped for when the contracts were recalled. Livy says nothing more on this episode, so it seems that the *publicani*, and the

[665] Livy 23.49.1-2.
[666] Livy 23.48.10.
[667] This episode suggests that it was unusual to offer military contracts prior to 215. The move may have been unprecedented.
[668] Badian (1972: 16-24) outlines the increasing variety of contracts that individuals could purchase.
[669] Badian (1972) 37-47.
[670] Ibid.
[671] Livy 39.44.8.

rest of the Senate for that matter, could do little more to overcome Cato's characteristic severity.[672]

A similar episode occurred fifteen years later in 169, when the lessees of 174 were not permitted to lodge bids for the contracts of that year.[673] Livy, however, is quiet on the reason for this exclusion. There is nothing in his account of the contracts of 174 that hints at any issue arising from the bidding process or the manner in which the winning bidders undertook their subsequent programmes.[674]

A possible reason for this sort of exclusion might be found in its potential relationship to the closure of the Macedonian mines of the following year. Diodorus tells us directly that this was done in part so that the local population would not be oppressed.[675] Livy goes a step further to name the *publicani* as the potential oppressors.[676] Badian believes that this was also the reason that the forests of Macedonia were not opened to exploitation.[677] This implies that those deciding on the fate of the four Macedonian republics after the Third Macedonian War felt that the *publicani*, the very individuals who would likely be responsible for the running of the mines, would seek to maximise the their profits at the expense of the Macedonians themselves. A number of senators, therefore, likely disapproved of the practices of the *publicani* for practical and perhaps moralistic reasons.[678] We might imagine, then, that the largely political interests of the senatorial elite conflicted with the largely financial interests of the *publicani*. Since the later held little political influence, the senatorial elite were able to restrict profits of the *publicani* in Macedonia.

To return to the issue of the contracts of 169, it might be assumed that a similar conflict of interest was the cause of the exclusion of the previous lessees. Whatever its origin, however, the extant sources do not permit us to reconstruct the episode with any certainty.

---

[672] These new lessees, knowing how fortunate they were to be making any profit all, likely did not seek to increase their potential income in case they too lost their contracts. If this were the case, then, I would suspect that frequent competition existed between *publicani*.
[673] Livy 43.16.2.
[674] Livy 41.27.5-13. It is worth noting that this particular passage has not entirely survived nor has there been any widely accepted full reconstruction. Even with a full reconstruction, though, I doubt that a reason for the later exclusion would be found with the text.
[675] Diod. Sic. 31.8.7.
[676] Livy 45.18.3-5.
[677] Badian (1972) 40.
[678] Treating the Macedonians harshly at this stage may have invited them to revolt again.

The two episodes just mentioned help us come to some conclusions about the relationship between the Senate and the *publicani*. During the first half of the second century, the senatorial elite, either as a whole or as individuals, were largely able to control the *publicani*, and by extension the *equites*. When conflict occurred, the senatorial elite seemed to possess the necessary advantages to further their interests. Perhaps the best advantage that the senatorial elite held was the position of the censor. As we have just seen, not only did the position allow its hold the ability to determine the profitability of the contracts and to a limited extent determine who could purchase them, but this position also determined who held the status of *equites*. It would seem that the latter was also used as a means to control the activity of the *publicani*.

Given the activeness of the censors in removing *equites* between 184 and 168, it seems necessary to conclude that the expulsions of this period were likely related to the hostility between the *publicani* and members of the senatorial elite mentioned above. Unlike the expulsion of individuals from the senatorial list, the numbers of *equites* removed from the equestrian list is normally not quantified but rather given in comparative terms. The reviews of 184, 174 and 169 were all purportedly harsh on the revision of the *equites*.[679] It is not unreasonable to assume that those expelled were predominantly *publicani*. Livy's account of the *lustrum* of 174 seems to link the removal of the *eques*' horse to the censors' role as moral supervisors.[680] It is therefore tempting to correlate the increasing pursuit of wealth, which brought with it the risk of luxury, to these expulsions, since the Romans obviously felt that these moral deficiencies threatened the *res publica* itself, or at least this was the justification that they gave.[681]

One particular case study may further reinforce the nature of these expulsions and potential for hostility between the senatorial elite and the *publicani*. Concerning the censorship of 169, we are fortunate to be informed about one prominent case of an expulsion concerning the equestrian P. Rutilius. As tribune of the plebs, Rutilius had tried to remove the censors of that year.[682] In his public trial, we are told that eight out of the twelve equestrian centuries had condemned the censor C. Claudius.[683] In Livy's opinion, the real reason for the trial taking

[679] Livy 39.44.1; 41.27.13; 43.16.1. Livy makes no mention of the review of the *equites* in 179. It is clear from Livy 40.51.8-9, however, that the censors of this year ushered in great changes regarding taxes, tribes, classes and voting methods.
[680] Livy 41.27.13.
[681] Zanda (2011: 7-11) offers a useful summary on the Roman view of luxury and its relationship with morality.
[682] Livy 44.16.8.
[683] Livy 43.16.14.

place was the harshness of the censor's contracts.[684] He also identifies the *veteres publicani* as the chief instigators of a separate law proposed in an effort to remove the censors' monopoly on the public contracts.[685] Both of these enterprises failed. The *publicani* did seemingly attempt to fight back against their opponents, but this ultimately proved unsuccessful. Again, the senatorial elite managed to control a hostile equestrian order.

Such was the success of the senatorial elites in controlling the *equites* that by 164 there seems to have been a large degree of harmony between the two groups. Plutarch suggests that the censorship of L. Aemilius Paullus and Marcius Philippus had been one of moderation with few *equites* expelled from their list.[686] Furthermore, the Macedonian mines, which had been previously closed in 168 specifically due to the *publicani*, were reopened in 158.[687] There are a few possibilities that may explain why the earlier hostility had now subsided. Badian claims that the *publicani* had come to realise that they could best increase their profits by working with the senatorial elite rather than against them, while the senatorial elite would have also benefited from the cessation of their conflicts.[688] This conclusion is perhaps slightly idealised. It should not be forgotten that the censors removed many of the *publicani* from the list of *equites* whom the Senate or they themselves found hostile. While this of course did not prevent the expelled individual from bidding for future contracts, it did mean that he would not have belonged to the equestrian class in the *comitia centuriata*. As a result, he would have lost the small degree of political influence he held as an *eques*. I would suspect that these expulsions did deter many other *publicani* from also acting in a hostile manner towards the senatorial elite in order to avoid similar treatment. They no doubt wished to increase their profits which were subject to the whim of the censors but belonging to an honour-based society at Rome these individuals likely preferred to maintain their current social and political status. As a result, many *publicani* likely opted for a more harmonious existence with the senatorial elite. They could still accrue some profit from their contacts without the risk of being removed from their position as opposed to seeking the maximum amount of profit which may have threatened it.

It seems then that during the first half of the second century, the *publicani*, and more widely the *equites*, did not have the political influence to pursue their interests since they could be

[684] Livy 43. 16.3. The trial itself was initiated when a client of Rutilius was ordered to pull down his house, but this is only given to explain Rutilius' role in the matter. See Livy 43.16.4.
[685] Livy 43.16.6-7.
[686] Plut. *Aem*. 38.
[687] Cassiod. *Chron.* 403 (*sub anno* 158).
[688] Badian (1972) 45.

controlled by the senatorial elite. As such, the *publicani* and the *equites* could do little to alter political life at Rome. Domestic and, importantly for my purpose, foreign policy was, therefore, still under the control of the senatorial elite.

Some of the control the senatorial elite had over the *publicani* was clearly lost in the Gracchan era. Badian claims that while the more senior members of the equestrian class were on most occasions tied closely to the senatorial class, in this period the other *equites*, particularly the so-called 'officer class', tied themselves to the *publicani*.[689] This union in the late 130s, he asserts, gave them a political consciousness and stronger political aims such as the desire to have greater freedom in the collection of taxes.[690] Given that they occupied a valuable position in the *comitia centuriata*, the equites came to possess a degree of political power.

Badian's argument though relies too much on the date of the first tax collection in Asia being 129 when 123 or 122 seems a more appropriate option.[691] The political aims that he claims existed in the early 120s probably did not occupy the minds of the *equites* until later in the decade, and importantly after C. Gracchus had made the jurors of the extortion courts exclusively equestrian.[692] This is problematic for Badian's argument given that he himself realises the significance of this new role to the group's political influence.[693] In this case, what Badian claims was the end point of a decade long revolution may have been the starting point for a swifter rise to power.

For this reason, it is better to adopt Brunt's argument that the judicial power they possessed in the extortion courts meant that senators were more likely to appease the *publicani* in order to avoid any possible conviction.[694] There are a small number of episodes in our sources that support this analysis. In his second speech against Verres, Cicero describes the promagistrates of those days when the equestrian class had made up the jurors of the courts as servants to the *publicani*.[695] He goes on to claim that if even one member of the equestrian class was injured

[689] Badian (1972) 58. The division between the senatorial class and the 'officer class' of the *equites* he also says was exacerbated by the law introducing places for *equites* at the games (Cic. *Mur.* 40; Vell. Pat. 2.32.3) and the law on the return of the public horse. These, according to Badian, represent a clear desire to be visually distinguishable from the senatorial class.
[690] Badian (1972) 59-60, 63-6.
[691] Most recently in Kay (2014) 59-83. See also Badian (1968) 47-8 for his similar claim that Asian taxation pre-dated equestrian jurors.
[692] Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5. The *Lex Repetundarm* lines 12-15 (Crawford [1996] 66) record a full list of those unsuitable to act as jurors in this court.
[693] Badian (1972: 64-6) recognises this as the pivotal moment that concluded the 'split' with the officer class.
[694] Brunt (1988) 145.
[695] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.94: *improbi et rapaces magistratus in provinciis inserviebant publicanis*.

or offended that the individual responsible for this action would suffer the hostility of the whole class.[696] Rhetoric aside, it is not difficult to imagine that a propraetor or proconsul who restricted the profits of a *publicanus* could from the 120s face the extortion court for simply interfering with the profiteering of these individuals. While there is little evidence of the equestrians using their judicial power to gain an advantage in this way, a small number of cases may hint at the wider trend that Cicero attests.

We are fortunate to have some knowledge of the case of Rutilius Rufus in 92. According to the testimony of Cassius Dio, the *equites* had devised a plan to charge Rutilius for receiving bribes while serving as a legate in Asia because he had ended many of the irregularities concerning their collection of taxes.[697] Valerius Maximus too claims that it was a conspiracy of the *publicani* which led to the exile of Rutilius.[698] Similar accounts of the trial are also found in the *Periochae* of Livy and Velleius Paterculus.[699] The latter in particular claims like Cicero that the equestrians had used their position in the law courts to gain an advantage. While this claim may apply to this particular case, it is somewhat difficult to defend on a wider scale, though, since only four of the eighteen *repetundae* cases that have survived in the sources between 123 and 91 ended in conviction.[700] Nevertheless, a small number of cases may have been enough to deter other magistrates from risking similar behaviour.[701] Indeed, Diodorus was of the opinion that promagistrates of Sicily in the 130s did not remove the threat posed by marauding bands of slaves because they feared the actions of slaves' masters in the Roman law courts.[702] If this were the case then C. Gracchus' decision to place the *equites* in charge of the extortion courts certainly seems to have given the pressure group the political influence they needed to pursue their interests.[703]

The importance of this decision was also not lost on a number of the ancient sources. Many in fact cite the *equites*' possession of the law courts as an instrumental moment in the decline of

[696] Ibid.
[697] Cass. Dio 28.97.1: ταῦτα ἐποίησαν θυμῷ φέροντες ὅτι πολλὰ περὶ τὰς τελωνίας πλημμελοῦντας ἐπέσχεν.
[698] Val. Max. 2.10.5.
[699] Livy *Per.* 70; Vell. Pat. 2.13.2.
[700] All these cases have been identified by Gruen (1968: 304-10).
[701] Cicero (*Scaur*. 1.2) suggests that since Rutilius' case even the innocent feared the equestrian jurors.
[702] Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.31. It is evident, as Brunt (1988: 151) rightfully points out, that this passage is anachronistic since Diodorus later (34/5.25.1) states that the *equites* did not serve as jurors on the extortion courts until the late 120s. Nevertheless, the passage likely characterised the experience of magistrates of a later date.
[703] Cicero (*Leg. Man.* 17-8) attests that wise men should consider the interests of the *publicani* even as late as 66 when the *equites* had lost their monopoly on the extortion courts. This seems to be more out of necessity than benevolence since in a few instances he speaks negatively about the group, for example at Cic. *Att.* 1.17.6 and Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.7. In another section of the same letter to his brother Quintus (1.1.33-5), Cicero attributes high importance to the difficult task of keeping both the *publicani* and the inhabitants of the *provinciae* satisfied.

the Roman Republic. Florus in particular argues that the Romans from this point were brought to ruin because the *equites* now possessed judicial power.[704] His account may reflect something of Livy's now missing narrative, but the *Periochae* mentions only that Gracchus introduced several ruinous laws, naming only three, none of which granted the extortion courts to the *equites*.[705] Of the three mentioned in detail, however, the epitomist does claim that Gracchus sought to place this group in charge of the Senate by amalgamating six hundred of its members with the existing three hundred senators.[706] While this statement is almost certainly confused in terms of identifying Gracchus' policies, or possibly altogether invented, the general sentiment of this statement may hold some truth.[707] There is after all a general consensus among the sources that C. Gracchus sought to empower the *equites* in some way. It is most likely the manner in which this was to occur that has caused the confusion.

The testimony of Diodorus on the matter is worthy of deeper consideration. Much like Florus, he recognises that by placing the *equites* in charge of the extortion courts, Gracchus had destroyed what he describes as a harmony that existed between these two groups.[708] Eventually, in Diodorus' opinion or perhaps rather Poseidonius', this led to the decline of the Republic.[709] He also claims, though, that it was the hope for private gains in the first place which enlarged Gracchus' support base.[710] We can safely conclude that part of this base was made up of members of the *publicani* since Diodorus links their increased activity in the *provinciae* in the following sentence to Gracchus' growing influence.[711] Again, this would seem to indicate that the role the law courts played in the *publicani*'s ability to profiteer in Rome's wider empire. This judicial focus, though, should not remove the possibility that there was a small number of the *equites* - C. Memmius and C. Marius seem the most obvious examples - who wished to compete directly with the senatorial elite for political dominance.[712]

---

[704] Flor. 3.17.3.
[705] Livy *Per*. 60.
[706] Ibid.
[707] Plutarch (*C. Gracch.* 5) attests that three hundred *equites* would be added to the three hundred senators from which jurors would be chosen, not added to the Senate itself. This gives a total of six hundred. Given that both Plutarch's and Livy's accounts conflict with the *Lex Repetundarum*, which states in lines 15-8 that senators and their relatives were specifically excluded from these juries, it is best to dismiss both these statements. See Gruen (1968) 87-9.
[708] Diod. Sic. 34/5.25.1.
[709] Ibid. Poseidonius is generally considered the major source of Diodorus from book 34. Sacks (1990: 211-2) rightly argues that Poseidonius was not anti-equestrian but rather criticises C. Gracchus in this particular section.
[710] Diod. Sic. 34/5.25.1.
[711] Ibid.
[712] C. Memmius' hostility towards the Senate, and his own desire to hold political power over them, can be found in Sall. *Iug.* 27, 30-1. The chief authority on C. Marius is, of course, Plutarch's account of his life, especially Plut.

One final point that I wish to make concerning Diodorus' account is concerning his reference to the common people. In creating a divide between the senate and the *equites*, Diodorus believes that Gracchus had made the common people hostile to both of these groups.[713] Even if this picture does not reflect the historical reality, which can certainly be questioned in light of Diodorus' strong anti-Gracchan bias, it does highlight that he did think that the common people formed an important third pressure group. Given the regularity with which both prominent *equites*, such as Marius, and members of the senatorial elite, including C. Gracchus himself, employed populist programmes to garner the support of the common people in the Late Republic, it is reasonable to come to this conclusion also. The capacity for individuals to pursue this style of programme as a long-term strategy was not always present throughout Rome's Republican era. Indeed, it largely appears to be a rather late development. To answer the question of why this approach gained prominence at this time, further analysis into the development of the *popularis* ideology is necessary.

5.2 – The Political Alternative: *Populares* and Popular Politics

The second pressure group to gain further influence in the late second century were the common people themselves. While this group could not directly form their own legislation, the desires of the common people could be championed by a plebeian tribune, an individual senator or a group of senators.[714] Those individuals who acted in this way were regularly described as *populares*.

The definition of the word *popularis*, though, is somewhat complicated. Our sources and the orators of the time often used divisive rhetoric concerning populism in order to further their political cause.[715] A working definition of the term, though, can be deduced for my purpose. Duplá identifies four possible definitions of *popularis* in the extant sources: (1) 'an individual favourable, in one way or another, to the populus or who seeks its approval'; (2) 'a political stance or attitude opposed to the senatorial majority, from different possible perspectives'; (3)

Mar. 7-8. See also Sall. *Iug*. 65.4-5 and Vell. Pat. 2.11.2, who also highlights the role of the *publicani*, for Marius' first consular campaign.

[713] Diod. Sic. 34/5.25.1.

[714] Only a consul, praetor or tribune of the plebs could summon a *comitium* in which legislation was voted on and passed. See Tan (2017) 112.

[715] Cicero (*Phil.* 8.19), for instance, shows that he is aware that on one hand Q. Fufius Calenus can undoubtedly be regard as a *popularis*, but on the other that he may not be acting in the interest of the people. As such, writers of the late Republic could argue that the conservative elite had the interests of the people in mind and were the 'true' *populares*. See Cic. *Sest.* 140.

'a political strategy based on the tribunate and the popular assemblies'; (4) a social tendency and political tradition related to the defence of the rights of the *populus*.[716] It is the third of these definitions that is most relevant to the current discussion. By focusing on the tribunate and popular assembles, an individual was able to enact legislation, if he possessed enough popular support, without directly consulting the senatorial elite or even bypassing them altogether. This was usually done to the benefit of the common people.

The introduction of legislation in 137 requiring the use of secret ballots for the voting process of the criminal courts is one early instance of this political approach.[717] Cicero describes its instigator, the plebeian tribune L. Cassius, at a much later date as a man 'always seeking the fickle applause of the mob' who 'stood apart from the aristocracy', even though Cassius himself was from an elite family.[718] His motivation, according to Cicero, was simply to garner popular support. However, Cassius' decision to take up the guise of a *popularis* reveals something more about politics of this era. Someone who opposed the conventional order established by the senatorial elite could compete effectively on a political level by adopting this approach.[719]

While individuals had used similar popular approaches in the past,[720] beginning in the Gracchan period, acting in this manner became a feasible long-term strategy, which was perhaps, as Lintott suggests, brought on by the success of the two individuals after whom the era is named.[721] Before the tribunates of these two individuals, so few tribunes had rarely opposed the wishes of the Senate, with the result that their names and careers attracted little attention of our sources. While our sources for the period are rather meagre, particularly after Livy's account ends in 167, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was little hostility between the tribunes of the plebs and the senatorial elite. In this earlier period, from approximately 300 BCE down to the Second Punic War, the Senate too for their own part appear to have better considered the lot of the common people, especially when it came to

[716] Duplá (2011) 280.
[717] Cic. *Brut.* 106.
[718] Cic. *Leg*. 3.35 (trans. Keyes, 1966).
[719] Such was the effectiveness and disruptiveness of this approach that L. Sulla did eventually inhibit the position of tribune completely in the late 80s by removing the tribunes' right to introduce or veto legislation and excluding its holders from future office and the Senate (App. *B Civ.* 1.100). The tribunes' position was, of course, re-established in the consulship of M. Crassus and Cn. Pompey (Plut. *Pomp*. 21).
[720] Tan (2017: 106-115) has recently highlighted the activity of 'anti-senatorial' tribunes between 250-230 BCE. Even these cases, though, had a limited scope. They focus almost exclusively on the topic of military service.
[721] Lintott (1992a) 94.

declarations of wars outside of the Italian Peninsula.[722] At the onset of the First Punic War, for example, the Senate asked the people if Roman soldiers should be sent to assist Messana in Sicily.[723] In this way, the common people did have some say in Rome's foreign policies. Of course, acting in this manner could have kept the common people satisfied and reinforced the belief that the senatorial elite were the best choice for community leaders.[724] Given the control the senatorial elite had over these votes, we might doubt how genuine their concern for the common people's opinion really was.[725] Certainly following the end of the Second Punic War, however, it seems that the common people lost whatever little influence they had on foreign policy.[726]

At least in the period before 152, there seems to have been a large degree of harmony between the Senate and the tribunes of the plebs.[727] When the two did clash, the tribunes usually deferred to the authority of the Senate or at least reached a compromise.[728] We should also note that these clashes were almost exclusively over the terms of military service.[729] In 193, when the Ligures were raiding the territory of Placentia, the consul Ti. Sempronius Longus and the Senate were simply able to declare that it was not in Rome's interests that the tribunes bring forward cases concerning soldiers who had completed their service or were too ill to serve.[730] Two years later, the tribunes referred the appeals of Roman colonists due to undertake naval

[722] The two most useful cases to consider appear at Polyb. 1.11, and Livy 23.48.7-9. Tan (2017: 94-106, 113-5) argues that this came down to the need for the Senate to consider the interest of the common people who actually funded the military campaigns of this era through the collection of *tributum*.
[723] Polyb. 1.11.
[724] Yakobson (2010) 301.
[725] Despite the prominent role of the people during the legislative process, Morstein-Marx (2013: 30-1) suggests it is possible to conclude that the act of public deliberation was 'an elaborate sham'. Influential senators did after all dominate this process. This undermines the arguments of Millar (1998: 201-26) who strongly argues for a more prominent role for the common people in the political decision-making process.
[726] Tan (2017: 94) suggests this was because wars no longer had to be funded solely by *tributum* and so the elite did not have to consider their interests any more. However, Tan (2017: 142) also places significance of the role on the tribunes. Following the work of Develin (1978: 142-3), he argues that the senators had given the tribunes incentives to stay compliant by enabling them to become senators and vice versa in 216. This seems to undermine his first point since the common people could only influence policy through the tribunes or in an assembly arranged by certain magistrates. In sum, this meant that the common people could pay *tributum*, but not have a tribune support them and consequently they would not have had political influence. The two were independent of each other.
[727] L. R. Taylor (1962: 20-22) is the seminal authority on this topic. More recently, Tiersch (2009) 52. Contra Tan (2017) 113, 129.
[728] A rather complicated case appears at Livy 39.38.8-12 when two sides, each with tribunes of the plebs and a consul, argued over the terms of service for those legions sent to the Iberian Peninsula. This too, though, ended in something of a compromise.
[729] The case of land distribution in Cisalpine Gaul and Picenum in 232 clearly shows that tribunes could take action regarding issues not concerning military service earlier than the second century. See Cic. *Brut*. 57 and Polyb. 2.21.7-9. The granting of the right to vote to Arpinum, Fundi and Formiae in 188 was also, according to Livy 38.36.6-9, introduced by a plebeian tribune without the sanction of the Senate.
[730] Livy 34.56.9-11.

service directly to the Senate.[731] When twenty three veterans had appealed to the tribunes of the plebs in 171 concerning the terms of their military service, two of these tribunes had insisted that the authority of this case belonged to those who were conducting the war, and referred the matter to the consuls.[732] Even the tribunes who had decided to continue to investigate the claims themselves the consul persuaded to conduct the investigation within a *contio*.[733]

In the period between 152 and 133, the policies of the plebeian tribunes continued to have a limited scope, and would not have long term impact on Roman political life.[734] Much of their actions continued to revolve around the issue of military service.[735] However, we also see in this period an increase in the frequency of legislation introduced by members of the tribunate that did relate to other areas of society. In 149, for instance, L. Libo legislated a measure to investigate Servius Galba's conduct against the Lusitanians, some of whom he had unwarrantedly put to death.[736] The same year saw the introduction of legislation by L. Calpurnius Piso establishing the court against misconduct and extortion in the *provinciae*.[737] At the beginning of the following decade, the *lex Gabinia* established the use of a secret ballot during elections.[738] This law was followed two years later with the expansion of the secret ballots to include their use in the law courts, as has already been mentioned.[739] Therefore, it would be wrong to view the programme of Tiberius Gracchus as a revolutionary step that occurred spontaneously. He belongs to a newer form of political activity dating back to the mid second century. The year 133, nevertheless, appears to be a turning point for political life in the Roman Republic as the senatorial elite for the first time faced a considerable opponent adopting the method and attitude of what would later become typical of the *populares*.

Following the success of the Gracchan programme, much like the *equites* of the same period, the common people now possessed the means to influence Rome's political life. By voicing

[731] Livy 36.3.5.
[732] Livy 42.32.7-8.
[733] Livy 42.33.1-2.
[734] Again, this is best outlined in L. R. Taylor (1962) 27. See also Mouritsen (2001) 68.
[735] While the tribunes had seemingly in 151 and 138 established a new precedent by imprisoning the consuls, this was done due to the supposed harshness of the levies in their respective years. Livy's epitomist records that this action occurred in 151 (*Per*. 48) and 138 (*Per*. 55) because the tribunes were unable to choose individuals, in all likelihood their friends, who would be excluded from the levy. Alternatively, Cicero (*Leg*. 3.20) suggests that 138 had been the year when such an action had first occurred.
[736] Cic. *Brut.* 89.
[737] Cic. *Brut.* 106.
[738] Cic. *Amic.* 41; *Leg.* 3.34. There is some debate in modern scholarship about how much the introduction of the secret ballot actually came to affect the passage of popular legislation. See Mouritsen (2001) 75-6 for a more recent discussion. Mouritsen himself doubts that any real change occurred as a result of the secret ballot's introduction.
[739] Cic. *Brut.* 97.

their demands, the common people invited a tribune to take up their cause, if for nothing more than his own political advancement. Yakobson rightly points out that demands for change from the common people would have predated any legislation.[740] It would have been, and remains, very hard for populist politicians to predict the desires of the populace. Our sources confirm this order of events for the formation of popular legislation. Cicero's account of the introduction of the secret ballot used in the *comitia* clearly indicates that the common people had demanded its introduction for some time.[741] A similar situation seems to have occurred in the case of Tiberius Gracchus' land reforms in 133. Plutarch attests, among a number of other reasons, that 'it was above all the people themselves who did most to arouse Tiberius' energy and ambition by inscribing slogans and appeals on porticoes, monuments, and the walls of houses, calling upon him to recover the public land for the poor'.[742] It was by a process of appeal that the common people could exert their political influence through the support of a plebeian tribune or, though rarely in this particular period, a senator.

Over the three decades that followed the programmes of both Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, several pieces of 'popular' legislation were introduced against the Senate's authority.[743] Perhaps the most immediate example of this sort of legislation after the Gracchi was Marius' law on voting procedure in 119 that the future consul introduced while tribune. This legislation had in effect made the voting passages narrower, thereby making it harder for any spectators to undermine the secrecy of the vote or exert influence on the voters.[744] Ten years later, C. Mamilius Limetanus successfully implemented a measure establishing a law court for the prosecution of those who had assisted Jugurtha in his revolt.[745] The common people had passed this legislation, Sallust tells us, not for the good of Rome, but for their hatred of the senatorial elite, who were most troubled by this measure.[746] The increased influence of the common

[740] Yakobson (2010) 296.
[741] Cic. *Leg*. 3.34: *quam* (sc. *legem tabellariam*) *populus liber numquam desiderauit, idem oppressus dominatu ac potentia principum flagitavit.*
[742] Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 8.7: τὴν δὲ πλείστην αὐτὸς ὁ δῆμος ὁρμὴν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ἐξῆψε, προκαλούμενος διὰ γραμμάτων αὐτὸν ἐν στοαῖς καὶ τοίχοις καὶ μνήμασι καταγραφομένων ἀναλαβεῖν τοῖς πένησι τὴν δημοσίαν χώραν. Trans. Scott-Kilvert (1965).
[743] A useful list of these pieces of popular legislation can be found in Mouritsen (2001) 69. Another list compiled by Morstein-Marx (2013: 34-5) considers perhaps more carefully the identification of popular legislation in the same period.
[744] Cic. *Leg*. 3.38. Whether the narrowing of the passages was the purpose and sole aim of this legislation is unknown. According to Plutarch (*Mar.* 4), Marius not only opposed the Senate in this measure, which would weaken the power of the senatorial elite, but even went so far as to threaten to imprison firstly the consul L. Aurelius Cotta, and secondly his own benefactor Q. Caecilius Metellus.
[745] Sall. *Iug*. 40.1.
[746] Sall. *Iug.* 40.3. This passage appears heavily influenced by Sallust's own interpretation of the conflict between the common people and the senatorial elite. A hatred against all members of the elite seems unlikely.

people was such that in 103 even the election of individuals to positions within the priestly colleges came to be determined by popular vote.[747]

This does not mean the senatorial elites were powerless to stop the programmes of the *populares* tribunes. Certainly, by the early 90s, the Senate seems to have wrested some control of Rome's political life back as a result of the introduction of the *Lex Caecilia Didia* in 98. This piece of legislation defined specific time restrictions between introducing and voting on legislation and prevented unrelated items appearing in the same legislation.[748] This seems to have been a reaction against the turbulent tribunate of L. Appuleius Saturninus. In 100, Saturninus had introduced legislation concerning the distribution of land in Cisalpine Gaul, however after coming up against significant opposition from members of the Senate and the urban poor, he added the condition that any senator who refused to give an oath swearing to the observance of the legislation would be exiled if it passed.[749] In effect, the people could be asked hurriedly to vote on two unrelated issues in a single law which they might realistically pass on the support of a single element even though they did not approve of the affixed item. This was particularly advantageous for a *popularis* tribune who could have been expected to fill an assembly with his own supporters and pass legislation in a short space of time. The senatorial elite would simply not have been able to gather together enough of their own supporters in time to prevent the success of these votes. It is little wonder then that many modern scholars, such as Burckhardt, consider the *Lex Caecilia Didia* a vital piece of legislation against the efforts of *populares* since it enabled the opponents of any particular piece of legislation to form an effective opposition.[750] Furthermore, the delay between the publication of proposed laws and the votes that would have limited the ability of authors flooding the *comitia* with their own supporters.[751] It was precisely this tactic that had led to Saturninus being elected to a second tribuneship in the early morning after the death of the tribune whom he replaced.[752] The *Lex Caecilia Didia* would have limited the possibility of such an election ever happening again.

---

[747] Vell. Pat. 2.12.3; Cic. *Agr*. 2.18.
[748] *schol. Bob*. 140 defines this period as a *trinundinum*, which Lintott (1965: 281-5) has calculated to equate to at least eighteen days. For the clause prohibiting unrelated items see Cic. *Dom*. 53.
[749] App. *B Civ*. 1.28-32.
[750] Burckhardt (1988) 212-13. This point of view is based on the observation that most laws that reached the *comitia* were passed. The authors of unsuccessful legislation, in Burckhardt's opinion, withdrew their measures prior to the vote itself due to obstruction or intense opposition.
[751] Vanderbroeck (1991: 499) offers this as an alternative explanation to Burckhardt, though, I cannot see any reason why both could not apply.
[752] App. *B Civ*. 1.28. According to this account, Saturninus had organised the tribune's murder.

The expulsion of M. Duronius, a former tribune of the plebs, from the Senate in 97 too may have had some effect on the political conflicts between the two pressure groups. Valerius Maximus informs us that the censors supposedly expelled Duronius for likening the condition of the common people to that of slaves, whereas, in accordance with their liberty, they should have been free to ruin themselves with luxury if they so wished.[753] This informed current and future tribunes that they could not oppose the senatorial elite with too much ferocity otherwise they might also be subjected to the same treatment. For those tribunes who desired a political career beyond their tribunate, the prospects of being expelled from the Senate, membership to which was required for the higher magistracies, likely acted as something of a deterrent.

Nevertheless, even with these measures put in place, the senatorial elite no longer held the monopoly on political influence that they had possessed in the era before the Gracchi. From the 130s onwards, the senatorial elites, while still dominating Rome's political life, did have to compete with this new pressure group founded on popular policies, as well as another group formed by the *equites*.[754] Each of the pressure groups held their own mechanisms for securing their own interests and counteracting whoever opposed them. The *equites* dominated the extortion courts, while the senatorial elites and the common people, through the tribunes of the plebs, sought to control the passage of legislation in the assemblies via different political approaches. Furthermore, each of these three groups were regularly in competition due to their often diametrically opposed interests. Of course, this overview has not taken into account the level competition that could exist within these groups. This could only complicate the overall picture.[755] The process to secure ones' interests within Rome's expanding empire had become more complex and ultimately more difficult.

5.3 – The Gracchan Programme and the Italian Allies

The conflicts between these three pressure groups, while mostly confined to domestic politics, did come to affect the Italic communities. The Gracchan programme is one such instance. During the tribunates of both Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, concerns about the elites' acquisition of public land at the expense of the poor resulted in a number of Italian allies losing

[753] Val. Max. 2.9.5.
[754] Shotter (2005: 26-7) describes Rome's political life in this era as lacking 'corporate sense' since factional and individual goals gained prominence over collective interests.
[755] I have chosen not to give more details for such divisions since such alliances could be sporadic and would add nothing to my wider argument.

lands they had occupied for at least two centuries.[756] This largely domestic dispute between two of Rome's pressure groups, the senatorial elites and the common people, negatively affected the interests of the Italic communities. It is little wonder then that Galsterer dates the alienation of Italic communities to this time.[757] Given the importance of this programme to the late second century and the role it played in the growing conflict between the Italic communities and Rome, it is worthwhile having a deeper look into the nature of this programme.

The ancient sources give two main reasons for the motivation behind Tiberius Gracchus' agrarian legislation. Firstly, Tiberius himself found it morally wrong that, although Rome possessed a large empire, many of the Roman poor did not possess land of their own and that slaves had largely taken place of the same individuals in the rural farms.[758] Secondly, he believed that the redistribution of the Roman poor onto the land would increase the number of soldiers who could serve in the legions.[759] Both these motivations were Romano-centric. Neither the concern for the Roman poor nor number of Roman soldiers would have existed outside of Rome's domestic political sphere. To solve these issues, which was well within the capability of the Romans, acknowledges the presence of a political element within Rome's domestic sphere that was almost exclusively inward facing.[760] Other Italic communities had faced, and likely continued to face similar issues, particularly in regard to recruitment of soldiers to meet Roman demands.[761] Yet in the case of the Italic communities, aside from the Latin colonies, little was done to solve their particular issues.[762] However, the Romans were capable and, importantly, willing to solve their own problems. This was a key advantage of being hegemon. Furthermore, both the issue of extreme elite wealth and the introduction of large amounts of slaves into the Italian Peninsula were products of Rome's expansion. Had

[756] The author of the *Periochae* (57) claims that Gracchus' laws had been passed against the wishes of both the senatorial elite and the *equites*.
[757] Galsterer (1976) 165-76. Salmon (1962: 108-110) too recognises the importance of the Gracchi as a factor in their alienation. I would largely agree with this conclusion, however, the process that led to this alienation probably began the decade before Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate. Those scholars, including Scullard (1982: 18), who date this alienation to the first half of the second century seem to consider the matter with too much hindsight.
[758] Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 8; Cass. Dio 34/5.6.1.
[759] App. *B Civ.* 1.7-11.
[760] Sampson (2013: 10) states that the Gracchan programme 'was designed in Rome, by Romans, to solve a Roman problem'.
[761] Roselaar (2010: 227) seems right to suggest that local elites were also occupying large amounts of land in the Italic communities through the same means as their Roman counterparts, even if her evidence for this is not wholly convincing. See n. 783.
[762] The clearest example can be seen in the case of 177 (Livy 41.8.6-12) when four thousand Samnites and Paelignians migrated to Fregellae. Although these communities sent an embassy to Rome seeking a solution to the manpower issue this migration created, the Romans only seem to have solved the issues faced by the Latin colonies, who had also sent an embassy to Rome at the same time. See Broadhead (2001) 89 and (2008) 459-61.

Rome not expanded the elites would not have possessed the financial means to acquire both large amounts of lands and slaves to work it, which in turn reduced the number of men eligible for service.[763] In this way, the alienation of the inhabitants of the Italic communities with regards to the confiscation of land was indirectly a result of Rome's expansion. This should serve as a reminder that changes in one area can create unintended consequences in seemingly unrelated ones.

In the past a number of scholars, Rich in particular, have questioned the validity of Appian's claim that Tiberius Gracchus sought to increase Rome's manpower in the late second century by redistributing land.[764] If this is the case, then there are some important implications for how we should view this legislation in regard to the Romans' relationship with the Italic communities. For instance, if there was no concern for population, would it have been acceptable to the Romans of the second century that the proportion of Roman citizens serving in the armies could drop to a level at which Italian allies vastly outnumbered them? Given the importance of these implications, it is worthwhile taking a brief look into this particular argument.

In his argument against Appian's claim, Rich notes that the demand for manpower in this period was in fact not as great as it had been previously.[765] The number of legions raised in the period after the Second Punic War does indeed drop by over fifty percent.[766] The usual counter-argument against this view, adopted for instance by Roselaar, is that Romans were only ever concerned for their population levels because it could determine whether there was also a decline in the number of soldiers.[767] The fact that the Romans believed that the number of males who could serve in the army was falling, would have been call for concern, even if this was only a product of underrepresentation in the census totals.[768] Whether the number of eligible men actually declined or not is largely irrelevant. It is more significant that the Romans believed their population was in decline.

[763] There is no great need to choose between the two explanations of the sources as they are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, seem to be related. The choice of individual authors to stress one motivation over the other lies more in their own characteristics and themes. Accordingly, Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 8) chose to focus on the moralistic issue of the landless Romans.
[764] Rich (1983) 292-3 and (2007) 162. Also, Perelli (1993) 79-82.
[765] Rich (1983) 292-3.
[766] Ibid. The average number of legions raised drops from approximately twenty-five during the Second Punic War to just under nine.
[767] Roselaar (2010) 227.
[768] De Ligt (2004) 754.

There is, however, perhaps a greater flaw in Rich's argument. He assumes in his analysis that the Romans always had a set number of legions in mind. Although he is correct that number of legions Rome levied dropped significantly in the second century, the Romans likely wished to account for the possibility that the same or greater number of legions could be needed in the future. It was perhaps not so much a question of a certain number of legions, but rather as many as possible. The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union might act as a useful analogy. At the height of the Cold War both countries held an impractical arsenal of nuclear weapons,[769] each side possessing far beyond that needed to neutralise its opposition, not a set number designed for a strategic military purpose.[770] The goal was to deter the opposition with military strength, even if this strength was never called upon, and perhaps largely unnecessary in practice.[771] So while there may not have been an immediate practical use for a greater number of legions that could be raised, this greater number likely acted as a deterrent against possible hostility, even if the exact figures were not precisely known to Rome's enemies or its allies. Indeed, Roselaar suggests that the Romans may have always endeavoured to increase their manpower for ideological reasons.[772] Perhaps the reason was nothing more than achieving the reputation of being the community who could raise the most troops. This prestige alone would have acted as something of a deterrent. The strategy of increasing manpower may not seem logistically necessary, but it did bring practical benefits to Rome. It seems safe to conclude, then, that Tiberius Gracchus introduced agrarian legislation with the main aim of increasing the manpower of the Roman army by granting land to the Roman poor.[773]

To return to my overall focus, the concern for the specifically Roman population who could serve in the legions offers an interesting insight into how the Romans viewed the internal dynamics of their armies. The focus on increasing Roman manpower, as opposed to overall manpower, would suggest a largely Romano-centric attitude. As such, it may have also been a concern to some Romans that the Italian allies outnumbered them in the armies.[774] A concern

[769] An estimate of the total number can be found at Norris and Kristensen (2010) 81.
[770] Waltz (1990: 735) suggests several hundred nuclear weapons would have be sufficient for the United States to have destroyed the Soviet Union or vice versa, yet at times each possessed over thirty thousand. Even taking into account possible targets outside of their immediate enemy, this number is excessive in terms of practical deployment.
[771] Ibid 733-5.
[772] Roselaar (2010) 152.
[773] Here I follow Roselaar (2010) 226. Appian's account (*B Civ*. 1.7-11) forms the basis for this point of view, though it is also mentioned in Plutarch's account (*Ti. Gracch*. 8) that the poor were unwilling to preform military service due to their situation.
[774] Mouritsen (2008: 474) too raises the possibility of this concern.

of this nature is hinted at in 171 when a praetor was ordered to enrol sailors of which two-thirds were to be Roman citizens.[775] I am by no means suggesting that the Romans actively sought to outnumber their allies in the armies, there is no evidence that they ever did during the second century,[776] but rather that they aimed to keep some level of parity between their contribution and that of the allies. If such a strategy existed, even for no other reason than the ideological motive suggested above, then the maintenance of potential troop numbers would have to be observed and addressed over a period of time. This leaves the possibility that Tiberius Gracchus formed a new tactic to increase Rome's military strength that departed somewhat from other tactics to address the manpower issue after the Second Punic War. The two most significant of these tactics were perhaps the preference in establishing citizen colonies rather than Latin colonies,[777] and the 'promotion' of communities possessing *civitas sine suffragio* to the 'full' citizenship.[778]

It would seem that the Romans held greater concern for their own military strength during the Gracchan period than the interests of the Italic communities. Of course, this is entirely unsurprising for a community which had attained the position of hegemon and wished to maintain it. Importantly for my purpose, however, the introduction of Tiberius Gracchus' legislation concerning public land threatened the interests of many Italian allies, who occupied much of the land set aside for redistribution.[779] Although Appian's account might at first seem to suggest the opposite, it is necessary to realise that this programme was not designed to assist them. In considering Appian's account, Mouritsen,[780] who follows Gargola,[781] points out that initially the Italian allies were seemingly the focus of the Gracchan legislation, [782] but later only the Roman poor become the beneficiaries.[783] The simplest solution to this problem is to assume that in these initial passages Appian's 'Italians' (Ἰταλικοί) were in fact rural Roman citizens

[775] Livy 42.31.7. An alternative explanation might be that since these men were relieving existing troops, the Romans sought to relieve more of their own citizens. This would assume, however, that the sailors were relieved on a like for like basis depending on their status.
[776] Rich (1983) 321-23.
[777] Mouritsen (2008: 479-80) argues strongly that the Romans no longer wished to lose a proportion of their own manpower to Latin colonies in the decades after the end of the Second Punic War and so established Roman colonies instead. This contradicts Salmon (1969: 100) who believed that since the Romans could not entice enough of its citizens to become colonists with Latin status, they were forced to offer Roman citizenship.
[778] Livy 38.36.7 offers the only clear instance of this 'promotion' when Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum received 'full' citizenship in 188. We might also conclude tentatively that the Campani, who previously held *civitas sine suffragio*, too received 'full' citizenship at approximately this time. See Livy 38.36.5.
[779] A thorough survey of the location of *ager publicus* has been provided by Roselaar (2010: 298-326). The programme of Ti. Gracchus was particularly active in the territories of Lucania, Apulia and Etruria.
[780] Mouritsen (2008) 472.
[781] Gargola (2008) 495.
[782] App. *B Civ*. 8-9.
[783] App. *B Civ*. 14-5, 27.

living in the Italian Peninsula, whom Appian wished to distinguish from urban Roman citizens.[784] By reading Appian in this light, we can reconcile his account to the other extant sources who all claim that only Roman citizens would benefit from Tiberius' programme. These sources include Plutarch, who suggests citizens would receive the land grants, and Cicero, who too only refers to Romans as recipients.[785] Perhaps most convincing of all, though, is the *Lex Agraria* of 111, which sought to solve issues arising from the Gracchan programme. According to the surviving inscription of this law, only Roman citizens or Latins could be granted lots of public land.[786]

From the point of view of the Italic communities, then, the introduction of these programmes would have seemed entirely negative. For these people, the greatest consequence of this legislation was that land would have been taken away and given to Roman citizens.[787] In the past, the further confiscation of land from allies was reserved, as Roselaar rightly stresses, largely for rebellious communities, but even loyal allies were now subjected to this treatment.[788] This was problematic for the Romano-Italic relationship for two reasons. Firstly, many inhabitants of the Italic communities, much like those of the Romans themselves, ran large scale farming operations on this land.[789] The loss of all or a proportion of this land would have resulted in financial losses. Clearly, this would not be in the interests of the Italic communities. Secondly, the confiscation of this land undermines the very basis of the pre-existing relationship. The inhabitants had been seemingly able to continue to work *ager publicus* unless it was claimed by the Romans for colonisation.[790] This was no longer the case after Tiberius introduced the land commission for the purpose of privatising the land. By altering the conditions of their relationship and reducing the positive social and economic

[784] See discussion in Carter (1996) 411-2. Here Appian seems to be confused by the differences between the use of the word in second century CE and its use in the pre-Social War period. For the alternative argument that Ἰταλικοί does refer to the Italian *socii* see Roselaar (2010) 246-7.
[785] Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 9; Cic. *Agr*. 2.10, 81; *Sest.* 103.
[786] Lines 3, 21 and 31. See Crawford (1996) 65-9. The Latins named here would be former Roman citizens who, having moved to Latin colonies during Gaius Gracchus' programme (Plut. *C. Gracch.* 8; App. *B Civ.* 23), would have been able to receive land grants as Latin colonists.
[787] Roselaar (2010: 248-51) has convincingly argued that although Italian allies could not receive land from the commission, their ownership of the land not taken away could be 'confirmed' since the programme sought to privatise most of the *ager publicus*. However, since inhabitants already occupied this land, and likely thought of themselves as its owners, it would be difficult to imagine that they viewed this concession as a benefit.
[788] Roselaar (2010) 83-4.
[789] Roselaar (2008: 595-6) suggests this would particularly have been the case in Southern Italy. See also Jongman (2003) 101-2 for the importance of agriculture on these lands to the inhabitants of the local communities, particularly the elites.
[790] Roselaar (2010) 79-83. In normal circumstances, the use of this land would have been considered a *beneficium*.

incentives on which that relationship was formed and maintained, a large degree of uncertainty about the Italic communities' relationship with the Romans likely surfaced at this time.

This uncertainly likely found physical form in the increase of politically minded Italian allies at Rome. A more direct approach to securing their interests seems to have been adopted after the death of Scipio Aemilianus in 129. The expulsions of Italian allies in 126 by M. Junius Pennus, as tribune of the plebs, would seem to indicate that the Romans themselves believed that even the very presence of these individuals at Rome could influence the voting process either through canvassing or intimidation. [791] This would seem to pre-empt Fulvius Flaccus' legislation of the following year proposing that the inhabitants of the Italic communities should be given Roman citizenship.[792] However, it is not inconceivable that the Italian allies had originally tried to influence the voters in the assemblies. Only after they were expelled in 126 did a significant portion of the Italian allies aspire to hold Roman citizenship. It seems likely that they were attempting to adapt to the changes that had occurred in domestic political sphere of the Romans. Since the informal approach of appealing to the Romans themselves had failed, it is reasonable to conceive that these allies had turned their attention to attaining Roman citizenship in order to pursue their own interests. However, a second proposal credited to C. Gracchus put forward that only the Latins should receive Roman citizenship while the Italian allies were to have Latin status failed in 122.[793] This would be the last wide spread enfranchisement legislation proposed for this period.

During the late second century there were undoubtedly a vast number of possible interests that the Italian allies, both elite and non-elite, might have wished to pursue. However, it should also be noted that on the occasions when many Italian allies most vehemently called for their enfranchisement in 125 and 91, significant land redistribution programmes occurred in the same year. I find it unlikely that this would be a coincidence. This, therefore, leaves the impression that there was a strong link between the issue of land rights and the desire of many Italian allies for enfranchisement.

[791] For the law of Pennus see Cic. *Off.* 3.47, and Lintott (1992a) 76.
[792] App. *B Civ.* 1.21. On the pre-emptive nature of Pennus' legislation see Dart (2010) 99.
[793] App. *B Civ.* 1.23. Plutarch (*C. Gracch.* 12) records a supposedly unprecedented move that allies and foreigners were also expelled from the city at this time.

5.4 – The 'Privileged' Citizenship and Its Desirability

From the analysis above, it should be clear that, like Gabba, I am arguing that the Italian allies, particularly those of the more elite status, wished to attain Roman citizenship in order to gain political influence. Gabba, however, chose to focus mainly on the commercial advantages that the upper classes might gain a result of enfranchisement.[794] I would rather expand this desire to a greater proportion of the individuals within the wider Italic communities. If Roman citizenship was attained by the poorer classes within the Italic communities, there would have been at least some hope, however small, that the *populares* might have sought to fulfil their interests. Domestic politics at Rome had, after all, come to be something of a balancing act between members of three very different social classes, which came to form the pressure groups outlined above. Besides, the very fact that the same style of politicians had supported their cause for Roman citizenship in the first place likely reinforced this hope.

I would not rule out the possibility, however, that there were other benefits associated with rights of Roman citizenship that may have appealed to the Italian allies and inspired their desire for enfranchisement. Certainly, when this issue first arose in the Gracchan period, an opponent of the cause could cite the exclusively Roman benefit of reserved seating at the *ludi* and at various festivals as a reason not to extend the franchise to the Latins.[795] The Romans themselves must have viewed the franchise as highly valuable and worthy of its exclusivity for this rhetoric to have applied. I find it necessary, then, to leave open the possibility that many of the allies, particularly those living some distance from Rome, might have been drawn to the Roman franchise for reason other than for political influence.

To expand on the possible reasons why the inhabitants of Italic communities may have desired Roman citizenship in the lead up to the Social War does seem, however, largely inessential given that Kendall has covered the topic so thoroughly.[796] Nor do I feel that expanding upon his work would necessarily further the argument. These reasons are, after all, entirely

[794] Gabba (1976) 70-89. See also Brunt (1988) 127 for an analysis of Gabba's work.
[795] *ORF* 32.3: *si Latinis civitatem dederitis, credo, existimatis vos ita, ut nunc constitistis, in contione habituros locum aut ludis et festis dies interfuturos. nonne illos omnia occupaturos putatis?*
[796] Kendall (2013) 91-137. Some of Kendall's list of reasons are quite outdated. For instance, to demonstrate that the allies wished to be enfranchised because they had adopted a Roman way of life, he claims (131-2) that Romans and the *socii* could not be told apart since they had adopted Roman arms, language and customs after serving in the army. Yet a number of scholars, including Pfeilschifter (2007: 31), had previously refuted such a claim. Jehne (2006: 243-67) offers a more constructive analysis of the role the army played in the relationship between the Romans and the Italian allies.

speculative as Kendall himself is very much aware.[797] Scholars could likely identify more reasons for why the Italian allies might have desired Roman citizenship, though given the speculative nature of these reasons, I suspect these would not carry the argument nor end the counter-arguments of any scholarly debate. Nevertheless, it may prove useful to highlight some areas that are most relevant to my argument.

The greatest indication for the benefits of Roman citizenship could, perhaps, be seen while on service in the army since this was likely where the most interaction took place between citizens and non-citizens. After *tributum* was no longer collected due to the success of the Third Macedonian War,[798] the Romans no longer directly taxed their own citizens to fund Roman enterprises, namely the cost of military activities.[799] The cost of warfare from the point of view of the Romans was now largely funded by indemnities and the spoils from Corinth and Carthage. While the burden of funding wars had been lifted from the Roman people, it seems likely, as Kendall suggests, that the Italic communities still had to furnish their own troops through taxation.[800] The costs involved included not only the soldiers' pay but also necessities such as rations.[801] The local elites and the soldiers who served in the Roman armies were unlikely to have overlooked this double standard. The increasing cost of warfare due to prolonged service in outlying regions of the Mediterranean perhaps further exacerbated this difference.

Even while on service the punishments that could be legally imposed on Italian allies, but not Roman citizens, suggests the inferior nature of other statuses. The *leges Porciae*, two of which can be dated to the first decade of the second century while a third appears sometime between 150 and 138, provided Roman citizens with better conditions within the army.[802] While their precise provisions are unknown, they seem to have made it illegal to flog or, indeed, kill a Roman citizen while on service.[803] It was these laws that Verres unforgivingly ignored while serving as the governor of Sicily during the Late Republic.[804] We have evidence, though, that allies could be flogged and killed while on service. The flogging of Latins while on military

[797] Kendall (2013) 74.
[798] Plut. *Aem.* 38; Cic. *Off.* 2.76.
[799] Badian (1972: 62-3) rightly notes that Romans did continue to pay taxes in the form of manumission fees and customs dues, but these obviously were only paid by those to whom they applied.
[800] Kendall (2013) 95.
[801] Nicolet (1978: 1-7) has demonstrated that the *stipendium* of the allies came from their own treasuries, not the Roman treasury.
[802] Goldberg (2015: 148-50) provides a recent discussion on the dating of these three laws.
[803] Kendall (2013) 111.
[804] Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.163. On these laws see also Sall. *Cat.* 51.21-2.

service lasted until at least 122 according to Plutarch's testimony.[805] However, no similar measure is known to us concerning the flogging of the wider Italian allies, nor concerning capital punishment. Indeed, the evidence would seem to indicate that capital punishment for non-Romans continued up until the Social War. Valerius Maximus records that both Scipio Aemilianus and L. Aemilius Paulus had killed non-Roman deserters for entertainment by throwing them into the path of wild animals.[806] During the Jugurthine War, Metellus after recapturing the town of Vega had the only surviving member of its garrison, a certain Turpilius Silanus, executed specifically, Sallust tells us, because he was only a Latin citizen and not a Roman.[807] Therefore, in the case of punishments while undertaking military service, there was a clear advantage for being a Roman citizen.

The inhabitants of the Italic communities also seem to have been at a disadvantage compared to their Roman counterparts during the recruitment phase of their service. Roman citizens were regularly able to avoid military service altogether or at least had the capacity to object to their conscription. I have already outlined above how the tribunes of the plebs had often defended individuals, including their friends, from conscription.[808] It should be said here, however, that this service would not have been open to those from the Italic communities. The tribunes of the plebs, of course, were only obliged to protect the rights of the Roman plebeians. Furthermore, it seems increasingly the case that for much of the second century the decline in the census number was a result of underrepresentation.[809] The most logical reason for this phenomenon is that Roman men did not wish to present themselves to the censor, since doing so would have made them liable for service.[810] Indeed, Polybius claims that many young men had avoided service just after the onset of the Spanish Wars in the late 150s by alleging what he views as disgraceful excuses.[811] Although not enrolling in the census meant also giving up

[805] Plut. *C. Gracch.* 9. In 122, M. Drusus the Elder proposed a law ending this practice, though it is not known whether the measure was approved. Dart (2010: 101) is of the opinion that it was not.
[806] Val. Max. 2.7.13-4. Here *exterarum gentium transfugas* likely refers to mainly Italian allies since Valerius suggests that Aemilianus had killed the same type of men (*eiusdem generis homines*) as Paulus had done previously. Since Rome did not have African allies during the Third Macedonian War, the Italian allies may have made up a majority of the deserters.
[807] Sall. *Iug*. 66-9.
[808] E.g. Livy 34.56.9-11, 42.32.7-8. See also Vishnia (1996) 150.
[809] De Ligt (2004: 754) offers a recent detailed treatment of the topic.
[810] Roselaar (2010) 227-8.
[811] Polyb. 35.4.3-6.

a vote in the assemblies, not having to serve in unfavourable wars, such as those in the Iberian Peninsula, likely made this concession bearable.[812]

It seems very unlikely that the inhabitants of the Italic communities would have been able to avoid military service in any similar fashion. This is not to say that it was impossible. The *Lex Repetundarum* confers to the victor of a trial the right of *uacatio* if he was a *peregrinus* and did not wish to receive Roman citizenship.[813] Evidently, the Romans themselves could grant an individual from an Italic community the ability to avoid military service. It does also seem possible for an Italic community itself to award exemption for military service to one of its own citizens. An inscription has survived at Aletrium publicising that the local senate had bestowed a number of awards on the architect L. Betilienus Varus sometime between 135 and 90, including military exemption for his son.[814] I suspect, though, that exemptions of this sort were quite rare since the likely central concern of the Italic communities was to fill their quota for the *formula togatorum* in order to avoid any potential repercussions.

Even when it came to the proportion of plunder distributed among the soldiers, Italian allies seem to have been at a disadvantage. While they did generally acquire these spoils in an equal manner, the total amount of *praeda* shared between the Romans and the Italian allies was ultimately determined by the holder of *imperium*.[815] Some spoils seized throughout a military campaign by the an army's commander, a Roman citizen, could be reserved as *manubiae* to be deposited directly into the Roman treasury where it was, for instance, set aside for the construction of temples promised to the appropriate divinity during battle.[816] On the other hand, a commander might simply choose to enrich himself with this particular type of spoil.[817] This would, of course, mean that the division of the total spoils shared between the Romans and their allies were probably never truly equal.

---

[812] This also assumes that these individuals were in a position to regularly partake in the voting process. If they were not, then they were unlikely to have valued their vote in the first place.
[813] Lines 78-9. See Crawford (1996) 74.
[814] *CIL* I^2 1529.
[815] Kendall (2013) 114-6. An account of the procedure of the allocation of spoils can be found at Polyb. 10.16.
[816] Churchill (1999) 93. *Manubiae* differed from other types of spoil in that these were spoils won through surrender or some form of settlement rather than through military victory. The commander's skill rather than that of his troops secured this type of spoil. Accordingly, he had greater authority over it. It was not a requirement that this type of spoil be deposited in the treasury. There seems to have been some consensus, though, that 'good' commanders did this.
[817] Churchill (1999) 95. Valerius Maximus (4.3.13), Cicero (*Off.* 2.76-7), and Dionysius (*Ant. Rom.* 19.16.3-4) all praise commanders for not enriching themselves in this fashion. Such praise implies that there were many who did enrich themselves in this way. Indeed, Cicero (*Verr.* 2.3.9) accuses Verres of adorning his own house specifically with *manubiae*.

The second area in which a non-Roman may have felt at a disadvantage to a Roman citizen is in the economic sphere. The Italian *negotiatores* were not eligible to apply for public contracts.[818] This is perhaps best attributed to the likelihood that many public contracts could only be transferred through *mancipatio*. Polybius hints at this possibility when he claims that some lessees of these contracts had offered their property as a form of security.[819] An inscription from Puteoli dating to the late first century for the construction of a wall confirms this practice.[820] Since land was *res mancipi*, the purchaser would either have to be a Roman citizen or hold the right of *commercium.*[821] I am inclined to agree with the recent work of Roselaar, who seems to have shown that the *socii* in general did not possess the right of *commercium*.[822] As such, the Romans would have almost exclusively dominated the purchasing of these contracts. The incapacity to bid for these contracts would have only become more disheartening as the frequency of these contracts increased after 187.[823] The great profits procured through military contracts and the highly sought-after contracts permitting the collection of taxes in the *provinciae*, of course, only continued to increase at the very end of the second century.

While the discussion on the Italian allies' reasons for desiring citizenship is entirely speculative as Kendall suggests,[824] there is enough surviving evidence from contemporary, or near contemporary writers, to confirm that there was such a desire at least among some allies.[825] For the reasons stated throughout this section and those that precede it, many allies would have likely desired Roman citizenship. The reason for this desire, or non-desire, was perhaps quite varied depending on the particular individual's circumstances. Enfranchisement would have given the inhabitants of the Italic communities, namely the elites, a greater capacity to pursue their own interests by giving them some say in the policies of the empire, although it is quite possible that some wished for citizenship with an eye to more immediate practical purposes such as the peace of mind that they could gain protections against harsh commanders and magistrates. For Mouritsen to disregard their desire for citizenship as a later invention, he must

[818] Brunt (1988) 127. Polybius (6.17) ambitiously claims that there was not a single citizen (i.e. Roman citizen) who was not involved in these contracts.
[819] Polyb. 6.17.
[820] *CIL* I^2 524–6. See Du Plessis (2004) 291-5 for this case and a discussion of the use of land as a security.
[821] Gai. *Inst.* 2.14-7. See also Roselaar (2012) 392 n. 50 on the rights required to create an obligation in Roman law.
[822] Roselaar (2012) 409-10. Contra, for instance, Luraschi (1979) 261-5 and Kremer (2007) 13-4.
[823] Du Plessis (2004) 290.
[824] Kendall (2013) 74.
[825] Pobjoy (2000a: 193-4) and Keaveney (2005: 81-7), who both argue that the Social War was in essence a revolt against Rome, claim that there was some desire among the Italian allies from Roman citizenship.

either actively ignore their testimony or assume deliberate manipulation of the historical 'facts'.[826] His argument relies on the possibility that writers of the late Republic and early Empire have incorporated a pre-Social War desire for Roman citizenship into their accounts because this was a more acceptable motive to both Romans and those Italian allies who, as new Roman citizens, now sought political office.[827]

There are, however, a number of issues arising from this argument. Firstly, Bispham seems right to question that if the Italian allies had not fought for citizenship, why it would make more sense to an imperial writer and his audience that they had.[828] While fighting a war against a former ally in order to acquire its citizenship, does at first glance seem counter-intuitive, it is unlikely that Romans of the late Republic, many of whom would have served in the Social War or had relatives who did, would have reacted favourably to the portrayal of a fabricated motive. This being the case, I suspect a contemporary writer would never have devised such an account. Secondly, Rome's historical record freely records revolts for independence even of communities with close ties to Rome in the first century BCE and later. The revolt of Capua and other Campanian communities during the Second Punic War may be the most famous of these. This naturally prompts the question that if a late Republican or an imperial audience found these revolts so unacceptable in the way that Mouritsen suggests, why would their historical narratives not have been altered in a similar way. The likes of L. Fufidius, elected praetor in the late second or early first century, would likely have had to deal with similar prejudices, yet no attempt to palliate their motive for revolt has ever been identified in the sources.[829]

Nevertheless, we should perhaps follow the lead of Dench and be open to the possibility of divergent aims being possessed by those involved in the Social War.[830] The aims of certain groups, as Kendall rightly argues, may have changed depending on the amount of success that

[826] Mouritsen (1998) 125-7. He is forced to overlook the key contemporaneous accounts of Cicero (*Phil.* 12.27), Diodorus Siculus (37.2.2) as well as Justin (38.4.13) who epitomised the work of Livy's near contemporary, Pompeius Trogus. Mouritsen's evaluation of Appian seems particularly harsh. He claims (131-3) that Appian has deliberately rearranged the chronology of the Social War's outbreak in order to establish and reinforce his own leitmotif.
[827] Mouritsen (1998) 7-10.
[828] Bispham (2016) 84.
[829] Wiseman (1971: 232) tentatively gives Fufidius' place of origin as Campania, though he acknowledges that Arpinium is another possibility. Wiseman (1971: 186) also supplies a list of further senators originating from Campania.
[830] Dench (2005) 129.

they were experiencing at a certain time.[831] The initial success the Italian rebels enjoyed at the outset of the war likely meant they sought more advantageous terms from the Romans. These perhaps subsided when the Roman side gained dominance and outright victory for their opponents seemed increasingly unlikely. An element of the Italian rebels may have at all times sought to overthrow the Romans. Such an element may have been behind the iconic coins depicting the Italian bull goring the Roman wolf.[832] However, I find it unlikely that these coins represent the sole intentions of the entire movement but rather an element within it.[833] The possible existence of divergent and changing aims ultimately means that the supposed dichotomy identifying the Social War either as a fight for citizenship or a revolt against Roman dominion simply did not exist.[834]

5.5 – Conclusion

Due to the rise of often competing pressure groups in Rome's domestic politics during the late second century, the Roman franchise had become highly valuable both on account of its political value and its practical benefits. Other statuses simply did not offer the same advantages to their holders. The Roman franchise gave more Romans the opportunity to pursue their own interests to a greater extent. Consequently, the legislation passed in the Roman assemblies tended to enact policies of a distinct Romano-centric character as each of the three pressure groups sought to fulfil their own interests. The Gracchan programme was the most prominent of those policies produced in these circumstances. Moreover, it is evident from this example that Roman-focused policies could have a negative effect on the inhabitants of Italic communities, even if this was largely unintended.

The changes in Rome's political sphere did also mean that the local elites of the Italic communities could no longer rely solely on the traditional mechanism of appealing to the senatorial elites to fulfil their interests. Other pressure groups, particularly the common people and the *equites*, could now more easily inhibit the activities and policies of the senatorial elites. As a result, the process that the Italian allies usually used to canvass for support of their interests

[831] Kendall (2013) 231-3. Isaac (1990: 378) also offers a useful discussion on the difficulties associated in identifying the particular aims of communities.
[832] *BMCRR* 2.327.
[833] This is the claim of Mouritsen (1998: 141). Tataranni (2005: 291-304) and Tweedie (2008: 67-71) offers the most recent detailed discussion on the meaning of these coins.
[834] As noted recently by Ridley (2003: 52) and Harris (2016: 32). Wallace-Hadrill (2008: 81) also raises the valid point that the modern debate likely reflects how unclear the issues were for even the participants themselves.

became more volatile and likely led to some elites attempting other means of achieving this aim. The proposed enfranchisement legislation did after all come from *populares* rather than the senatorial elite. The volatility of domestic politics at Rome at the end of the second century, however, likely made any alternative approach rather ineffectual. A more permanent and direct solution was needed.

THE SOCIAL WAR

6.0 – Introduction

Now that I have established the likelihood that Roman citizenship was a major interest of the Italic communities in the late second century, I will deduce the likely chronology of events in the lead up to the Social War. First and foremost, I will explore the possible reasons for the thirty-year period between the citizenship proposals of the 120s and 90s. Interests other than gaining Roman citizenship were likely more prominent during this period, sidelining the issue altogether. The Italian allies would have likely seen the benefit of united effort against the Cimbrian forces that threatened the Italian Peninsula itself in the late second century. Furthermore, the Jugurthine War offered the Italian allies more material benefits than the long conflicts of the Spanish Wars that had dominated Rome's military effort for the previous generation. This conflict too may have acted as something of a distraction.

I also seek to explain why our sources offer two seemingly contradictory accounts of the suddenness of the war's occurrence. Both Appian and Plutarch explicitly suggest an abrupt and unexpected outbreak,[835] while Velleius Paterculus claims that the war had been some time in the making.[836] These two accounts can be reconciled with each other if we consider the wider chronology of the citizenship issue that arose in the 90s. It is a combination of these two factors, the fulfilment of other interests and a drawn-out campaign for citizenship during the 90s, which further explains the interlude between the citizenship proposals of the Gracchan period and the one introduced by M. Livius Drusus in 91.

Once this chronology is established, I will be in a position to explain how we might conceptualise the Social War as a conflict over citizenship. A straightforward conflict over citizenship seems counterintuitive to the pursuit of self-interest at a fundamental level. Pobjoy seems correct to question the rationale behind fighting the Romans for their citizenship when doing so would not only weaken the overall strength of the people with whom the Italian rebels

[835] App. *B Civ*. 1.34; Plut. *Mar*. 32. Livy's epitomist (*Per*. 71) and Diodorus Siculus (37.2.2) too seem to imply that the Italian rebels planned for war within a few months, if not weeks, of Drusus' failure to secure citizenship for them.

[836] Vell. Pat. 2.15.1. Asconius (*Corn.* 68), of course, famously identified the *lex Licinia Mucia* of 95 as a major cause of the war. Florus (2.18.8) claims that the first move of the rebel's campaign had been an attempt to assassinate the consuls during the *Feriae Latinae*. This would place the planning of the campaign several months before the failure of Drusus' legislative programme.

wished to share an empire, but also devalue the very thing they desired.[837] Given the prominence of the citizenship issue as the prime motive of the Italian rebels in the sources, we should not rule out this motivation simply because it seems irrational.[838] Wars are not always rational in hindsight. This is to say that those partaking in military conflicts do not always have the aim of attaining a tangible benefit of some sort. Instead, some wars seem more a product of volatile circumstances.

The First World War is probably the most prominent example of such a war. It would prove difficult to extrapolate the occurrence of the First World War from the diplomatic issues of 1914 between Austria-Hungary and Serbia following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand if the sources for this conflict were as meagre as those of the Social War. Rendering the *casus belli* of all wars as a simple matter of motives and aims of one or more participants can drastically oversimplify the relevant circumstances. The outbreak of the First World War was rather the product of individual participants' miscalculations leading to further consequences over the space of several weeks.[839] In this way, a localised dispute escalated into a continental war. It is possible that a series of similar miscalculations occurred prior to the Social War. Indeed, several sources hint at such circumstances.[840] The state of the sources, though, does not allow us to grasp completely the complexity of the situation without some speculation. I will offer a reconstruction to the outbreak of the Social War in which these miscalculations are more central to the opening of hostilities, yet the citizenship issue will remain at the heart of the conflict in my analysis.

6.1 – An Interlude

The conventional explanation for the interlude between the two enfranchisement programmes of 122 and 91 is that the *ius adipiscendae civitatis Romanae per magistratum* had quelled the

[837] Pobjoy (2000a) 190-3.
[838] Eckstein (1987: xviii) stresses the tendency of modern historians to 'over organise reality by seeing (or creating) order and coherence where none, in fact, may exist'. This is done in order to make their subjects more intelligible to themselves and their audience. There is some risk, then, that viewing the Social War as a straightforward rebellion oversimplifies the subject, but is preferable due to the reconstruction's comprehensibility to a modern audience.
[839] Mulligan (2010: 209-26) offers a recent treatment of the origins of the First World War. Particularly prominent among these miscalculations and consequences of the July Crisis of 1914 were Austria-Hungary's rejection of a Serbia's comprise to their ultimatum; Germany's belief that, if they backed Austria-Hungary, Russia would not enter the war; and France's and Britain's decision to follow Russia into the war.
[840] I refer here to the Senate's rejection of the Italian embassy without first having heard their appeals following the massacre of Roman citizens at Asculum (App. *B Civ.* 1.39).

concerns of the local elites and satisfied them for the time being.[841] However, my own reconstruction of this right does not easily allow for such a reading.[842] Given the local elites' concerns about what holding Roman citizenship meant if they wished to continue to serve their local Italic communities, these individuals may have doubted the efficacy of this legislation as a means for the acquisition of Roman citizenship. Consequently, I doubt this concession could explain the interlude. Another explanation is needed.

To address this issue, it is worthwhile remembering that interests themselves can be varied and change depending on circumstances. I have already related how the introduction of Carthaginian forces into the Italian Peninsula during the last quarter of the third century allowed for the Capuans to seek better conditions for themselves with Carthage in the event that Hannibal overthrew Rome's hegemony.[843] Had this not happened, Capua would likely not have chosen to pursue this interest in the way that it had. The change of circumstances had allowed Capua to pursue this particular interest over others.[844] Bearing these things in mind, perhaps the circumstances of the late 130s and 120s partially enabled Italian allies to consider the prospects of attaining citizenship for themselves. Other than the campaign against Eumenes in distant Asia, conflicts of this time period were minor. This relative calm may have created a sense of idleness which may have in turn provided an environment disposed to socio-political reassessment.[845] These circumstances though were always liable to change. It is quite possible that a new set of circumstances forced the Italian allies to re-evaluate their priorities. This process may have removed citizenship from the top of their interest list.

In the past, a number of scholars have made some suggestions regarding what circumstance may have prompted such a change in priorities. Nicolet hypothesises that the Romans kept the Italian allies quiet by allowing them to colonise Africa and Cisalpine Gaul.[846] I do not find this suggestion to be entirely convincing. Not only does the use of colonisation programmes further exacerbate the issue of depleted manpower resources, but it also seems likely that the Italian allies might not have been the intended target of the legislation. Appian's use of 'Ιταλιῶται' in

[841] E.g. Keaveney (2005) 84-5; Brunt (1988) 97; Salmon (1967) 334; Badian (1958) 179-80. Elsewhere Badian (1968: 53) suggests the silence is also in part a product of the nature and interests of our ancient sources.
[842] See Chapter 3.1.
[843] See Chapter 3.1.
[844] Without the Carthaginian threat to Rome, Capua's main interest might otherwise have been to preserve as much independence as possible under a Roman hegemony. This was, as Baronowski (2011: 79-85) argues, Polybius' main suggestion to those that found themselves living under Roman leadership.
[845] Livy *Per*. 59-61. The only other conflicts mentioned in this period were against the Gallic Sardi and Salluvii.
[846] Nicolet (1980) 40.

this context can only refer to rural citizens since it was the same 'Ιταλιῶται', in contrast to the urban population, who helped Saturninus to the pass his law in the assembly by vote.[847] These people clearly already possessed Roman citizenship. This being the case, these programmes are unlikely to have distracted the Italian allies enough from their desire for Roman citizenship to account for the thirty-year interval between legislative programmes.

I suspect also that such a reprioritisation of interests would not have been the result of a single issue but rather a combination. There is need, then, to identify a number of issues that affected the Italic communities between the 120s and Drusus' legislative programme of 91.

The first of these issues, and perhaps the least significant, may be the suppression of a number of slave revolts in 104. Diodorus records that in this year slave revolts occurred at Nuceria, and two in the vicinity of Capua.[848] He suggests that the most serious of these eventually raised as many as three thousand five hundred men.[849] The suppression of these revolts, much like those of earlier times, does demonstrate the possible positive aspects of a Roman hegemony. Rome's claim to the leadership of the Italian Peninsula continued to rely on its capacity to solve these sorts of problems. The suppression of the slave revolts likely reinforced the Roman alliances.

The very serious campaigns against various Gallic and Germanic tribes (most prominently the Cimbri) were likely another factor in the reprioritisation of the Italic communities' interests during this period. From 113 until 101, the Romans and their Italian allies fought off the immense threat that these invading forces posed to the whole Italian Peninsula. The numbers recorded in the sources mainly of those killed and captured attest to the force's threat to many Italic communities, including Rome itself. Livy's epitomist, citing Valerius Antias, claims that after the Battle of Arausio in 105, the Cimbri had killed eighty thousand soldiers and forty thousand camp followers, including a current and former consul.[850] Furthermore, Plutarch suggests that their cavalry alone numbered fifteen thousand, while a total of sixty thousand troops were taken prisoner at the conclusion of the final battle at Vercellae.[851] Livy gives the

[847] App. *B Civ*. 1.29-31. Here, Appian claims that Saturninus sent out messengers to the rural areas prior to the *comitia*. The confidence Saturninus placed in these men would be best ascribed to the loyalty they might demonstrate when voting. Moreover, Crawford (2014: 373-4) warns modern scholars against assuming ancient authors were capable of using consistent terminology at all times. This seems particular important in this case since inscriptions (*ILLRP* 369, 370, 374, 376) even after the Social War attest to both Romans and Italian allies using Ἰταλικοὶ to describe themselves in the *provinciae*.
[848] Diod. Sic. 36.2.1.
[849] Diod. Sic. 36.2.5. The Roman Senate deemed this particular insurrection serious enough to send a praetor with four thousand troops.
[850] Livy *Per.* 67.
[851] Plut. *Mar.* 25-7.

final casualty list of the same battle as one hundred and forty thousand deaths with the same number of captives as reported by Plutarch.[852] In another two battles that had preceded this final victory, he gives the total of two hundred thousand killed and ninety thousand captured.[853] Putting aside the issue of numerical accuracy, there is little doubting that protection against these raids would have been a key interest of the Italic communities during the last decade of the second century.

Mouritsen has in the past challenged the degree to which protection against these external threats can really be attributed as an interest of the Italic communities themselves. He is correct in pointing out that in practice, the Romans' defence of the Italian Peninsula was in its own self-interest and that the same motivation drove the Italian allies, who contributed the majority of troops in these conflicts, but his cynicism in this context seems misplaced.[854] In the case of the Cimbrian War, the collective effort of the Roman alliance served the interests of everyone involved. It may be idealistic to describe Rome as the facilitator of this cooperation and the protector of the Italian Peninsula, but on the other hand, such cooperation was usually the basis of ancient alliances.[855] Given the strength of the invading Gallic and Germanic forces, without this cooperation there would have been a great risk that the invaders may have destroyed many of the Italic communities. As such, the Italian allies themselves likely recognised the necessity of a strong alliance with the Romans at this time in order to overcome the invading forces. Defeating this threat was perhaps their most important interest in these circumstances. Consequently, the issue of citizenship would not have been in the forefront of the minds of those allies who had previously desired enfranchisement.

The wars of the last decade of the second century were not purely defensive affairs similar to the Cimbrian war; others also yielded a significant amount of profit. This was important for the Italic alliances since the profits procured through fighting wars were no longer the major form of revenue in the decades prior to the Gracchan period, yet only this form was shared with the Italian allies.[856] The Jugurthine War is at times even portrayed as a conflict specifically aimed

[852] Livy. *Per.* 68.
[853] Ibid. Velleius Paterculus (2.12.4) also suggests a similar number.
[854] Mouritsen (1998) 43.
[855] See my discussion in Chapter 1.3. There is no doubt that the Romans had come into a position to dictate the terms on their alliances after the Second Punic War, but even this position does not remove them entirely from the basic requirements of alliance membership.
[856] See Chapter 4.3.

at the maximisation of plunder.[857] During this war, if the account of Sallust is to be believed, C. Marius specifically engaged in the strategic looting during the final year of the war in order to bind the loyalty of new troops to himself.[858] In the years preceding this, Sallust also suggests that Marius' predecessor Metellus had told his soldiers to look forward to acquiring vast amounts of spoils once they had completed the easy task of defeating their enemy.[859] The soldiers themselves purportedly often took to plundering even while forming camp:

> Camp followers and soldiers ranged about in company day and night, and in their forays laid waste the country, stormed farmhouses, and vied with one another in amassing booty in the form of cattle and slaves, which they bartered with the traders for foreign wine and other luxuries.[860]

In all, this evidence would suggest then that the campaign was particularly focused around the issue of spoils and the maximisation of profits. This would seem to be further confirmed in light of the bribes that were associated with the various favourable outcomes for Jugurtha in the Roman Senate, and particularly with L. Calpurnius Bestia in 110.[861] Although we cannot directly identify members of the Italian allies partaking in these looting practices, there appears to be little reason to restrict this practice to the Romans alone.

The return to wars yielding large quantities of spoils would have had a positive impact on Roman alliances with the Italic communities. I have previously noted that Rome had transferred most of its income from the profits raised through the spoils of war to a tribute based taxation system.[862] For individual members of Italian communities, though, aside from those with business ties throughout the wider Mediterranean, these spoils would have still been

[857] Plutarch (*Mar*. 12) records that Marius' triumphal procession at the end of the war carried with it over three thousand pounds of gold and over five thousand pounds of silver. Frank (1933: 264) calculates that the war yielded 'only some 3,000 talents' for the Roman treasury, which is significantly less than acquired in Corinth's destruction, but we should keep in mind that some booty was probably already distributed among the soldiers. Indeed, Strabo (4.1.13) preserves an account of Q. Servilius Caepio's capture of Tolosa in 105 from Poseidonius suggesting that all fifteen thousand talents plundered from this city was already distributed among the soldiers. Elsewhere, Orosius (5.15.25) ambitiously claims that a hundred thousand pounds of gold and a hundred and ten thousand pounds of silver were plundered from Tolosa.
[858] Sall. *Iug.* 87.1.
[859] Sall. *Iug.* 54.1.
[860] Sall. *Iug*. 44.5 (trans. Rolfe, 1980). This section, however, seems to be heavily influenced by Sallust's view that avarice was a sign of ill-discipline and corrupt character. This leitmotif has likely influenced his portrayal of the regularity and character of this plundering. The sack of Vaga (69.2-4) too seems to have this same influence.
[861] Sall. *Iug*. 13.6-8; 16.1-2; 29.1-3.
[862] See Chapter 4.3.

a major form of income.[863] The 130s and 120s had been a lean period for profitable wars, so the wars of the 110s no doubt came as something of a relief to the Italian allies. It would seem wrong to deny that the acquisition of these spoils continued to be an important interest of the Italic communities. By engaging in these wars, or rather by being successful in these wars and acquiring the financial benefits associated with being the victor, the interests of the Italic communities' inhabitants were being satisfied. These events would have reinforced the Roman alliance.

In light of what I have said above, there may be some truth to Momigliano's claim that the Italian allies needed to be kept busy.[864] However, he reasons that if the Romans did not make use of the military obligations established within their agreements then the Italian alliances themselves would become meaningless.[865] This would seem to suggest that many campaigns amounted to little more than a distraction aimed at diverting the gaze of those in the Italic communities away from the reality of their situation. Moreover, such a hypothesis would imply Roman military superiority could be challenged if only the Italian allies had the time to organise a collective response. The problem with such an image, though, is that military contributions were arguably the most contentious issue concerning the Italic communities' involvement in the Roman alliance.[866] I would suspect that military contributions associated with larger campaigns, particularly the unprofitable sort like those on the Iberian Peninsula, would in fact highlight the problems associated with their position in regard to the Roman alliance rather than disguise it. It is, therefore, hard to conceive the continued use of allied troops as a form of distraction in the way that Momigliano does.

While the regularity of Rome's wars was not necessarily about distracting its allies, a more attractive view might be that warfare 'busied' allies, to use Momigliano's terminology, through the temptation of further profits in some cases, and the fulfilment of interests in others. In this way, we might overcome the issues associated with the unpopularity of campaigns that yielded

[863] Crawford (2014: 374) surmises that he 'finds it hard to avoid the conclusion that the *Italici* of Delos were in origin Roman citizens living outside Rome'. In other words, many of the 'Italians' found in inscriptions throughout the Mediterranean may in fact be Romans. If he is correct, then the availability of a means for profiting from Rome's wider empire for the Italian allies would be reduced far beyond the level that is usually believed.
[864] Momigliano (1975) 45-6. Polybius (32.13.6-7) suggests that a reason for the Romans pursuing a war against the Dalmatians in 156 was that 'they did not at all wish the Italians to become effeminate owing to the long peace, it being now twelve years since the war with Perseus and their campaigns in Macedonia' (trans. Paton, 1954).
[865] Momigliano (1975) 45. He also claims that by keeping the Italian allies busy, the Romans reduced the risk of them using their manpower against Rome.
[866] Seen in, for example, the treatment of the twelve Latin colonies who refused to supply troops during the Second Punic War (Livy 29.15.2–10) and concerns for migration of individuals away from their native communities in 177 (Livy 41.8.7-8).

little in the way of spoils. Profitable campaigns provided the Italians allies with the means to secure their material interests, both individually and as a community. The Italian allies likely believed that the best way to secure these material interests was to continue to remain compliant to the Roman alliance and connected to the Romans' wider empire.

Other forms of campaigns, such as the Cimbrian War, were clearly wars of self-defence, though for the Romans and the inhabitants of the Italic communities, these sorts of wars were increasingly rare in the late second century. These wars too likely had the capacity to 'distract' from the question of their position in relation to the Roman alliance. It would seem, then, that warfare both of the profitable type and that fought in self-defence did indirectly 'busy' the Italian allies.

Once these particular interests had lost their effect on the Italic communities, the issue of the Italic allies' position within the Roman empire may have returned. Consequently, the desire for Roman citizenship would have also regained its former prominence in the minds of the allies. The Cimbrian War had ended in 101, while the Jugurthine War came to an end five years prior to this. Any alternative interests that were secured through these military campaigns would now have been removed from consideration. At this point many inhabitants of the Italic communities probably began to reconsider acquiring Roman citizenship in order to pursue further interests.

6.2 – Roman Citizenship and the Italian Allies in the 90s

Before delving too deeply into the chronology of the 90s, there are a few key events involving the Italian allies and the issue of Roman citizenship to keep in mind. These three events will later form the basis for analysing the decade as a whole. Firstly, Marius enfranchised two cohorts from Camerinum in 100 due to their courage on the battlefield.[867] Plutarch suggests that this was as many as a thousand men.[868] Indeed, Marius seems to have given out these grants quite freely to individuals. Cicero also identifies two individuals from Iguvium and Spoletium as recipients of citizenship from Marius, though his argument certainly implies there

[867] Cic. *Balb.* 46; Plut. *Mar.* 28: Val. Max 5.2.8. Each of these writers note that this action was illegal though only, it would seem, following the annulment of Saturninus' law concerning grants of citizenship to colonists (Cic. *Balb.* 48). Since this annulment was applied retrospectively, Marius' citizenship grants have a questionable character.

[868] Plut. *Mar.* 28. Plutarch does suggest that Marius had enfranchised only a single cohort while both Valerius Maximus (5.2.8) and Cicero (*Balb.* 46) claim two.

were many more.[869] Secondly, the consuls of 95 introduced the *lex Licinia Mucia* to remove from the citizenship those inhabitants of the Italic communities who had been illegally posing as Roman citizens.[870] This legislation must have incited a great deal of animosity between the Romans and their allies. It is perhaps unsurprising that Asconius described the introduction of *lex Licinia Mucia* as the greatest cause of the Social War.[871] Lastly, M. Livius Drusus' proposed enfranchisement legislation failed to be ratified in 91.[872]

Tweedie has demonstrated that it is possible to link these three important events together if we consider them in conjunction with the censuses of 97 and 92.[873] At the same time, her reconstruction allows for the possibility that, although many of the Italian allies had a strong desire for Roman citizenship, they were prepared to wait several years for a solution to this issue.

If Badian is correct that the censors of 97, M. Antonius and L. Flaccus, were Marian supporters, then these men may have enrolled a number of allies to support Marius' *factio*.[874] These new citizens would have included the two cohorts from Camerium and any other individual upon whom Marius had 'illegally' bestowed Roman citizenship. The newly enfranchised men, now possessing the ability to vote and determine the passage or failure of legislation and the success of candidates, would have presumably supported Marius in his endeavours. However, in 95 the anti-Marian consuls, L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola, removed those foreigners who had been enrolled as citizens by means of the *lex Licinia Mucia*.[875] By introducing this measure, Marius' political opponents were ensuring their own political interests. Marius' disenfranchised supporters would no longer have been able to influence the passage of legislation or the election of magistrates. This would have allowed his political opponents a

[869] Cic. *Balb.* 46-8.
[870] Asc. *Corn.* 67-8; Cic. *Off.* 3.47; *Sest.* 30. Tweedie (2012: 125) is right to stress that this was not an expulsion law. Those removed from the citizenship could still presumably reside at Rome. The apparent largeness of the *quaestio* set up in response to the laws' introduction suggests that Marius had been quite active in granting citizenship to the inhabitants of the Italic communities. See Lomas (1996) 83. For an alternative view see Tweedie (2012) 130.
[871] Asc. *Corn.* 67-8.
[872] The sources for Drusus' tribunate are quite numerous: App. *B Civ.* 1.35-7; Diod. Sic. 37.10.1-3; Livy *Per.* 70-1; Vell. Pat. 2.13.1-14.3; [Aur. Vict.] *De Vir. Ill.* 66.11. There is, as will become evident below, no accepted chronology for his legislative programme. This does make evaluating his role in the origin of the Social War open to debate.
[873] Tweedie (2012) 123-39.
[874] Badian (1964) 48. Wulff Alonso (1991: 299-304) also makes this same point. The key census figures of 97 are unfortunately missing. These may have revealed an increase in the number of citizens which might have in turn implied that a number of Italian allies had been enfranchised prior to 97.
[875] Badian (1958) 213-4 and (1964) 47-9. Tweedie (2012: 128) claims that this law is in essence a piece of anti-Marian legislation.

better playing field on which they had a greater opportunity to secure their own prominence and legislative programmes.

While not the same variety of political conflict as the type I have previously stressed, the internal divisions of domestic Roman politics once again affected the Italian allies. This sort of division, which occurred within the pressure groups, undermined the relationship between the Romans and the inhabitants of the Italic communities in the same way as the division among the pressure groups.[876] The often-conflicting interests of these divisions too came to spill over into foreign policy. The pro-Marian party wished to grant citizenship to the Italian allies in order to enlarge it voting base. Conversely, it was in the interests of their opponents for their own political aspirations that they did not let this enfranchisement programme succeed. For this reason, Badian may indeed be correct to claim that the enfranchisement of the Italian allies became a 'play-thing' of Rome's domestic politics.[877]

The introduction of the *lex Licinia Mucia* was, according to Tweedie's reconstruction, not the end of the issue for the Italian allies. She supposes that those who did gain Roman citizenship at the beginning of the decade but were later disenfranchised in 95 were awaiting the census of 92 where they would reassert their claim to the censors.[878] As one of the censors of the year, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was, it would seem, a Marian supporter, those that had been removed from the citizenship perhaps had a great deal of hope that they would be returned to the lists of citizens in 92.[879] It is clear, however, that this had not happened. His colleague was Crassus, the former consul of 95, with whom he was increasingly at odds.[880] How much the abdication of both the censors in this year affected the procedure of the census is not known.[881] Yet the need for this action does perhaps demonstrate the significance of the census and the citizens lists in 92.

It is perhaps after this census failed to resolve the issue that Pompaedius Silo, according to Diodorus, marched on Rome in 91 to demand citizenship with ten thousand men described as

[876] For this reason, it is best not to overstress the unity and likeness of aims within particular pressure groups or socio-economic classes. For instance, contrary to Gabba's claim (1976: 85-6), I do not see why the *equites* would have looked after the interests of the Italian *negotiatores* within the Roman political scene.
[877] Badian (1964) 58.
[878] Tweedie (2012) 135-8.
[879] Rowland (1967) 185-6.
[880] This is evident in Cic. *Brut.* 164-5. It is worthwhile noting that in this year there was a censorial edict made by Crassus and Domitius, which prohibited Latin rhetoricians from remaining at Rome. See Cic. *De Or.* 3.93-5; Gell. *NA* 15.11.2. Any connection between these events, however, would be highly conjectural.
[881] Broughton (1952) 17.

those most likely to fear judicial investigation.[882] I can only assume, like Brunt, that these men feared punishment under the *lex Licinia Mucia*.[883] It seems likely then that concern for this law and its subsequent prosecutions had renewed itself in 92.[884] Greater action, whether military or otherwise, might have been delayed by the otherwise unknown C. Domitius with an understanding that their concerns would be satisfied in the near future.[885] Drusus, who promised to campaign for their enrolment in 91, was seemingly the solution to their problem. Drusus' support of the enfranchisement of the Italian allies in the latter half of his tribunate might be used to place Silo's march prior to the enfranchisement proposals.[886] As will be discussed in greater detail below, the enfranchisement of the allies was not initially the focus of Drusus' political activity.

The choice of Drusus as the instigator of the enfranchisement programme at Rome may have been relatively straightforward. An agreement might have been reached as part of Drusus' association with Silo. According to the testimony of Plutarch, Silo had stayed at Drusus' house for a period of several days during 91 and is described as friend of Drusus.[887] At this meeting, Silo did supposedly raise the question of the Roman citizenship for the Italic communities.[888] Whatever their agreement, Drusus' legislative programme failed and he was eventually murdered.[889] This seems to have ended the more diplomatic approach to acquiring Roman citizenship.

---

[882] Diod. Sic. 37.13.1: Μυρίους γὰρ ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τῶν τὰς εὐθύνας φοβουμένων, ἔχοντας ὑπὸ τοῖς ἱματίοις ξίφη, προῆγεν ἐπὶ τῆς Ῥώμης. This march seems to have occurred during Drusus' tribunate, though it is unclear (Sampson [2013] 19). I would be inclined to place the episode prior to Drusus' attempted citizenship programme, since this would seem to be the more diplomatic solution that Domitius proposes to the Marsic leader (Diod. Sic. 37.13.1-2). This section, though, does clearly have a relationship with the riots in Asculum. In this passage, Diodorus contrasts Domitius' approach to that of Q. Servilius, but gives no temporal marker to identify the chronology of events. As a result, the episode is the subject of much debate. Indeed, there are scholars who doubt the historicity and value of this episode. See Mouritsen (1998) 124-5.

[883] Brunt (1988) 101. The only alternative law that this could refer to is the *lex Varia* which prosecuted those accused of assisting the Italian allies (App. *B Civ.* 1.37). This seems unlikely though since they were themselves considered allies. The law also dates from after the death of Drusus. It would require a significant change to chronology for such a reading to work. Cicero (*Off.* 2.75) in fact suggests that it is the fear of the law courts which stirred up the Social War. This too is the opinion of Badian (1970-1: 408). For the consequences of the courts' activity in the 90s see Gruen (1966) 32-64.

[884] Tweedie (2012) 138.

[885] Ibid. 138-9.

[886] Here I follow Dart (2014: 73) in preference to Keaveney (2005: 87-8) who claims that Drusus was from the outset of his tribunate concerned with the Italian allies' enfranchisement. Velleius Paterculus (2.14.1) was certainly of the opinion that Drusus' citizenship proposal came after his other legislative programmes. A fuller account of Drusus' tribunate is provided below.

[887] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 2

[888] Ibid.

[889] Vell. Pat. 2.15; App *B Civ*. 1.37; Livy *Per*. 71.

From this reconstructed narrative of the citizenship issue of the 90s, it is possible to see the outbreak of the Social War as either sudden or prolonged depending on what view is taken. If the outbreak is considered to have its origin in the introduction of the *lex Licinia Mucia* four years prior to the war, then the war seems sometime in the making. Equally, viewing the war as a consequence of Drusus' failure to secure citizenship from the inhabitants of the Italic communities in 91 would frame the outbreak of the war within a short timeframe. If Tweedie's reconstruction is correct, though, this topic is not as straightforward as it seems. The Italian allies were prepared to wait for a possible resolution prior to any form of conflict. It is possible that there were multiple *causa belli*. Indeed, the origins of war have often been discussed in terms of particular and general causes.[890] As such we might view the failure of Drusus' legislation as the *particular* cause of the Social War since it is the most immediate event preceding the beginning of the war. For this reason, it would also have likely been recorded and identified as the cause in the sources.[891] However, an observer might view the introduction of the *lex Licinia Mucia* as the part of the *general* cause of the Social War since it was this event that did most to undermine the Italian allies in regards to the citizenship issue and the pursuit of interests, which collectively formed the general cause of the Social War. Whether or not the war seemed sudden or prolonged would depend on the viewer. Both views have a degree of validity.

At this point a few words should be set aside for a discussion of Drusus' tribunate. Not only will this help elucidate how his legislative programmes failed to resolve the citizenship issue, but also how the divisions in Rome's domestic politics affected this outcome.

It has often been noted that Drusus' tribunate is a source of major debate.[892] This debate ultimately stems from the difficulty in pinning down Drusus' character and motivations. The ancient sources for their own part portray Drusus sometimes as the champion of the Senate,[893] but at other times also the common people,[894] or even the Italian allies.[895] Yet eventually, following his various enterprises, he was allegedly hated by each of the Roman pressure groups

[890] In, for instance, Kennedy (1986) 24-5. Polybius himself (3.6) speaks of three separate notions regarding the origins of wars: cause, pretext and beginning. In his account of the origin of the Second Punic War he identifies three different causes of the conflict (3.10).
[891] To use Kennedy's (1986: 25) example, the particular cause of a war is more likely going to be recorded in a diplomatic dispatch. In the same way, then, Drusus' failure to enfranchise the Italian allies is more likely to be recorded as the cause of the Social War than the desire of the Italic communities to greater pursue their interests.
[892] e.g. Brunt (1988) 106-7, 131-2; Mouritsen (1998) 129-51; Keaveney (2005) 87-92; Dart (2014) 69-97.
[893] Diod. Sic. 37.10.1; Livy *Per*. 71; Vell. Pat. 2.13.2; Flor. 2.17.4; Cic. *Cluent*. 153.
[894] Livy *Per*. 70; Flor. 2.17.6. In Val. Max. 9.5.2, he is at least anti-senatorial.
[895] App. *B Civ*. 1.36.

with the possible exception of the common people, if Appian is to be believed.[896] This is not the most solid base from which to judge his tribunate. Yet it would seem that Keaveney and Dart are correct to see this inconsistent character as an indication that he simply sought to satisfy the interests of all three pressure groups either simultaneously or at various points in time.[897]

This conclusion is hinted at in Appian's account of Drusus' tribunate.[898] The second century CE historian records that Drusus sought to sway the common people with the promise of colonial settlement.[899] Livy and Velleius Paterculus inform us this was only done to ensure their support for his wider legislative programmes that aimed to benefit the senatorial elite.[900] As a result of this support, he would champion the Senate by returning the law courts to their control, but, he must have surmised, this measure would only have been successful in the *comitia* if some members of the equestrian class, purportedly three hundred, were promoted to the senatorial class.[901] While as a result of these schemes each of the pressure groups were getting something they desired in terms of their interests, he might not have foreseen the hostility each of these measures could produce.[902]

Again, Appian's account supports this conclusion. He describes the situation as follows:

> The Senate resented so many men being added in bulk to its roll of members and transformed from equestrians to the highest in the land, thinking it not unlikely that when they had actually become senators they would form a faction to fight even more energetically on their own account against the existing senators. The equites suspected that this favour meant that the courts would eventually be transferred from themselves to the Senate alone, and because they had tasted huge gains and illicit power, were most unhappy with this thought. In addition, Drusus caused the whole body of the equestrians to become uncertain and suspicious of each other over who should be thought most

[896] Livy *Per*. 71; Vell. Pat. 2.13.2-3. Appian (*B Civ*. 1.35) records that Drusus still enjoyed the support of the common people. He is the only source to claim this.
[897] Keaveney (2005) 88; Dart (2014) 70, 76.
[898] App. *B Civ*. 1.35-6.
[899] App. *B Civ*. 1.35.
[900] Livy *Per*. 70-1. Velleius Paterculus (2.13.2) is perhaps the best source for Drusus' support of the Senate.
[901] App. *B Civ*. 1.35. The same outline for Drusus' legislation appears in Vell. Pat. 2.13.2, and Livy *Per*. 71, though not in the same level of detail. Morrell (2015: 246-8) convincingly argues that Appian has mistakenly combined two separate phases of Drusus' legislative programme, the enlargement of the Senate and the sharing of the law courts, into one.
[902] See especially Vell. Pat. 2.13.2-3 for a pro Drusus account. Velleius is of the opinion that internal divisions of the Senate, who favoured Drusus' rival tribunes, had undermined Drusus' excellent and well devised legislative programmes.

> worthy to be included among the three hundred, and the stronger candidates started to excite jealously among the rest. Above all they were irritated by the reappearance of bribe-taking as a criminal offence, a charge which they thought had been completely eliminated by this time, so far as they were concerned.
>
> In this way, although the equestrians and the Senate were at odds with each other, they were united in their enmity towards Drusus, and only the common people were pleased with the colonial programme.[903]

In sum, Drusus had attempted to fulfil the interests of each of the pressure groups, and arguably succeeded in this endeavour, but had failed to garner wider support for his legislative programme. Perhaps this is why one ancient author attributed to Drusus the quote that 'he had left nothing for anyone else to distribute except *caenum aut caelum*'.[904] It is immediately clear in hindsight, as Tweedie notes, that Drusus' programme 'simply required too much compromise from the affected parties'.[905] The delicate manoeuvres he was probably attempting simply did not produce absolute gains for each of the pressure groups. Their gains were at the same time offset by the advantages afforded to the others. Collectively, the advantages gained by the competing groups would have probably amounted in their minds to a net loss in the struggle for political prominence. In turn, the situation would have undermined Drusus' effectiveness to pass legislation and his popularity among the pressure groups.

It is most likely in this context that Drusus turned to Italian assistance in order to pass his legislative programmes through the use of force.[906] In return, Drusus, it seems, promised to propose legislation to secure Roman citizenship for all the inhabitants of the Italic

---

[903] App. *B Civ*. 1.35-6 (trans. Carter, 1996): ἥ τε γὰρ βουλὴ χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν ἀθρόως αὐτῇ τοσούσδε προσκαταλεγῆναι καὶ ἐξ ἱππέων ἐς τὸ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα μεταβῆναι, οὐκ ἀδόκητον ἡγουμένη καὶ βουλευτὰς γενομένους κατὰ σφᾶς ἔτι δυνατώτερον τοῖς προτέροις βουλευταῖς στασιάσειν: οἵ τε ἱππεῖς ὑπώπτευον, ὅτι τῇδε τῇ θεραπείᾳ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐς τὴν βουλὴν μόνην τὰ δικαστήρια ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππέων περιφέροιτο, γευσάμενοί τε κερδῶν μεγάλων καὶ ἐξουσίας οὐκ ἀλύπως τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἔφερον. τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἐν ἀπορίᾳ σφᾶς ἐποίει καὶ ὑποψίᾳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἀξιώτεροι δοκοῦσιν ἐς τοὺς τριακοσίους καταλεγῆναι: καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς φθόνος ἐς τοὺς κρείττονας ἐσῄει: ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δ᾽ ἠγανάκτουν ἀναφυομένου τοῦ τῆς δωροδοκίας ἐγκλήματος, ὃ τέως ἡγοῦντο καρτερῶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν πρόρριζον ἐσβέσθαι.

οὕτω μὲν δὴ καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς καὶ ἡ βουλή, καίπερ ἔχοντες ἀλλήλοις διαφόρως, ἐς τὸ Δρούσου μῖσος συνεφρόνουν, καὶ μόνος ὁ δῆμος ἔχαιρε ταῖς ἀποικίαις.

[Aur. Vict.] *De Vir. Ill.* 66.10 records a similar situation.

[904] [Aur. Vict.] *De Vir. Ill*. 66.5: *ipse etiam professus nemini se ad largiendum praeter caelum et caenum reliquisse*.

[905] Tweedie (2011) 589.

[906] The work of Livy's epitomist (*Per.* 71) would seem to indicate that the choice to associate with the Italian allies was a new direction for Drusus after his initial plans fell through.

communities.[907] Again, though, Drusus simply faced too much opposition. It was the failure of this legislation, and perhaps the assassination of Drusus, which forced those desiring Roman citizenship to rethink their approach to securing this interest.

6.3 – A Case for Irrationality

The particular aims of the Italian rebels prior to the Social War have long been a matter of considerable debate. There has been a recent tendency for modern scholars, including Pobjoy, to disregard the aims of the Italian rebels as they appear in the sources since these were preserved by Romano-centric writers.[908] As such, scholars typically now prefer hypothetical reconstructions of the Social War in which independence from Rome was the main goal of the Italian rebels, often with, in my opinion, an overreliance on the numismatic evidence.[909] Much of the logic behind portraying the war in this manner seems misdirected. Those scholars, especially Mouritsen and Pobjoy, who suggests that the war was a straightforward revolt against Rome, rely heavily on the notion that waging war for citizenship was irrational, or at the very least difficult to understand.[910] Therefore, these scholars conclude, whether consciously or not, that the Social War could not have been fought with the aim of securing Roman citizenship precisely because such an approach would be irrational. This would falsely imply that wars can only be the product of a perfectly rational decision-making process.

Interestingly, Thucydides' *Melian Dialogue* has often formed the basis for the rationality of war as part of the decision-making process.[911] However, the dialogue itself reveals that military conflict can be the product of an irrational decision. The Melians did decide not to yield to the Athenian demands and opted instead for war with Athens whom they knew possessed a far

[907] Livy *Per.* 71. Diodorus Siculus (37.10.11) preserves an oath allegedly made by the Italian allies. While the authenticity of this particular oath may be a product of anti-Drusus propaganda (Keaveney [2005] 100; contra L. R. Taylor [1949] 46; Gabba [1992] 113), it seems almost necessary that some sort of agreement was made. See Dart (2014) 80-1.
[908] Pobjoy (2000a) 190.
[909] See especially Mouritsen's claim (1998: 142) that he was 'writing history without sources'. Pobjoy (2000a: 198-205), for instance, dedicates a large proportion of his chapter to the topic of numismatics. In truth, the coinage of the Italian rebels minted during Social War does portray a desire to overthrow the Romans, yet in light of the propagandistic value of coins, there is some risk attached to attributing this aim to the entire campaign.
[910] Mouritsen (1998) 7. Pobjoy (2000a: 190-1) highlights the perplexing notion that had the Italian rebels defeated the Romans over the issue of citizenship, then the value of this very status would be diminished. These scholars frame their arguments in terms of implausibility rather than irrationality. Their own reconstructions, however, assume perfect rationality of the decision-makers regarding plausible or implausible actions.
[911] Eckstein (2006: 48-72) offers a detailed discussion on Thucydides as the intellectual ancestor of modern Realist thinkers.

greater military strength than themselves.[912] This irrationality, however, is only a judgement based on hindsight. The decision-makers of the day were obviously not privy to this information nor could they entirely foresee the consequences of their decision. Furthermore, the dialogue reveals that the Melians held beliefs and were subject to factors that resulted in them making a decision which could be construed as irrational in hindsight.[913] Thucydides himself identifies the notion of justice, the hope of an unlikely victory and the Melians' surety that they would receive Spartan assistance in the event that Athens did attack as key factors in their decision-making process.[914] While holding similar preconceived ideas, a community, or communities, might choose to pursue a course of action that might seem to contradict its own interests.[915] For this reason, the possibility that, with hindsight, the Social War was irrational should not be ruled out.[916]

The scholarly focus on the rationality of actors in the Social War tends to be concerned only with the role of the Italian rebels. These discussions generally revolve around whether the Italian rebels sought citizenship through a militaristic campaign or whether their action amounted to a rebellion against Roman domination.[917] The Romans themselves rarely enter into such discussions.[918] Yet Rome had something of a history for making decisions that bordered on the irrational.[919] Following three major defeats during the Second Punic War, not having come to terms with Hannibal might be considered irrational, however, since this move was ultimately successful in the long run, the discussion appears rather moot.[920] Given Rome's penchant for obstinacy, I suggest it was the Romans who might have been responsible for the irrationality that precipitated the outbreak of the Social War.

---

[912] Thuc. 5.114-6.
[913] Here the preference for bounded rationality over 'perfect' rationality is evident since this reconstruction of the decision-making process allows for a more realistic situation in which irrational actions can more easily be an outcome.
[914] Thuc. 5.89-90, 102-12.
[915] In the case of the Melians, they chose to engage the Athenians, thereby endangering their chief interest which was their own survival.
[916] We should be careful then of trying to rationalise the irrational. While the reconstruction of historical narratives from meagre sources tends to adopt that which is plausible or probable and disregard the alternatives, the history of more well documented eras would suggest that the unlikely and improbable occur with regular frequency.
[917] The bibliography on this topic is extensive. See Ridley (2003) 52-4. I might note briefly Brunt (1988) 93-130, Pobjoy (2000a) 187-97, Keaveney (2005) 117-27.
[918] Kendall (2012: 105-21) is a notable exception.
[919] Many scholars, including Goldsworthy (2016: 57), have noted for instance that the Romans had a seemingly innate trait of refusing to accept they had lost a conflict.
[920] The labelling of some behaviour as irrational seems to only apply when an action is unsuccessful in achieving its intended goal, otherwise it simply becomes lateral thinking.

In order to further this notion, it is necessary to highlight a few key points concerning the origin of the Social War itself. Firstly, it seems that the war could have been avoided if the Romans had granted their citizenship to the Italic communities.[921] While there was undoubtedly an element within the revolt who wished to overthrow the Romans, enfranchisement of those Italian allies who desired Rome citizenship certainly would seem to have been able to prevent the war's occurrence. I find it entirely reasonable that at the very least the Romans' failure to grant citizenship to the inhabitants of the Italic communities forced the allies to reconsider their approach to securing their interests, whether through political inclusion or independence. Although Kendall is right to suggest there were sound economic and political reasons for the Romans not to grant them this status, these reasons were based on the best personal interests of the Roman people, but this was not necessarily in the interests of the Romans if they wished to maintain their Italic alliances and even their wider empire.[922]

Secondly, the creation of *Italia* at Corfinium seems to support Kendall's *secessio* hypothesis more than Pobjoy's vision of *Italia* as alternative capital and a rival power base.[923] At a most basic level, the Social War, if painted as a straightforward rebellion, probably would not have required the existence of a rival city. I believe Kendall's hypothesis is further supported by the flexibility of the rebel's command structure evident in the surviving sources. Although Photius' ninth century CE summary of Diodorus Siculus claims quite the opposite, the rival 'capital' does not seem to have been used as any sort of governmental seat complete with forum and senate house.[924] Nonetheless, many scholars use Photius' testimony as evidence for a campaign of independence and the existence of a rival 'state'.[925] Perhaps the most difficulty in accepting Photius' account lays in the issue of his description of the purported magistracies.[926] Dart's work on the command structure of the Italian insurgency calls into question whether the Italian rebels were led by two consuls and the suspiciously Augustan twelve praetors.[927] After surveying the extant sources, he finds that the rebels instead more likely used the generic titles

[921] This is raised by a number of scholars, including but not limited to Badian (1970-1: 407), Nagle (1973: 376), and Heredia (2012: 138). Even Pobjoy (2000a: 193) admits to this point.
[922] Kendall (2012) 114-9. He notes in particular the loss of the advantages associated with Roman citizenship outlined in the previous chapter and the considerable political and administrative reorganisation that would be required, and eventually was required, upon the enfranchisement of the Italian allies.
[923] Kendall's (2013) 229-31; Pobjoy (2000a) 192. Steel (2013: 83) and Santangelo (2018: 237) too readily support Pobjoy's reconstruction.
[924] Diod. Sic. 37.2.4-5.
[925] Kendall (2013) 227. Pobjoy (2000a: 192-5) is perhaps the best example of such a scholar.
[926] Sherwin-White (1973: 147) rightly points out that it is difficult to view the senate of *Italia* as similar to that of the Romans since its members could not have been ex-magistrates elected via a popular vote.
[927] Dart (2009) 215-24.

of *dux* and praetor or the Oscan equivalent, which would seem to indicate that these men preformed a military function rather than a political one within an alternative 'capital'.[928] Furthermore, as Isayev importantly highlights, since the rebels' 'capital' moved three times during the war, from Corfinium to Bovianum and finally to Aesernia, it is quite difficult to see *Italia* as the major city within a rival 'state'.[929]

In all, then, Kendall's *secessio* hypothesis seems the more viable. This reconstruction also fits neatly into the political situation of the time. In the decade or so prior to 91, the Italic communities had attempted to gain the Roman franchise through the traditional channels by conversing with the Roman elite. Marius had initially granted some inhabitants of the Italic communities this status only for the *lex Licinia Mucia* to deprive them of it. The Italian elites, notably Pompaedius Silo, then turned to M. Livius Drusus in the hope of the status being restored to them. These attempts to secure Roman citizenship within the framework of the Roman alliances had failed. It seems reasonable to assume the logical next step was to attempt enfranchisement from outside the framework of these alliances.[930] After all, the Romans most often negotiated the conditions of their relationships with those who they were not currently under their leadership.[931] The *foedera* and other forms of agreements were, to the best of our knowledge, generally only formed or altered with the defeat of hostile communities or the formation of new alliances.[932] It would be unsurprising that some Italian elites thought that they had a better chance of securing Roman citizenship if they removed themselves from their alliance with the Romans. The use of a *secessio* would be an appropriate measure in these circumstances. The a physical self-removal from an original group, in this case the Roman alliance network, would ideally have forced those in charge to grant concessions to the secessionists in order to reform as a whole.[933] If this was indeed their intention, the Italians rebels would have hoped that they would have returned to the Roman alliance on 'a more equitable basis'.[934] Enfranchisement would have achieved this aim. Through this means, some

[928] Ibid. 218-21. This reading does not necessarily rule out that the Social War was a campaign of independence but undermines the argument of *Italia* as a rival capital.
[929] Isayev (2011) 213-4. See App. *B Civ*. 1.51 (Bovianum); Diod. Sic. 37.2.9 (Aesernia). Isayev (2017: 311-2) herself argues that *Italia* offered the rebels a horizontal distribution of power rather than Rome's hierarchy of power.
[930] Kendall (2013: 235) may be correct that the future Italian rebels were planning alternative approaches from the time of the *lex Licinia Mucia*. It may only have been from the time of Drusus' failure to secure citizenship for the Italian allies that they enacted these plans.
[931] The 'promotion' of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum from *civitas sine suffragio* to the 'full' citizenship in the 180s would be the most obvious exception to this. See Livy 38.36.7.
[932] See Chapter 1.1.
[933] See Kendall's (2013: 229-30) definition and reconstruction.
[934] Kendall (2013) 230.

Italian elites and their followers likely sought to secure Roman citizenship. The elites of other Italic communities, who were not prepared to undertake this more direct action or were content with their place in the Roman alliance, did not choose to join in this movement, or perhaps rather were not invited.

But Kendall's reconstruction is rather too grandiose. The idea that the Italian rebels had a 'silver' plan to fall back on in case their 'gold' plan failed portrays these individuals as overly rational.[935] It is probably best to refrain from assuming that such manoeuvres were as intricately planned as Kendall suggests, particularly as a straightforward conflict with a view to achieve citizenship seems diametrically opposed to one that sought independence.[936] This particular reconstruction appears to rely largely on hindsight by bestowing the key actors with too much foresight of events that had not happened yet.

In light of these issues, I now offer an alternative explanation for the strategy of the Italian rebels immediately prior to the Social War. The *secessio* or a similar form of strategic withdrawal from the alliance was perhaps designed to present the Romans with a *zugzwang*, a so-called 'no-win' situation, where the option was either to grant citizenship to the Italic communities or to enter into a military conflict with their former allies. The Romans would need to make a decision either way. The situation that the Italian rebels had created forced the Romans to choose between these two undesirable outcomes. To choose to engage in this military conflict would have required that the Romans weaken their own position through the loss of Roman manpower as well as that of the rebelling and loyal Italic communities, whom they still relied on for the bulk of soldiers in their armies. Such a war would have the potential to threaten not only Rome's hegemony in the Italian Peninsula but also its hold on the rest of the Mediterranean.[937] The Italian rebels likely believed that the Romans would choose the lesser of these two evils. While granting citizenship to the Italic communities would no doubt have been undesirable to most Romans and mean considerable reorganisation of Rome's

[935] Ibid. 231-3.

[936] Dench (2005: 127-8) does offer a useful discussion on whether Diodorus Siculus considered a desire for citizenship and the appropriation of the hegemony as contradictory aims. However, it should be remembered that Diodorus saw the Italian rebels as desiring to be masters rather than subjects. Moreover, as Kendall (2013: 72) points out, the 'freedom' the rebels sought can easily be linked to a desire for citizenship since *libertas* and ἐλευθερία frequently refer to civil rights in a Roman context. It is debateable whether freedom of this sort can exist outside of such a context.

[937] Our sources unfortunately do not relate the situation concerning Roman armies deployed in the *provinciae* prior to 91 but continued to serve during the Social War. Conceivably some of these armies consisted of inhabitants of Italic communities that were now rebels. Brunt (1971: 435-440), who details the legions used both in Italian Peninsula and oversees during the Social War, suggest there was probably several legions deployed in various *proviniciae* at this time.

system of governance, it would have been the more rational decision. The potential losses associated with the other option would have seemed in the eyes of the Italian rebels too great for the Romans to have selected the alternative. Yet the Romans did choose to engage in this conflict. This decision, I believe, forms the basis for the irrationality of the Social War.

The Romans, aside from concerns for their reputation as hegemon of the Mediterranean, likely chose this action because a military response was their typical reaction in the case of virtually all revolts whether in the Italian Peninsula or the wider Mediterranean. When Fregellae had revolted in 125, the Romans sent a force to suppress the colony.[938] This same approach had been used to quell the revolts of the Volsinii and Falerii a century and a half before.[939] The Romans also sought a military solution when the Achaean league revolted in 146.[940] When the Romans saw some of their allies forming a *secessio* - no doubt a revolt in their eyes - they approached the problem in the same way that they and their ancestors had always done.[941] Despite the particular issues associated with a revolt of a significant proportion of allies outlined above, the Romans presumed that this same action would work for them again. They likely believed that their enemy would be easily overcome, and their Italic alliances would resume to function as normal.

By virtue of this hypothesis, I am suggesting that the Romans had committed to the war from an early date, probably after the massacre of Roman citizens and the murder of Q. Servilius Caepio at Asculum in October of 91.[942] Indeed, Livy's suggestion that the opening move of the war was the massacre of Asculum may reflect only the Roman attitude towards the war, which for them had reached a point of no return.[943]

[938] Livy *Per.* 60; Vell. Pat. 2.6.4.
[939] Zonar. 8.7 (Volsinii), 18 (Falerii).
[940] Just. *Epit.* 34.2; Paus. 7.15.
[941] Eckstein (2006: 31), accepting Realist observations, notes that there is a strong tendency for actors to repeat previously successful policies of the past regardless of the particular circumstances. Satisficing behaviour would also tend to produce repeated behaviour since the first sufficient outcome would likely require an approach utilised in the past.
[942] Livy *Per.* 72; Vell. Pat. 2.15.1; App. *B Civ* 1.38; Flor. 2.18.8; Julius Obsequens 54. If this hypothesis is correct, then, this implies that the Romano-centric sources have downplayed the role of the Romans in initiating the war. There is, of course, precedent in other conflicts of similar palliation of responsibility. The controversial case of the Saguntum and the Ebro treaty at the onset of the Second Punic War may be the most obvious example. See Scullard (1989) 33-5.
[943] Livy *Per.* 72.

For the Italian rebels, however, there is some indication that they attempted to avoid the opening of hostilities even after the events at Asculum.[944] These rebels sent an embassy to Rome in the hope of securing Roman citizenship for themselves, yet the Senate, it would seem, did not open any discussion with them.[945] This stance would seem to indicate that the Romans had already made a decision about how to deal with the Italian rebels. On the other hand, the rebels themselves were still open to a more diplomatic solution. For this reason, the failure of the Italian envoy would be a suitable starting point for the Social War.

There is still some need, though, to explain how a largely defensive *secessio* could turn into a military conflict in which the Italian rebels were aggressive and enjoyed the upper hand for the first campaign season.[946] This will also shed light on why the Italian rebels decided to take this action despite Rome's seemingly clear military superiority.[947] The Italian rebels, perhaps fearing the examples set by Corinth, Carthage and most recently Fregellae, chose to confront the Roman war effort. Those Italian rebels who had desired Roman citizenship probably reasoned that by simply giving up at this point resigned them to whatever punishments the Romans wished to employ. Given the seriousness of these punishments, in the worst case the destruction of their communities, the rebels probably thought they were attempting to negotiate with an enemy already set on their destruction. Whether they chose to surrender or engaged in the conflict, the result was likely going to be the same. Fighting at least gave them some hope for a positive outcome.[948] What had begun as a miscalculated strategic ploy to secure citizenship had turned into a struggle for survival.

---

[944] Like Kendall (2013: 238, 247-8), I am of the opinion that the events of Asculum seem to be either a mistake or a premature reaction of the locals to the possible uncovering of the Italian rebels' plans rather than the outbreak of the war itself.

[945] App. *B Civ* 1.39. Both Mouritsen (1998: 140) and Keaveney (2005: 118-9) view the events of Asculum as the starting point for the war, however, their reconstruction downplays the importance of the Italian embassy sent to Rome after this time.

[946] I am in agreement with Sherwin-White (1973: 145) that the best reconstructions of the Social War will attempt to identify the changing aims of the Italian rebels, though he sees the rebels as fighting for independence after the political campaign for citizenship failed. De Sanctis (1976: 39) seems to have popularised this approach. Again, a straightforward aim of fighting the Romans for citizenship does not seem very viable, so the rebels' aims likely reflected their immediate goals.

[947] The author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4.13) implies that the rebels were aware of their military inferiority when they committed to the war. This section also reveals that the opposing sides were already established at this time.

[948] On this topic, Thucydides (3.47) in his *Mytilenian Debate* has Diodotus claim that those supressing revolts should avoid extreme treatment of revolting communities since it teaches potential revolutionaries that the guilty and innocent alike that their punishments would be the same, whether they surrender willingly or not. This same logic would have reinforced the cause of the revolt.

The focus on the citizenship issue in the sources likely reflects the confusion surrounding the war's outbreak. Since the rebels had been demanding citizenship immediately prior to the conflict, it would seem logical to both contemporaries and later writers that the Social War was fought in order to attain the Roman franchise. This conclusion was perhaps reinforced by the rebels' insistence that their enfranchisement would have put an end to the conflict. Thus, when entering into negotiations with the Romans during the course of the Social War, such as the meeting Cicero witnessed, these Italian rebels could claim quite truthfully that they were fighting for citizenship.[949]

6.4 – The Citizenship Solution

It may be asked that if the Social War had been a dispute over Roman citizenship, why did the Romans eventually concede the very thing they were had refused in the first place. I find it likely that the Romans came to realise the gravity of the situation which they had not comprehended earlier. The course of the war, which at the time of the introduction of the *lex Iulia* was favouring the Italian rebels, demanded that the Romans rethink their original decision regarding the enfranchisement of their Italian allies.[950]

There were a few factors that likely made the Romans realise that a concession of citizenship was in their best interest. Firstly, Bispham seems right to suggest that even if they defeated the Italian rebels, the Romans must have realised that they would still face the issue of citizenship in the future.[951] Other political programmes centred on the issue of Italian enfranchisement, potentially leading to further revolts, were still likely to occur. There must have been some acknowledgement that the solution that had worked for them in the past would not be suitable for remedying this situation. Armed conflict with those responsible for the revolt would not have yielded a desirable result. An alternative solution needed to be sought.

Secondly, unlike the Italian rebels, the Romans still had to manage a large empire. This came under some threat in the late 90s and early 80s. Livy records issues in Thrace and Syria in the

[949] Cic. *Phil.* 12.27.
[950] The first year of the war is typified by the rebels securing the forced surrenders of many southern Italic communities. Appian (*B Civ.* 1.41-8) offers the most complete account of campaigns during the first year of the Social War. The aggressive campaigns of the Italian rebels during the first year of the conflict may appear to contradict the picture of a strategic withdrawal and the fight for survival, where we might expect a more defensive campaign, however there is always some defensive value in offensive undertakings.
[951] Bispham (2016) 87.

year proceeding the Social War which continued into 90 and 89.[952] In 90, there was also a rebellion of the Salluvii of Transalpine Gaul.[953] Perhaps most concerning of all to the Romans, Mithridates was enjoying success in Cappadocia and Bithynia where he had managed to dethrone Nicomedes IV.[954] There is some possibility, then, the realities of being a large hegemonic power forced the Romans' hand. Continuing to fight against their former allies would potentially risk the loss of much of their empire, even in the event that they were successful. Given the early accomplishments of the rebels, this outcome must have seemed some way off. Assuming they could get the upper hand and regain the clear superiority in the Italian Peninsula, there would be no guarantee that in the meantime the communities of their wider empire would not have revolted on their own accord or been forced to revolt by another local power. The Social War itself threatened Rome's wider empire. The Romans could not have hoped to demonstrate the military superiority required of a regional hegemon if all of its resources were being used, and pushed to the limits, in the Italian Peninsula. We also hear of recruitment issues in the *provinciae*. During the course of the Social War, C. Cassius had predominantly used local allies against Mithridates in Asia presumably because he did not have any assurances he could get Romans and loyal Italian allies at this time.[955] It would make some sense that the Romans would seek to put an end to a war from which they stood to gain very little and potentially risked a great deal. Since the Italian rebels and presumably many of the loyal Italic communities had initially desired Roman citizenship, an offer to enfranchise the Italian allies at this point would have ended much of the threat that the rebels posed to Rome's empire and Rome itself.

The process of bestowing citizenship on all the Italic communities lasted well into the third decade of the century. For my purposes, though, it will only be necessary to evaluate the effects of the grants upon the hostility of the two sides since this will tell us something about the aims and interests of the Italian rebels. First and foremost, Appian suggests that the *lex Iulia* of 90 had kept many of its allies loyal for the duration of the war and stopped the spread of fighting.[956] While this statement seems to be for the most part accurate, the introduction of this legislation did not put an end to the fighting entirely. Certain rebels, particularly the Samnites, continued

[952] Livy *Per.* 70, 74-6; Cic. *Pis.* 84; Diod. Sic. 37.5.
[953] Livy *Per.* 73
[954] Livy *Per.* 76; App. *Mith.* 10-13, *Syr*. 48; Cass. Dio 30-35.99.2; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 11.1. Justin (*Epit.* 38.3-8) in particular suggests that Mithridates had used the distraction of the Social War opportunistically to launch his own campaigns against friends of Rome.
[955] App. *Mith.* 17.
[956] App. *B Civ.* 1.49. See also Steel (2013) 86. Matyszak (2014: 99, 104) goes as far as to suggest that the Romans 'won' the Social War by surrendering and giving into the demands of the Italian rebels.

their hostility towards the Romans through to 88 and arguably even into the first of the Sullan civil wars.[957] These circumstances could be used as evidence that the war was centred on independence, but this was not necessarily the case.[958]

It seems likely that at least initially, however, the Romans had not offered a means to acquire citizenship that the Italic communities, both loyal and hostile, found acceptable. While conventional scholarship tends to depict the *lex Iulia* as applying only to loyal communities, Coşkun has offered a more feasible alternative.[959] His reconstruction presents this legislation as a measure that granted Roman citizenship to entire communities, but did not account for a small number of citizens in unique circumstances, for instance honorary citizens of Greek cities, and, for this reason, was deemed to be unsatisfactory by many.[960] This is probably a reason why citizens of Naples and Heraclea were not initially inclined to accept the offer.[961] Coşkun believes that only under the *lex Plautia Papiria* of 89 were some of these issues resolved.[962] Importantly, this law dealt with the enfranchisement of individuals in any circumstance as long as they were inhabitants of the Italian Peninsula and could present themselves to a praetor within sixty days.[963] It was probably only at this point that a good number of Italic communities accepted the offer.[964] The enfranchisement of the Italic communities likely occurred in piecemeal grants after the introduction of the *lex Plautia Papiria*. Partly for this reason, the continuation of hostility into 89 should not seem so strange.[965]

Consequently, the fact that some communities continued to fight after the enfranchisement legislation was introduced can hardly be used as evidence that the war was a revolt against

[957] Sampson (2013: 1-3) is of the unique opinion that the Social War and the civil wars involving Marius and Sulla should be considered a single great conflict.
[958] It is perhaps also possible that the Romans simply never offered to enfranchise the Italian rebels until such time as they were incapable of continuing the war. Indeed, Velleius Paterculus (2.17.1) suggests the Romans were only willing to grant the rebels citizenship when the revolting communities had lost their strength. Similar sentiment can be found in Coşkun (2004) 117. Alternatively, Matyszak (2014: 104-9) suggests that the campaigns of 89 onwards were 'mopping-up' affairs, the seriousness of which was exacerbated by the need for glory for a new type of Roman elite, namely C. Marius and L. Sulla.
[959] See Brunt (1988) 105-9 for summary of conventional scholarly views.
[960] Coşkun (2009a) 145-7.
[961] Cic. *Balb*. 21.
[962] Coşkun (2009a) 147. More conventionally minded scholars, for example Galsterer (2006) 298 and Nicolet (1980) 42, tends to suggest this law was reserved for those defeated by the Romans.
[963] This condition is made explicitly in Cic. *Arch.* 7.
[964] Coşkun (2009a) 147.
[965] Coşkun (2004: 110) rightly notes, though, that the Marsic leaders that held parley with Cn. Pompeius, consul of 89, in the presence of Cicero (*Phil.* 12.27) were not interested in the political conditions of the *lex Iulia* but with receiving citizenship. How much the inadequacies of the *lex Iulia* affected their outlook is, therefore, questionable.

foreign dominion. The offer of citizenship in 90 had after all ended any revolt of the Etruscans and Umbrians.[966] Had their aim been to overthrow Roman hegemony, this offer should not have been as effective. This being the case, we must again return to the possibility that there were divergent aims within the rebel group or accept Bispham's suggestion that a premature grant of citizenship may have been seen as an admission of responsibility for starting the war or a sign of their own weakness, if not both.[967]

The final point of interest in the discussion surrounding aims of the rebels comes from the final year of the war. In 88, the last remaining Italian rebels supposedly sought to make an alliance between themselves and Mithridates.[968] While many scholars, particularly Sherwin-White, have often maintained that Diodorus' claim has significant bearing on the motives of the Italian rebels, I suspect this purported alliance may be nothing more than a perceived correlation between the activities of these two parties.[969] It would be easy to imagine that some Romans might have seen the events occurring in the Italian Peninsula and those in the Asia Minor as somehow related. This connection, though, may only go as far as Mithridates using the Social War as a distraction for his own opportunistic gains.[970] It is difficult to see how the Italian rebels could have even contemplated the possibility that Mithridates might assist them at all. Mithridates would have been inhibited in this pursuit by geography and a lack of resources.[971] I, therefore, find it difficult to give much basis to this alleged alliance.

6.5 – Conclusion

The Social War, it would seem, stems from the Italian allies' desire to fulfil more of their interests. This desire could only be achieved if they were given a greater say in the running of Rome's empire. Perhaps the best way to acquire this influence, they believed, would be to

[966] Appian (*B Civ*. 1.49) claims they received citizenship before any revolt could take place, but Livy (*Per*. 74) and Florus (2.18.13) do record campaigns against these people during the war.
[967] Bispham (2007) 164.
[968] Diod. Sic. 37.11.
[969] Sherwin-White (1973: 149) notes in his reconstruction of the Social War that the Samnites' decision to converse with Mithridates was not made to 'win the citizenship'.
[970] For the opportunistic nature of Mithridates' actions between 90 and 88 BCE see McGing (1986) 79-88.
[971] Appian (*Mith.* 13) preserves a speech in which Nicomedes claims Mithridates was adding more warships to the three hundred he already possessed. He goes further to suggest that these are going to be used not against the people of Bithynia, but the Romans themselves. It is not stated that they would be sent to the Italian Peninsula. Furthermore, if these forces did exist, they must have been used in Asia Minor (App. *Mith.* 14-8). This was likely always Mithridates' intention.

become directly involved in Roman politics. Naturally, possessing Roman citizenship became paramount to their interests.

The interlude between the Gracchan period and the outbreak of the Social War likely reflects that other 'Italian' interests had arisen in the 110s and 100s which had momentarily sidelined the issue of Roman citizenship. Throughout the Italian Peninsula, there were serious concerns over a new northern threat that possessed the manpower to threaten and potentially destroy many Italic communities if left unchecked. The Jugurthine War too offered something of a distraction. These circumstances rather called for amicability within the Romano-Italic relationship or, at the very least, a functioning solidarity. During the last years of the second century, then, there were simply more pressing concerns for the Italic communities. When these concerns were removed, however, the question of citizenship could once again return to prominence.

The issue of Roman citizenship probably reasserted itself in the first year of the 90s when Marius had granted Roman citizenship to many non-Romans who served under him. The internal divisions of Roman politics ensured through the *lex Licinia Mucia* that those who had received citizenship in this way would not keep it. At that time, many Romans had been unwilling and steadfast in their commitment to refuse the proposals of the Italic communities. The prospect of military conflict, however, did not come to the forefront until after the programme of Livius Drusus failed in 91, although it does seem possible that some individuals within the Italic communities were seeking independence from Rome, even if they were not actively doing so at all times. Gaining citizenship was not the only way to secure their interests. Full independence, while at this time an unlikely prospect, would have also enabled to pursue their interests more actively. Yet it must have seemed to the vast majority of Italic communities that such an approach would have failed in light of Rome's reputation as a military power. As a result, a number of Italic communities devised as scheme to force Rome's hand on the citizenship issue. The rebels, though, did not anticipate the Romans' reaction to this manoeuvre, particularly following the massacre at Asculum. The miscalculations and consequences of these actions led to the outbreak of a war that for the Italian rebels was as much about survival as citizenship.

CONCLUSION

I began this thesis with a brief overview of the extant sources on the Social War. This was necessary, since any investigation concerning this war must contend with their nature. These brief and fragmentary sources likely present an oversimplified portrayal of the issues at the centre of the war. Whether Asconius' identification of the *lex Licinia Mucia*'s introduction as the primary factor in the war's outbreak or Appian's focus on the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus, the works of the ancient writers highlight the tension within the Romano-Italic relationship during the opening decade of the first century rather than explain the origin of the war itself. These two events are pieces of a much larger puzzle, one that can be better solved by taking a more encompassing gaze at the wider evidence. Ancient accounts of the Social War seem to consider only short-term issues. There was, after all, a tendency for ancient writers to focus on the narrative of a war itself at the expense of its cause and origin.[972] Even if, for instance, Livy's six books on the Social War had survived, there is a great likelihood that he would have also rendered the outbreak of the war in a similar fashion.[973] The survival of a non-Roman source, however, might have at least offered a useful contrast.

I have demonstrated that the nature of these sources has shaped how the origin of the war has been studied. Modern works too have often focused on the events that are more characteristic of the issues involved with the Romano-Italic relationship, namely the treatment of the Italian allies, than on the war's origin. While, for instance, Dart's work on Drusus' relationship with the inhabitants of the Italic communities tells us a lot about the events in the lead up to the war, this thesis has proved that more can be done to explain how this point was reached.[974] As a result, we have attained a greater understanding of the war's origin. There is no denying that Drusus' legislative programme and the *lex Licinia Mucia* played an integral role in the outbreak of the war, but these measures were designed to solve a wider set of foundational issues. For this reason, my thesis has been primarily concerned with the process and circumstances that

[972] This is perhaps a result of the ancient writers' interests in exemplarity as well as the frequency of wars, which probably seemed so commonplace to the Romans that they did not overly seek out explanations for their origins.
[973] The *Periochae* indicates that Livy wrote six books on the period covering Drusus' tribunate and the end of the Social War.
[974] Dart (2014) 70-5.

prompted the introduction of such legislative programmes, which in turn laid the ground work for further hostility.

The process that brought about the possibility for conflict between Rome and the Italic communities stemmed ultimately from an increasing imbalance in their relationship. As the Romans extended their empire, they were unwilling or incapable of adjusting to the structural changes within their alliance network that devalued the position of the Italic communities. Consequently, the cohesion of the Romans' Italic alliances was undermined. These circumstances did not necessarily prompt a revolt aimed at independence from the Romans or a military campaign to seize Roman citizenship, yet this wider context does reveal a great deal about the origin of the Social War. Indeed, if the volatile circumstances within the Romano-Italic relationship in 91 likely caused the outbreak of the Social War as I have now suggested, the development of these circumstances should form the focus of any future study on the topic.

My thesis has significantly deepened our understanding of the connection between Roman expansionism and the Italian question. The structural changes within the Romans' alliance network produced an imbalance within the Romano-Italic alliances and the subsequent attempts of the Italic communities to address this issue, which in turn resulted in the outbreak of the Social War. The identification of these links is the key benefit of trancing Romano-Italic relations back into the fourth and third centuries BCE. Without the growing imbalance between Rome and the Italic communities, the inhabitants of these communities would likely not have desired Roman citizenship so that they might greater pursue their interests, nor would the increasingly inward facing politics produced the political programmes of the 90s as well as those of the Gracchan period. This imbalance, however, went hand in hand with Rome's overall success.[975]

As Rome's Republican empire began to expand into the wider Mediterranean in the last half of the third century, the relationship with the Italic communities altered to reflect Rome's acquisition of a Mediterranean hegemony rather than its purely Italian character of the previous century. This change forced the Romans to establish a system of governance that could deal with the geopolitical challenges that their new empire posed to them. The answer, as we have seen, was to tax these non-Italic communities rather than having them supply soldiers for the Romans' many conflicts. The inhabitants of the Italic communities arguably saw this type of

[975] Cornell (1993: 158) rightly claims that Rome was a victim of its own success.

contribution as less burdensome than the one they provided. Moreover, the practice of controlling these communities – in some cases the use of annual magistrates, in others merely a reliance on *fides* – did initially allow for a greater degree of freedom than would have been experienced within the Italian Peninsula. For these reasons, the introduction of non-Italic communities to the Roman network of alliances likely undermined the Romans' relationship with the inhabitants of the Italic communities.

The expansion of the empire also meant that the Romans had to consider the cohesion of all their alliances, not simply those within the Italian Peninsula as had previously been the case. Since the Romans believed that the Italian Peninsula to be their possession by the middle of the second century and that the loyalty of the Italic communities had been permanently secured, their attention seems to have been orientated more towards the Mediterranean. Given the precedence of the overseas expansion and political concerns during the second century, the Romans, perhaps unintentionally, undervalued the Italic alliances. If Livy's account is accurate, during the second century the embassies from the Italic communities were seen after those from the non-Italic communities suggesting a clear order of importance.[976]

The alternative means of revenue open to the Romans after Mediterranean expansion also worked to devalue the perception of these alliances. Indemnities and taxation of the wider empire provided the Romans with the vast amounts of wealth that they could enjoy. Unlike the acquisition of spoils gained as a product of conquest, there was no requirement to share wealth procured through these means with the Italic communities. Coupled with the decline of profitable wars, particularly after the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146, the empire's management, not its conquest, yielded the greatest profit. While the conquest of the empire was a joint effort on the part of both the Romans and their Italian allies, its management fell squarely on the shoulders of the Romans.

The transition from establishing an empire to managing one transformed Rome's domestic politics. It was the increase in the opportunities and means of acquiring wealth that solidified the interest of the equestrian class, especially the *publicani*, though it was not until the time of C. Gracchus that they came to possess the political influence to act on these. A similar story exists for the rise of popular politics at Rome. The expansion of the empire left the vast majority of wealth and power concentrated in the hands of those from a higher social standing. By taking

[976] Livy 32.2.2-7; 33.24.8; 39.3.4.

up the cause of the common people, certain senators and political aspirants were able to pursue careers based on the plebeian tribunate and the popular vote in the legislative assemblies. The introduction of these two new pressure groups reduced the senatorial dominance over Rome's domestic politics. While conflicts and competition had regularly manifested within the senatorial class, the three pressure groups' interests were often fundamentally opposed to each other, which at times resulted in something of a political impasse. While the pressure groups generally fought out such competition over issues of domestic policy, the case of Ti. Gracchus' land commission demonstrates that these contests could spill over into areas that were not solely Roman issues and adversely affect non-Roman communities.

When the inhabitants of the Italic communities sought a solution to their own concerns about the running of the empire and their place within it, they found themselves having to contend with the complexities of Rome's domestic politics. Each of the three pressure groups did not believe that granting Roman citizenship to the inhabitants of the Italic communities was in their interests. To have enfranchised the Italic communities would have meant each giving up a proportion of their own political influence to a new group of potentially hostile competitors. The result was yet another impasse. These were the circumstances in which the potential for conflict emerged.

The Social War, therefore, was, as Jehne suggests, a product of the slow separation of interests between the Romans and those within the Italic communities.[977] While this observation has often been made at a general level, I have offered a more comprehensive understanding of the effect that this separation had on alliances. In order to assess the effect, we first had to understand the nature of alliances themselves. At a most basic level, communities formed alliances to secure one or more mutual interests. Since such arrangements were often *ad hoc*, alliances, particularly between equal partners, tended not to endure for long. The frequently changing alliances of the fourth century are proof of this. Hegemonic alliances, such as the Roman alliances, were a more complex issue.

It is possible, as I have demonstrated, to understand why communities remained compliant within a hegemonic alliance. For those communities that managed to possess the hegemony over a region for a prolonged period, the securing of certain interests was a central aspect of their strategy to maintain compliance. Without this incentive, in the right circumstances, a

[977] Jehne (2008) 147.

community might have made the decision to revolt against another community that was claiming hegemony over it. For this reason, the circumstances surrounding the Social War were perhaps not all that different to the revolts of the Second Punic War and other earlier examples. Indeed, during the invasion of Hannibal, the Capuans sought to improve their own position when Rome seemed likely to lose its hegemony over the Italian Peninsula in 216.[978] Regardless of whether historians see the Social War as a revolt against foreign domination or a campaign aimed at securing Roman citizenship, there is agreement that improving their lot was the aim of the Italian rebels in 91.[979]

One key difference between the Second Punic War and the Social War, however, is that the former required an outside force to intervene in the Italian Peninsula in order for the revolts to take place. This is consistent with the effect a competitor can have on alliance. The revolts of the Social War, on the other hand, were instigated by the Italic communities themselves. It was a united effort of Italian rebels in 91 that collectively became the viable competitor to the Romans. This does mean that the Italic communities at the time likely felt they possessed the military strength to challenge the Romans. It also implies that much of Rome's perceivable military superiority was likely due to reputation as much as actual military strength, though further work on this topic would prove useful.[980] At least in theory, had the Italic communities put aside their traditional alliances and enmities, as seems to be partially the case during the Social War,[981] the combined strength of the Italic communities would have matched that of the Romans. While the Italian rebels did not include all the Italic communities, the events of the war indicate that their strength was sufficient to challenge the Romans. Since many of the Italic rebels joined the movement prior to most of the rebels' success, there must have been some realisation that the Romans' military strength was somewhat vulnerable.

In the preceding century, however, the Italic communities were almost invariably loyal. Rome's military superiority too must have played a role in these circumstances even if this military strength was largely formed on reputation. Certainly, the fact that the Romans

[978] Livy (23.7.1-2) preserves the terms of the Capuans' *foedus* with Hannibal.
[979] See Dart (2014) 12.
[980] Mattern (1999: 122) does stress the importance of Rome's image and reputation to its strategy during the Imperial period. The Republican era, however, to my knowledge has not received a similar treatment, particularly in regard to the use of Italian manpower.
[981] Mouritsen (2006: 31-2) is likely correct to claim that the Romans' practice of granting bilateral treaties to individual communities inadvertently unified them. By the time of the Social War, many of the traditional alliances seem to have broken down. See Fronda (2010) 328-9.

dominated a large proportion of the Mediterranean added to Rome's reputation as a formidable community whose leadership should not be questioned nor undermined.

It is necessary, however, to avoid correlating the compliance of the Italic communities in this period to a naturally possessed characteristic. Given the freedom of choice, these communities would have likely preferred their own independence. Any hegemon had to deal with this issue. I hope to have now demonstrated that the compliance of the Italic communities was strategically managed by the Romans through a process that began as far back as the fourth century but had fallen largely into disuse during the final decades of the second century. Rome's approach to alliance management in the formative years of its empire relied on establishing deterrence against revolts and granting benefits for loyalty.

Deterrence relied predominantly on the probability of a Roman victory in any conflict and the expectation that the Romans would enforce harsh punishments on those responsible. While regular military success certainly highlighted Rome's ability to be formidable on the battlefield, other mechanisms contributed to the Romans' projection of its own military power. In establishing colonies at strategic locations around the Italian Peninsula, the Romans increased their capacity to quickly deploy military strength and emphasised their superiority by physically controlling the landscape of the region. The network of roads built throughout the peninsula also served a similar function.

In the event that a revolt did take place, the Romans made regular use of exemplary punishments against both entire communities and the instigators of any action deemed not in Rome's interests. In extreme cases, this could result in the destruction of an entire community or more commonly the execution of ringleaders. The Romans would have forced those aspiring to undertake such behaviour to consider the likelihood of its failure and the consequences of their actions. Given the Romans' ability in military affairs, the safest approach would have been compliance to Rome.

As we have seen, the Romans provided benefits to the Italic communities in order to incentivise the loyalty of the allies. These benefits took many different forms. The elites of the Italic communities received support and backing from their Roman counterparts in the event of civil disturbances. Both elites and the lower classes benefitted for the spoils that the Romans shared with their allies as well as the rewards associated with Roman peace, namely trade and social stability. For many of the inhabitants of the Italic communities, there must have appeared to be

considerable advantages in following Roman leadership. Through a working partnership with the Romans, these people were achieving their own interests, while in return the Romans received the loyalty of the Italic communities. Thus, cooperation with the local elites and the Italic communities themselves was key to Rome's success as a hegemon. Consequently, this element formed a cornerstone in Rome's approach to alliance management.

With the accord between the Romans and many of the inhabitants of the Italic communities partially absent in the late second century, a major factor in the compliance of the Italic communities was ultimately missing. This has been previously overlooked in studies of the Social War that focused only on the events of the second and early first centuries. Indeed, in this context, the eventual revolt of a number of these communities should not come as that much of a surprise. For these communities, the alliance, as it functioned in the 90s, was not fulfilling their interests to a satisfactory level. In the past, communities experiencing these sorts of issues might have approached a competitor for help or relied on their own ability, but in the first century, the options open to the relevant decision-makers were limited. It seems quite possible that a number of Italic communities decided to pursue an alternative, and in the Romans' eyes unacceptable, approach to rectify their own situation, perhaps in the form of a *secessio* or a similar action. The Romans' response to this may well have ignited the Social War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, J. N. (2003), *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*. Cambridge.

Afzelius, A. (1942), *Die Römische Eroberung Italiens 340-264 v. Chr*. Copenhagen.

Ager, S. L. (2008), 'Roman Perspectives of Greek Diplomacy', in C. Eilers (ed.), *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World*. 15-43. Leiden.

Agnew, J. (1999), 'Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics', *Journal of International Studies* 28, 499-521.

Alföldi, A. (1965), *Early Roman and the Latins*. Ann Arbor.

Ando, C. (2011), *Law, Language and Empire in the Roman Tradition*. Philadelphia.

- (2015), *Roman Social Imaginaries: Language and Thought in Context of Empire*. Toronto.
- (2016), 'Making Romans: Citizens, Subjects and Subjectivity in Republican Empire', in M. Lavan, R. E. Payne and J. Weisweiler (eds.), *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*. 169-81. New York.

Aston, M. (2000), 'A Legal Interpretation of Livy's Caudine *Sponsio*: Using Roman Law to Test the Validity of Livy's Caudine Forks Narrative', *Past Imperfect* 8, 5-32.

Austin, N. J. E. and Rankov, N. B. (1995), *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*. London.

Badian, E. (1958), *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)*. Oxford.

- (1964), *Studies in Greek and Roman History*. Oxford.
- (1968), *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*. Oxford.
- (1970-1), 'Roman Politics and the Italians (133-91 B.C.)', *Dial. di Arch.* 4-5, 373-409.
- (1972), *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Republic*. Oxford.

Baronowski, D. W. (1984), 'The "Formula Togatorum"', *Hist.* 33, 248-52.

- (1988), 'Roman Treaties with Communities of Citizens', *CQ* 38, 172-8.
- (2011), *Polybius and Roman Imperialism*. London.

Beck, H. (2015), 'Beyond "Foreign Clienteles" and "Foreign Clans". Some Remarks on Intermarriage between Roman and Italian Elites', in M. Jehne and F. Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration*. 57-72. Stuttgart.

Bederman, D. J. (2001), *International Law in Antiquity*. Cambridge.

Beloch, K. J. (1880), *Das italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie*. Leipzig.

Betts, I. and Marshall, B. (2013), 'The *Lex Calpurnia* of 149 BC', *Antichthon* 47, 39-60.

Bispham, E. (2006), 'Coloniam Deducere: How Roman was Roman Colonization during the Roman Republic', in G. Bradley and J. -P. Wilson (eds.), *Greek and Roman Colonization: Origins, Ideologies and Interactions*. 73. Swansea.

- (2007), *From Asculum to Actium. The Municipalization of Italy from the Social War to Augustus*. Oxford.
- (2008), 'Warfare and the Army', in E. Bispham (ed.), *Roman Europe*. 135-69. Oxford.
- (2016), 'The Social War', in A. E. Cooley (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Italy*. 76-89. Chichester.

Bonnefond-Coudry, M. (1989). *Le Sénat de la République romaine de la guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste: pratiques délibératives et prise de décision*. Rome.

Bradeen, D. W. (1959), 'Roman Citizenship *per magistratum*', *CJ* 54, 221-8.

Bradley, G. (2000), *Ancient Umbria: State, Culture and Identity in Central Italy from the Iron Age to the Augustan Era*. Oxford.

- (2006), 'Colonization and Identity in Republican Italy', in G. Bradley and J. -P. Wilson (eds.), *Greek and Roman Colonization: Origins, Ideologies and Interactions*. 161-87. Swansea.
- (2014), 'The Nature of Roman Strategy in Mid-Republican Colonization and Road Building', in T. D. Stek and J. Pelgrom (eds.), *Roman Republican Colonization: New Perspectives from Archaeology and Ancient History*. 60-72. Rome.

Brennan T. C. (2000), *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: Volume 1: Origins to 122 BC*. Oxford.

- (2004), 'Power and Process Under the Republican "Constitution"', in H. I. Flower (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic*. 31-65. Cambridge.

Broadhead, W. (2001), 'Rome's Migration Policy and the So-Called *ius migrandi*', *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz* 12, 69-89.

- (2008), 'Migration and Hegemony: Fixity and Mobility in Second-Century Italy', in L. De Ligt and S. Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD 144*. 451-70. Leiden.

Broughton, T. R. S. (1952), *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, vol. 2. Cleveland.

Brunt, P. (1971), *Italian Manpower 225 B.C. – A.D. 14*. Oxford.

- (1988), *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*. Oxford.

Burckhardt, L. A. (1988), *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten römischen Republik*. Stuttgart.

Burkert, W. (1987), *Ancient Mystery Cults*. Cambridge.

Burton, P. J. (2011), *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Roman Republic (353-146 BC)*. Cambridge.

Cagniart, P. (2007), 'The Late Republican Army (146–30 BC)', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*. 80-95. Oxford.

Campbell, B. (2002), 'Power Without Limit: "The Romans Always Win"', in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (eds.), *Army and Power in the Ancient World*. 167-80. Stuttgart.

Capogrossi Colognesi, L. (2014), *Law and Power in the Making of the Roman Commonwealth*, translated by L. Kopp. Cambridge.

Capozza, M. (1997), 'La Tradizione sui Conflitti Sociali a Volsini nel III Secolo a.c.: Dai Servi agli Oiketai Attraverso I Liberti', *Atene e Roma* 40, 28-40.

Cappelletti, L. (2018), 'The Bruttii', in G. D. Farney and G. Bradley (eds.), *The Peoples of Ancient Italy*. 321-36. Boston and Berlin.

Carlà-Uhink, F. (2017), *The "Birth" of Italy: The Institutionalization of Italy as a Region, 3rd-1st Century BCE*. Boston and Berlin.

Carney, E. (2011), 'Being Royal and Female in the Early Hellenistic Period', in A. Erskine and L. Llewellyn-Jones (eds.), *Creating the Hellenistic World*. 195-220. Swansea.

Carter, J. (1996), *Appian: The Civil Wars*. London.

Cary, E. (1962-3), *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, vols. 4 and 7. Loeb Classical Library 364 and 388. London.

- (1969), *Dio's Roman History III: Books XXXVI-XL*. Loeb Classical Library 53. London.

Chaplin, J. D. (2000), *Livy's Exemplary History*. Oxford.

Churchill, J. B. (1999), '*Ex qua quod vellent facerent*: Roman Magistrates' Authority over *Praeda* and *Manubiae*', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 129, 85-116.

Cornell, T. J. (1989), 'The Conquest of Italy', in F. W. Walbank et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 351-419. Cambridge.

- (1993) 'The End of Roman Imperial Expansion', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*. 139-70. London.

- (1995a), *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*. London.
- (1995b), 'Warfare and Urbanization in Roman Italy', in T. J. Cornell and K. Lomas (eds.), *Urban Society in Roman Italy*. 121-34. London.
- (1996), 'Hannibal's Legacy: The Effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin (eds.), *The Second Punic War: A Reprisal*. 97-117. London.

Coşkun, A. (2004), 'Zu den Rechtsgrundlagen der römischen Bürgerrechtsvergabe infolge des Bundesgenossenkrieges', *Revue Internationale des droits de l'Antiquité* 51, 101-32.
- (2009a), '"Civitas Romana" and the Inclusion of Strangers in the Roman Republic: the Case of the Social War', in A. Gestrich (ed.), *Strangers and Poor People: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe and the Mediterranean World from Classical Antiquity to the Present Day.* 135-64. Frankfurt.
- (2009b), 'Zu den Bedingungen des Bürgerrechtserwerbs *per magistratum* in der späten römischen Republik', *Hist.* 58, 225-41.
- (2016), 'The Latins and Their Legal Status in the Cultural and Political Context of the Integration of Pre- and Early Roman Italy', *Klio* 98, 526-69.

Crawford, M. H. (1973), '*Foedus* and *Sponsio*', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 41, 1-7.
- (1992), *The Roman Republic*, 2nd edn. London.
- (1996), *Roman Statutes*, vol. 1. London.
- (2011), *Imagines Italicae: A Corpus of Italic Inscriptions*, vol. 1. London.
- (2014), 'From Italía to Víteliú', *Da Italìa a Italia: le radici di un'identità. Atti del 51° Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia*, 369-76.

Curchin, L. A. (1991), *Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation*. London.
- (2004), *The Romanization of Central Spain: Complexity, Diversity and Change in a Provincial Hinterland*. London.

Dart, C. J. (2009), 'The 'Italian Constitution' in the Social War: A Reassessment (91 to 88 BCE)', *Hist.* 58, 215-24.
- (2010), 'Deceit and the Struggle for Roman Franchise in Italy' in A. J. Turner et al. (eds.), *Private and Public Lies: The Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World*. 91-105. Leiden.
- (2014), *The Social War, 91 to 88 BCE: A History of the Italian Insurgency against the Roman Republic*. Farnham.

David, J. -M. (1996), *The Roman Conquest of Italy*, translated by A. Nevill. Oxford.

Degrassi, A. (1954), *Fasti Capitolini*. Turin.

Develin, R. (1978), 'The Atinian Plebiscite, Tribunes, and the Senate', *CQ* 28, 141-44.

De Ligt, L. (2004), 'Poverty and Demography: The Case of the Gracchan Land Reforms', *Mnemos.* 57, 725-757.

- (2007), 'Roman Manpower and Recruitment during the Middle Republic', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*. 114-31. Oxford.

Dench, E. (1995), *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples of the Central Apennines*. Oxford.

- (2005), *Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian*. Oxford.

De Romilly, J. (1963), *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, translated by P. Thody. Oxford.

Derow, P. S. (1979), 'Polybius, Rome, and the East', *JRS* 69, 1-15.

De Sanctis, G. (1976), *La Guerra Sociale*. Florence.

De Sélincourt, A. (1971), *Livy: The Early History of Rome*. London.

De Visscher, F. (1952), '"*Conubium*" et "*Civitas*"', *RIDA* 1, 401-22.

Dixon, S. (1993), 'The Meaning of Gift and Debt in the Roman Elite', *Echos du Monde Classique* 12, 451-64.

Donnelly, J. (2006), 'Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, 139–170.

Drogula, F. K. (2015), *Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire*. Chapel Hill.

Duplá, A. (2011), '*Consules populares*', in H. Beck et al. (eds.), *Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*. 279-98. Cambridge.

Du Plessis, P. (2004), 'The Protection of the Contractor in Public Works Contracts in the Roman Republic and Early Empire', *The Journal of Legal History* 25, 287-314.

Eckstein, A. M. (1987), *Senate and General: Individual Decision-making and Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C.* Berkeley.

- (2006), *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. Berkeley.
- (2013), 'Hegemony and Annexation Beyond the Adriatic, 230-146 BC', in B. D. Hoyos (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Imperialism*. 79-97. Leiden.

Errington, R. M. (1989), 'Rome against Philip and Antiochus', in A. E. Astin et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History*: *Roman and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 244-89. Cambridge.

Erdkamp, P. (2007), 'War and State Formation in the Roman Republic', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*. 96-113. Oxford.

- (2011) 'Soldiers, Roman Citizens, and Latin Colonists in Mid-Republican Italy', *Anc. Soc.* 41, 109-146.

Erskine A. (1993), 'Hannibal and the Freedom of the Italians', *Hermes* 121, 58-62.

Falconer, W. A. (1979), *Cicero*: *XX, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*. Loeb Classical Library 154. London.

Farrell, J. (2001), *Latin Language and Latin Culture*. Cambridge.

Ferrary, J. -L. (1997), "*Optimates* et *populares*. Le problème du rôle de l'idéologie dans la politique", in H. Bruhns, J. -M. David and W. Nippel (eds.), *Die späte römische Republik. La fin de la République romaine. Un débat franco allemand d'histoire et d'historiographie*. 221-35. Rome.

Forster, E. S. (1966), *Lucius Annaeus Florus: Epitome of Roman History*. Loeb Classical Library 231. London.

Forsythe, G. (2005), *A Critical History of Early Rome*. Berkeley.

Frank, T. (1933), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome: Rome and Italy of the Republic*. Baltimore.

Frederiksen, M. (1984), *Campania*. London.

Fronda, M. P. (2007), 'Hegemony and Rivalry: The Revolt of Capua Revisited', *Phoenix* 61, 83-108.

- (2010), *Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy During the Second Punic War*. Cambridge.
- (2011), '*Privata Hospita, Beneficia Publica*? Consul(ar)s, Local Elites and Roman Rule in Italy', in H. Beck et al. (eds.), *Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*. 232-55. Cambridge.

Gabba, E. (1962), 'Italia e Roma nella "storia" di velleio patercolo', *CS* 1, 1-9.

- (1976), *Republican Rome, The Armies and the Allies*, translated by P. J. Cuff. Oxford.
- (1989), 'Rome and Italy in the Second Century B.C.', in A. E. Astin et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History*: *Roman and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 197-243. Cambridge.
- (1992), 'Rome and Italy: The Social War', in J. A. Crook, A. Lintott and E. Rawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146-43 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 104-28. Cambridge.

Galsterer, H. (1976), *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien*. Munich.

- (2006), 'Rom und Italien vom Bundesgenossenkrieg bis zu Augustus' in M. Jehne and R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*. 293-308. Frankfurt.

Gardner, J. F. (1993), *Being a Roman Citizen*. London.

Gargola, D. J. (2008), 'The Gracchan Reform and Appian's Representation of an Agrarian Crisis', in L. De Ligt and S. Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD 144*. 487-518. Leiden.

Gladhill, B. (2016), *Rethinking Roman Alliance: A Study in Poetics and Society*. Cambridge.

Göhler, J. (1939), *Rom und Italien: die Römische Bundesgenossenpolitik von den Anfängen bis zum Bundesgenossenkrieg*. Breslau.

Goldberg, C. (2015), 'Decimation in the Roman Republic', *CJ* 111, 141–64.

Gotter, U. (2009), 'Cato's *Origines*: The Historian and His Enemies', in A. Feldherr (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians*. 108-22. Cambridge.

Grant, M. (1995), *Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation*. London.

Gruen, E. S. (1966), 'Political Prosecutions in the 90's B.C.', *Hist.* 15, 32-64.

- (1968), *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-79 B.C.* Cambridge.
- (1976), 'The Origins of the Achaean War', *JHS* 96, 46-69.
- (1984a), 'Material Rewards and the Drive for Empire', in W. V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome*. 59-82. Rome.
- (1984b), *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, vol. 1. Berkeley.
- (1990), *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy*. Berkeley.

Hantos, T. (1983), *Das römische Bundesgenossensystem in Italien*. Munich.

Harris, W. V. (1971), *Rome in Etruria and Umbria*. Oxford.

- (1972), 'Was Roman Law Imposed upon the Italian Allies?', *Hist.* 21, 639-45.
- (1979), *War and Imperialism in the Roman Republic 327-70 BC*. Oxford.
- (1984), 'The Italians and the Empire', in W. V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome.* 89-109. Rome.
- (2016), *Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire*. Cambridge.

Harders, A. (2008), *Suavissima Soror: Untersuchungen zu den Bruder-Schwester-Beziehungen in der römischen Republik*. Munich.

Heredia, C. (2012), 'Notas Sobre el Comportamiento Militar en la Guerra Social', *Historiae* 9, 137-152.

Heurgon, J. (1973), *The Rise of Rome to 264 BC*, translated by J. Willis. London.

Hölkeskamp, K. -J. (1987), *Die Entstehung der Nobilität: Studien zur sozialen und politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jhdt. v. Chr*. Stuttgart.

- (2010), *Reconstructing the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research*, translated by H. Heitmann-Gordon. Princeton.

Hopkins, K. (1978), *Conquerors and Slaves: Sociological Studies in Roman History*. Cambridge.

Howarth, R. S. (2006), *The Origins of Roman Citizenship*. New York.

Humbert, M. (1978), *Municipium et Civitas Sine Suffragio: L'organisation de la Conquete Jusqu' a la Guerre Sociale*. Rome.

Hoyos, B. D. (1998), *Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars*. Berlin.

- (2003), *Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC*. London and New York.

Isaac, B. (1990), *The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East*. Oxford.

Isayev, E. (2011), 'Corfinium and Rome: Changing Place in the Social War', in M. Gelba and H. W. Horsnæs (eds.), *Communicating Identity in Italic Iron Age Communities*. 210-22. Oxford.

- (2017), *Migration, Mobility and Place in Ancient Italy*. Cambridge.

Jefferson, E. (2012), 'Problems and Audience of Cato's *Origines*', in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 311-26. Leiden.

Jehne, M. (2006), 'Römer, Latiner und Bundesgenossen im Krieg. Zu Formen und Ausmaß der Integration in der republikanischen Armee', in M. Jehne and R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*. 243-67. Frankfurt.

- (2008), 'Diplomacy in Italy in the Second Century', in C. Eilers (ed.), *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World*. 143-70. Leiden.

Jones, A. H. M. (1974), *The Roman Economy: Studies in Ancient Economic and Administrative History*. Oxford.

Jongman, W. (2003), 'Slavery and the Growth of Rome', in C. Edwards and G. Woolf (eds.), *Rome the Cosmopolis*. 100-22. Cambridge.

Kaimio, J. (1979), *The Romans and the Greek Language*. Helsinki.

Kallet, L. (2001), *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and Its Aftermath*. Berkeley.

Kallet-Marx, R. (1995), *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Berkeley.

Kay, P. (2014), *Rome's Economic Revolution*. Oxford.

Keaveney, A. (2005), *Rome and the Unification of Italy*, 2nd edn. Exeter.

Keller, J. (2007), 'Rome and Her Italian Allies: Conflicting Interests and Disintegration', in R. Roth and J. Keller (eds.), *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. 43-58. Portsmouth.

Kendall, S. (2012), 'Appian, Allied Ambassadors, and the Rejection of 91: Why the Romans Chose to Fight the *Bellum Sociale*', in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 105-21. Leiden.

- (2013), *The Struggle for Roman Citizenship: Romans, Allies, and the Wars of 91-77 BCE*. Piscataway.

Kennedy, P. (1986), 'A. J. P. Taylor and "Profound Forces" in History,' in C. Wrigley (ed.), *Warfare, Diplomacy, and Politics: Essays in Honor of A. J. P. Taylor*. 14-28. London.

Kent, P. (2012), 'Reconsidering the *Socii* in Roman Armies before the Punic Wars', in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 71-83. Leiden.

Keyes, C. W. (1966), *Cicero: De Re Publica, De Legibus*. Loeb Classical Library 213. London.

Kremer, D. (2007), *Ius latinum: le concept de droit latin sous la République et l'Empire*. Paris.

Kunkel, W. (1966), *An Introduction of Roman Legal and Constitutional History*, translated by J. M. Kelly. Oxford.

Langlands, R. (2011), 'Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero *de Officiis*', *JRS* 101, 100–122.

Lapyrionok, R. V. (2013), 'Some Critical Notes on Peter Brunt's Reconstruction of the Conduct of the Roman Census', in A. Mehl, A. Makhlayuk and O. Gabelko (eds.), *Ruthenia Classica Aetatis Novae: A Collection of Works by Russian Scholars in Ancient Greek and Roman History*. 133-43. Stuttgart.

Lavan, M., Payne, R. E. and Weisweiler, J. (2016), 'Cosmopolitian Politics: The Assimilation and Subordination of Elite Cultures', in M. Lavan, R. E. Payne and J. Weisweiler (eds.), *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*. 1-28. New York.

Lawrence, R. (1999), *The Roads of Roman Italy: Mobility and Cultural Change*. London.

Levy, J. S. (1983), 'Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems', *World Politics* 36, 76-99.

Lintott, A. (1965), '*Trinvndinvm*', *CQ* 15, 281-5.

- (1992a), 'Political History, 146-95 B.C.', in J. A. Crook, A. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146-43 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 40-103. Cambridge.
- (1992b), *Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic*. Cambridge.
- (1993), *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration*. Milton Park.

Lolos, Y. (2007), '*Via Egnatia* after Egnatius: Imperial Policy and Inter-regional Contacts', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 22, 273-293.

Lomas, K. (1993), *Rome and the Western Greeks 350 BC-AD 200*. London.

- (1996), *Roman Italy 338 BC – AD 200: A Sourcebook*. London.
- (1997), 'The Idea of a City: Élite Ideology and the Evolution of Urban Form in Italy, 200 BC–AD 100, in H. M. Parkins (ed.), *Roman Urbanism: Beyond the Consumer City*. 21-41. London and New York.
- (2012), 'The Weakest Link: Elite Social Networks in Republican Italy', in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 197-213. Leiden.
- (2018), *The Rise of Rome: From the Iron Age to the Punic Wars*. Cambridge, Mass.

Luraschi, G. (1979), *Foedus, ius Latii, civitas: aspetti costituzionali della romanizzazione in Transpadana*. Padua.

McCall, P. B. (2002), *The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic*. London and New York.

McGing. B. C. (1986), *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus*. Leiden.

Malcovati, H. (1955), *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta: Liberae Rei Publicae*, 2nd edn. Turin.

Mann. M. (1986), *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1. Cambridge.

Mattern, S. P. (1999), *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*. Berkeley.

Matthaei, L. E. (1907), 'On the Classification of Roman Allies', *CQ* 1, 182-204.

Matyszak, P. (2014), *Cataclysm 90BC: The Forgotten War That Almost Destroyed Rome*. Barnsley.

Miles, G. (1995), *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*. Ithaca.

Millar, F. (1998), *The Crowd in the Late Republic*. Ann Arbor.

Momigliano, A. (1975), *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization*. Cambridge.

Mommsen, T. (1894), *The History of Rome*, vol. 3, translated by W. P. Dickson. London.

Morel, J. (2007), 'Early Rome and Italy', in W. Scheidel, I. Morris and R. Saller (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*. 487-510. Cambridge.

Morrell, K. (2015), 'Appian and the Judiciary Law of M. Livius Drusus (Tr. Pl. 91)', in K. Welch (ed.), *Appian's Roman History: Empire and Civil War*. 235-55. Swansea.

Morstein-Marx, R. (2013), '"Cultural Hegemony" and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite', in H. Van Der Blom and C. Steel (eds.), *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in the Roman Republic*. 29-47. Oxford.

Mouritsen, H. (1998), *Italian Unification: A Study of Ancient and Modern Historiography*. London.

- (2001), *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*. Cambridge.
- (2006), 'Hindsight and Historiography', in M. Jehne and R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*. 23-37. Frankfurt.
- (2007), 'The Civitas Sine Suffragio: Ancient Concepts and Modern Ideology', *Hist.* 56, 141-58.
- (2008), 'The Gracchi, the Latins, and the Italian Allies', in L. De Ligt and S. Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD 144*. 471-83. Leiden.
- (2013), 'The Roman Empire I: The Republic', in P. F. Bang and W. Scheidel (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and the Mediterranean*. 383-411. Oxford.

Mousourakis, G. (2007), *A Legal History of Rome.* London.

Mulligan, W. (2010), *The Origins of the First World War*. Cambridge.

Münzer, F. (1999), *Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families*, translated by T. Ridley. Baltimore and London.

Nagle, D. B. (1973), 'An Allied View of the Social War', *AJArch* 77, 367-78.

Nicolet, C. (1978), 'Le *Stipendium* Des Allies Italiens Avant La Guerre Sociale', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 46, 1-11.

- (1980), *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*, translated by P. S. Falla. London.

Niebuhr, B. G. (1832), *Römische Geschichte*, vol. 3. Berlin.

Norris, R. S. and Kristensen, H. M. (2010), 'Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66, 77-83.

Oakley, S. P. (1993), 'Roman Conquest of Italy', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*. 9-37. London.

- (1997-2005), *A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X*, 4 vols. Oxford.

Pallottino, M. (1991), *A History of Earliest Italy*, translated by M. Ryle and K. Soper. London.

Patterson, J. R. (2006), 'The Relationship of the Italian Ruling Classes with Rome: Friendship, Family Relations and Their Consequences', in M. Jehne and R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*. 139-53. Frankfurt.

- (2016), 'Local Elites', in A. Cooley (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Italy*. 483-97. Chichester.

Paton, W. R. (1954), *Polybius: The Histories, Volume VI: Books 28-39*. Loeb Classical Library 161. London.

Peled, A. (1994), 'Force, Ideology and Contract: The History of Ethnic Conscription', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, 61-78.

Perelli, L. (1993), *I Gracchi*. Rome.

Pfeilschifter, R. (2007), 'The Allies in the Republican Army and the Romanization of Italy', in R. Roth and J. Keller (eds.), *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. 27-42. Portsmouth.

Piper, D. J. (1988), 'The *ius adipiscendae ciuitatis Romanae per magistratum* and its Effect on Roman-Latin Relations', *Latomus* 47, 59-68.

Pobjoy, M. (2000a), 'The First Italia', in E. Herring and K. Lomas (eds.), *The Emergence of State Identities in Italy in the First Millennium BC*. 187-211. London.

- (2000b), 'Building Inscriptions in the Roman Italy: Euergetism, Responsibility and Civic Virtue', in A. Cooley (ed.), *The Epigraphic Landscape of Roman Italy*. 77-91. London.

Prag, J. (2012), 'Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica: The First Provinces', in B. D. Hoyos (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Imperialism*. 53-66. Leiden.

Purcell, N. (2003), 'Becoming Historical: The Roman Case', in D. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T. P. Wiseman*. 12-40. Exeter.

Raaflaub, K. A. (2006), 'Between Myth and History', in N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic*. 125-46. Oxford.

Rafferty, D. (2017), 'Cisalpine Gaul as a Consular Province in the Late Republic', *Hist.* 66, 147–172.

Rawlings, L. (1999), ‘Condottieri and Clansmen: Early Italian Raiding, Warfare and the State’, in K. Hopwood (ed.), *Organised Crime in Antiquity*. 97-127. Swansea.

- (2007), ‘Army and Battle during the Conquest of Italy (350–264 BC)’, in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*. 45-62. Oxford.

Rich, J. W. (1983), ‘The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second Century B.C.’, *Hist.* 32, 287-331.

- (1989), ‘Patronage and Interstate Relations in the Roman Republic’ in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*. 117-35. London.
- (1993), ‘Fear, Greed and Glory: The Causes of Roman War-Making in the Middle Republic’, in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*. 38-68. London.
- (2008), ‘Treaties, Allies and the Roman Conquest’, in P. de Souza and J. France (eds.), *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*. 51-75. Cambridge.

Richardson, J. S. (1986), *Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 BC*. Cambridge.

- (1996), *The Romans in Spain*. Oxford.
- (2008), *The Language of Empire: Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD*. Cambridge.

Ridley, R. T. (2003), ‘The Contradictory Revolution: The Italian War (91-89 BC), *Ancient History* 33, 31-57.

Riggsby, A. M. (1999), *Crime and Community in Ciceronian Rome*. Austin.

Rolfe, J. C. (1980), *Sallust*. Loeb Classical Library 116. London.

Roselaar, S. T. (2008), ‘Regional Variation in the Use of *Ager Publicus*’, in L. De Ligt and S. Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD 144*. 573-602. Leiden.

- (2010), *Public Land in the Roman Republic: A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396-89 BC*. Oxford.
- (2012), ‘The Concept of *Commercium* in the Roman Republic’, *Phoenix* 66, 381-413.
- (2013), ‘The Concept of *Conubium* in the Roman Republic’, in P. J. du Plessis (ed.), *New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World*. 102-22. Edinburgh.

Rosenstein, N. (2004), *Rome at War: Farms, Families and Death in the Middle Republic*. London.

- (2007), ‘War and Peace, Fear and Reconciliation at Rome’, in K. A. Raaflaub (ed.), *War and Peace in the Ancient World*. 226-44. Oxford.
- (2012), ‘Integration and Armies in the Middle Republic’, in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 85-103. Leiden.

Rowland, R. J. (1967), ‘Saturn, Saturninus, and the *Socii*’, *CP* 62, 185-189.

Russo, F. (2012), ‘Kinship in Roman-Italian Relationships: Diverse Traditions, Perspectives and Interpretations in Velleius Paterculus and Other Roman and Greek Historical Writers’, *Histos* 6, 228-56.

Sacks, K. S. (1990), *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*. Princeton.

Salmon, E. T. (1962), ‘The Causes of the Social War’, *Phoenix* 16, 107-119.
- (1967), *Samnium and the Samnites*. Cambridge.
- (1969), *Roman Colonization under the Republic*. London.
- (1982), *The Making of Roman Italy*. Ithaca.

Sampson, G. C. (2013), *The Collapse of Rome: Marius, Sulla and the First Civil War (91-70 BC)*. Barnsley.

Santangelo, F. (2018), ‘The Social War’, in G. D. Farney and G. Bradley (eds.), *The Peoples of Ancient Italy*. 231-53. Boston and Berlin.

Scheidel, W. (2005), ‘Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population’, *JRS* 95, 64-79.

Scott-Kilvert, I. (1965), *Plutarch: Makers of Rome*. London.
- (1979), *Polybius: The Rise of the Roman Empire*. London.

Scullard, H. H. (1982), *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 to AD 68*, 5th edn. New York.
- (1989), ‘The Carthaginians in Spain’ in A. E. Astin et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History*: *Roman and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 17-43. Cambridge.

Scopacasa, R. (2014), ‘Building Communities in Ancient Samnium: Cult, Ethnicity and Nested Identities’, *OJA* 33, 69-87.
- (2015), *Ancient Samnium: Settlement, Culture, and Identity between History and Archaeology*. Oxford.
- (2016), ‘Rome’s Encroachment on Italy’, in A. Cooley (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Italy*. 35-56. Chichester.

Serrati, J. (2013) 'Imperialism and the Fall of the Roman Republic: *Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc*?', in B. D. Hoyos (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Imperialism*. 155-68. Leiden.

Shaw, B. D. (2001), *Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents*. Bedford.

Sherwin-White, A. N. (1972), 'The Date of the *Lex Repetundarum* and Its Consequences', *JRS* 62, 83-99.

- (1973), *The Roman Citizenship*, 2nd edn. Oxford.

Shotter, D. (2005), *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, 2nd edn. London and New York.

Simon, H. A. (1956), 'Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment', *Psychological Review* 63, 129-38.

- (1985), 'Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science', *The American Political Science Review* 79, 293-304.

Smith, C. J. (2006), *The Roman Clan: The Gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology*. Cambridge.

Sordi, M. (1960), *I rapporti romano-ceriti e l'origine della "civitas sine suffragio"*. Rome.

Steel, C. (2013), *The End of the Roman Republic 146 to 44 BC: Conquest and Crisis*. Edinburgh.

Stewart, O. (2017), 'Citizenship as a Reward or Punishment? Factoring Language into the Latin Settlement', *Antichthon* 51, 186-201.

Stone, M. (2013), 'The Genesis of Roman Imperialism', in B. D. Hoyos (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Imperialism*. 23-38. Leiden.

Strauss, B. S. (1997), 'The Art of Alliance and the Peloponnesian War', in C. D. Hamilton and P. Krentz (eds.), *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan*. 127-40. Claremont.

Staveley, E. S. (1989), 'Rome and Italy in the Early Third Century', in F. W. Walbank et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.*, 2nd edn. 420-55. Cambridge.

Stek, T. D. (2009), *Cult Places and Cultural Change in Republican Italy: A Contextual Approach to Religious Aspects of Rural Society after the Roman Conquest*. Amsterdam.

Takács, S. A. (2000), 'Politics and Religion in the Bacchanalian Affair of 186 B.C.E.', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 100, 301-310.

Tan, J. (2017), *Power and Public Finances at Rome, 264-49 BCE*. Oxford.

Tataranni, F. (2005), 'Il toro, la lupa e il guerriero: l'immagine marziale dei Sanniti nella monetazione degli insorti italici durante la guerra sociale (90-88 a.C.)', *Athenaeum* 93, 291-304.

Taylor, L. R. (1949) *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*. Berkeley.

- (1962), 'Forerunners of the Gracchi', *JRS* 52, 19-27.
- (1966), *Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*. Ann Arbor.

Taylor, M. J. (2017), 'State Finance in the Middle Roman Republic: A Reevaluation', *AJP* 138, 143-80.

Terrenato, N. (2007), 'The Clans and the Peasants', in P. van Dommelen and N. Terrenato (eds.), *Articulating Local Cultures: Power and Identity under the Expanding Roman Republic*. 13-27. Portsmouth.

- (2013), 'Patterns of Culture Change in Roman Italy', in M. Jehne, B. Linke and J. Rüpke (eds.), *Religiöse Vielfalt und soziale Integration. Die Bedeutung der Religion für die kulturelle Identität und politische Stabilität im republikanischen Italien*. 43-60. Heidelberg.
- (2014), 'Private *Vis*, Public *Virtus*. Family Agendas during Early Roman Expansion', in T. S. Stek and J. Pelgrom (eds.), *Roman Republican Colonization: New Perspectives in Archaeology and Ancient History*. 45-59. Rome.

Tiersch, C. (2009), 'Politische Öffentlichkeit statt Mitbestimmung? Zur Bedeutung der *contiones* in der mittleren und späten römischen Republik', *Klio* 91, 40-68.

Toynbee, A. J. (1965), *Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's Effects on Roman Life*, 2 vols. London.

Treggiari, S. (1991), *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian*. Oxford.

Tritle, L. A. (2006), 'Thucydides and Power Politics', in A. Tsakmakis and A. Rengakos (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. 469-91. Leiden.

Tweedie, F. C. (2008) 'Coinage of the Social War', *Journal of the Numismatic Association of Australia* 19, 67-74.

- (2011), '*Caenum aut caelum*: M. Livius Drusus and the Land', *Mnemos.* 64, 573-90.
- (2012), 'The *Lex Licinia Mucia* and the *Bellum Italicum*', in S. T. Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*. 123-39. Leiden.

Vanderbroeck, P. J. J. (1991), Review of *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten römischen Republik*, by L. A. Burckhardt, *Mnemos.* 44, 497-500.

Vasquez, J. P. (2005), 'Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 849-873.

Verboven, K. (2002), *The Economy of Friends. Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*. Brussels.

Vishnia, R. F. (1996), *State, Society, and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome, 241-167 B.C.* New York.

- (2012), *Roman Elections in the Age of Cicero*. New York.

Walbank, F. W. (1972), *Polybius*. Berkeley.

- (1985), *Select Papers in Greek and Roman History and Historiography*. Cambridge.

Wallace-Hadrill, A. (2008), *Rome's Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge.

Waltz, K. N. (1990), 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', *American Political Science Review* 84, 731-45.

Warner, R. (1972), *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*. London.

White, H. (1972), *Appian's Roman History*, vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library 2. London.

Williams, J. H. C. (2001), *Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy*. Oxford.

Wohlforth, W. C. (1999), 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', *International Security* 24, 5-41.

Woolf, G. (2012), *Rome: An Empire's Story*. Oxford.

Wulff Alonso, F. (1991), *Romanos e Itálicos en la Baja Republica*: *Estudios sobre sus relaciones entre la Segunda Guerra Púnica y la Guerra Social (201-91 a.C.)*. Brussels.

- (2015), 'Italians in Badian's Foreign Clientelae', in M. Jehne and F. Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration*. 73-92. Stuttgart.

Yakobson, A. (2008), 'Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and "Just War"', in C. Eilers (ed.), *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World*. 45-72. Leiden.

- (2010), 'Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic', *Hist.* 59, 282-302.

Zanda, E. (2011), *Fighting Hydra-Like Luxury: Sumptuary Regulation in the Roman Republic*. London.